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I declare that this thesis was composed solely by myself, Kristyn Gorton
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To the memory ofmy great-grandmother,
Margaret Gorton Geckler
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It would have been an absence-word, a hole-word, whose centre would have been
hollowed out into a hole, the kind of hole in which all other words would have been
buried It would have been impossible to utter it, but it would have been made to
reverberate. Enormous, endless, an empty gong, it would have held back anyone who
had wanted to leave, it would have convinced them of the impossible, it would have
made them deaf to any other word save that one, in one fell swoop it would have
defined the future and the moment themselves.
Marguerite Duras,
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This thesis examines scenes of desire in twentieth-century literary and
theoretical discourse. It argues that the scene of desire and the critical readings that
follow not only demonstrate how desire is linked to the question ofwoman but also
how desire evades critical readings that attempt to fix meaning or demand definition
Moving towards a critical practice which does not impose singular and restrictive
interpretations of desire, this thesis approaches scenes of desire as textual moments
that allow for multiple and open-ended critiques. Instead of trying to force meaning
out of desire, this thesis examines how desire functions within literary and critical
texts in order to consider alternative approaches to the question of desire.
Interdisciplinary in scope, this project includes writing from H.D. and Marguerite
Duras, feminist and psychoanalytic theory, and visual art by Carolee Schneeman and
Jenny Holzer. Each chapter begins with an analysis of a scene of desire and then
proceeds to an examination of the ways in which this scene is understood in
psychoanalytic and feminist theory.
The first chapter examines how Freud and Lacan connect lack to the 'truth' of
anatomy and the question of woman. This chapter also analyses the alternatives to
psychoanalytic constructions of desire as theorised by French feminists, Luce
Irigaray and Helene Cixous, and performance artist Carolee Schneeman The second
chapter discusses the analytic scene between H.D and Freud as represented in her
Tribute to Freud The third chapter draws on an article by Jacques Lacan about the
Papin sisters entitled, "Motifs du Crime Paranoique," in order to examine the
intersection Lacan constructs between 'knowledge' and 'woman.' The fourth chapter
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analyses representations of desire and analysis in Marguerite Duras's narratives,
Moderato Cantabile and Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein, and argues that her
resistance to providing a narrative cure illustrates the way she leaves desire open to
interpretation. The final chapter introduces and considers Deleuze and Guattari's
innovative theories on desire in Anti-Oedipus. This chapter also engages with




DESIRE, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
This dissertation focuses on the theorisation of desire in psychoanalysis,
feminism, twentieth-century literature, and in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. This
thesis begins with an examination ofhow desire has been theorised in psychoanalytic
and feminist interpretations and moves towards alternative perspectives of desire in
fictional representations and in Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical texts. In using the
words "moves towards," I am not suggesting that this thesis arrives at a conclusive or
exhaustive definition of desire nor will it construct a 'new' framework to theorise
desire for future use. Underlying this project is a conviction that desire should not be
limited by restrictive and singular theoretical models.
I began this thesis with the intention of producing an alternative way of
thinking about desire, one opposed to the negative and restrictive interpretations of
desire in psychoanalysis. However, as my research progressed, I recognised that in
setting up the psychoanalytic approach as 'negative' and my own as 'positive' I was
running the risk of constructing an argument that only opposed existing
interpretations. In other words, basing an argument in reaction and in response to
psychoanalytic models will always place my critique in a dependent and oppositional
relationship to psychoanalysis. As I discuss in Chapter One, arguments that oppose
psychoanalytic models, such as those found in work by French feminists, Helene
Cixous and Luce Irigaray, produce counter positions which do not actually provide
theorists with tenable alternatives to the question of desire.
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Instead of returning to psychoanalytic interpretations to rewrite what is
'wrong' or to 'cure' phallocentric logic with feminism, I examine the ways in which
psychoanalysis and feminism can be read together, instead of one as dominant to the
other. In other words, I want to resist psychoanalysing feminism and feminising
psychoanalysis. Instead of applying one to the other in a hierarchical model, or
inverting one to 'teach' the other, I want to level the playing field as much as
possible so they can both 'learn' from each other This multivalent approach to
theory can be found in recent feminist work. For example, feminist theorist, Diane
Elam brings seemingly opposing movements together in order to read them side by
side, whether feminism and deconstruction, feminism and feminism, or
postmodernism and romanticism.1 In Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme,
instead of applying a deconstructive reading to feminist theory, Elam successfully
draws deconstruction and feminism together to read for what she terms a "disruptive
linkage."2
Terms such as "disruptive linkage" and what another critic calls
"interimplications"3 help to phrase interdisciplinary or "crossdisciplinary"4 projects,
such as this one, which examine the possibilities that emerge when reading two fields
together Instead of reading one discipline as a master discourse to another, it is
possible to consider the arguments in each at the same time, without privileging one
1 Diane Elam follows this approach in Feminism Beside Itself, ed. by Diane Elam and Robyn
Wiegman (New York: Routledge. 1995); in Romancing the Postmodern (New York: Routledge,
1992); and in Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme (London: Routledge, 1994).
" Elam. Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme. p. 13.
3 Dianne Chisholm. H.D. 's Freudian Poetics: Psychoanalysis in Translation (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press. 1992), p. 2. Chisholm's work will be discussed further in Chapter Two.
4 In Feminism andDeconstruction, Diane Elam uses "crossdisciplinary" instead of "interdisciplinary "
following Derrida's influence. She argues that the "crossing through is a mark of questioning (a cross-
examination). which does not completely obliterate or erase the original term." pp. 11.
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over the other. This 'sideways' look at theory allows a critic to move beyond
reductive arguments that position one idea in relation to its more dominant other.
This approach is particularly useful in theorising desire. Feminists are often
relegated to a position of dutiful daughter in their relationship to a psychoanalytic
'father.' And so, a feminist approach to desire is assessed by how it does and does
not relate to its psychoanalytic predecessor. One way out of these redundant debates,
is to explore the ways in which the two work together and separately over the
question of desire and 'woman.' Instead of tracing the ways in which one follows the
other, it is useful to explore how and when they function together as well as when
they pull apart, for these intersections and divergences gesture towards alternative
ways of thinking about desire.
It is difficult and problematic to discuss desire without mentioning
psychoanalysis. Although some, including myself, would like to avoid Freud or
Lacan in their analysis of desire, doing so overlooks the dominant influence
psychoanalysis continues to have over a theorisation of desire. Psychoanalysis
underlines so many of the critical discussions we, as theorists, engage with on issues
such as the body, identity and particularly on desire. To dismiss psychoanalysis as
'outdated' is to overlook the way it has infiltrated the way we think through desire to
such an extent that it would be impossible to claim that the language we use does not
share a resonant cord with psychoanalysis.
However, in making this claim for psychoanalysis I would also like to specify
that I read psychoanalytic works as theoretical texts, not scripture. I do not subscribe
to psychoanalytic interpretations that use psychoanalysis as a tool to unlock a secret
'meaning' in fiction Like other theories, psychoanalysis is subject to contradiction,
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inconsistencies and faulty logic. I am therefore reading psychoanalysis for the way it
theorises desire, not as a guidebook for what desire is.
Although I do not have the same hesitation in using feminist theory as I do in
using psychoanalytic theory, I recognise that feminism carries with it its own
limitations and restrictions. Each chapter not only address the difficulties a
psychoanalytic perspective poses but also considers the limitations a feminist
interpretation presents to a theorisation of desire.
The approach I take in this thesis can be termed 'deconstructive' as it
examines contradictions and inconsistencies in seemingly consistent arguments.
Although Derrida's work appears in the margins, he does not take centre stage in my
examination of desire His work on psychoanalysis, namely in Resistances to
Psychoanalysis and in The Post Card, does offer readers an alternative way of
approaching Freud and Lacan's theoretical models, however, I have chosen instead to
focus on Deleuze and Guattari's critique in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus.
Deleuze and Guattari's texts concentrate more specifically on desire and the way it is
theorised in psychoanalytic theory. Their approach to desire not only offers readers
an alternative way of thinking through desire but also demonstrates a theoretical style
that is useful in countering the strength and dominance of psychoanalytic
interpretations.
WRITING DESIRE
Desire's abstract and enigmatic nature makes it a difficult concept to
elucidate. Catherine Belsey articulates the difficulties and challenges in writing
about desire in her brilliant analysis entitled Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture
She writes: "Desire: a kind of madness, an enchantment, exaltation, anguish. . .
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perhaps the foundation of a lifetime of happiness. Writing about desire: compulsive,
a challenge, self-indulgence, anxiety. . . above all, a project that defies completion."5
Belsey voices the contradictory emotions that run through a critical approach to
desire. It is at once inspiring and exciting and, at another, infuriatingly complicated
and formidable.
Belsey also alludes to the elusive quality of projects on desire. Similar to
Belsey's, my project "defies completion" which, means that I am not attempting to
solve or remedy the problem of desire, nor am I capable of offering a solution to the
question of desire. Instead, this project embraces a degree of indeterminacy that
desire engenders. As mentioned, this project traces the intersections and divergences
within a feminist and psychoanalytic theorisation of desire in an attempt to consider
alternative possibilities, not in order to conclusively 'solve' desire. Although my
work shares some similarities to Belsey's approach to desire, her project focuses
more on the metaphysics of desire and how desire shapes identity, I am interested in
how desire is theorised and the way in which it resists theorisation.
Throughout this thesis I refer to the word "desire." In order to clarify my use
of this word, I suggest that desire, used as a noun or a verb, refers to a deep and
intense emotion for something whether a person, place or object. The 'longing' or
'yearning' that is often used to define desire does not need to insinuate a negative
component It is possible to have a desire for something or someone that the 'desirer'
already possesses. Instead of framing desire in terms of acquistion (new car, new
house, et al), desire can be understood in terms of how it stimulates change, creates
connections and inspires movement.
5 Catherine Belsey. Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Press. 1994), p. 3.
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I have deliberately left this explantion vague because I feel that desire is best
left loosely defined. The more we, as theorists, attempt to pin down meanings and
map out frameworks to analyse desire, the more it will elude our grasp Instead of
trying to fix the limits of desire it is useful to examine how desire functions within
textual and critical boundaries in order to consider alternative ways of understanding
and approaching desire. It may also be useful to accept a certain degree of non-
understanding in a theorisation of desire. As part of its structure, desire is
indefinable. It does not 'make sense' all the time nor does it fit neatly into any one
theoretical framework. That is one reason why I will approach the question of desire
within an interdisciplinary or "crossdisciplinary" dissertation.
SCENES OF DESIRE
By 'scenes of desire' I mean a textual location where an author or critic
attempts to define or interpret desire. I use the word 'scene' for several reasons. The
first refers to the descriptive quality in an author or a critic's attempt to construct an
event of desire S/he paints a 'scene' of desire in language or constructs one within a
theoretical framework For example, Marguerite Duras's Moderato Cantabile begins
with a description of a crime passionel, a man shoots his wife in a cafe. This image
or "scene of desire" is repeated throughout the text and is an essential part of the
character and plot development It functions both as a way of narrating desire in the
text and of keeping a reader from fully understanding what desire means.
Despite an author or critic's attempt to pin down desire in language, it often
remains a mystery. For this reason, I suggest that 'scene' reflects a performative
quality in desire. Desire can be thought of in terms of movement - it moves within
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literary and theoretical texts. Any attempt made by a critic or reader to formulate an
answer or construct a framework to contain the question of desire usually results in
failure.
Finally, the word 'scene' refers to an analytic scene and a psychoanalytic
approach to desire Because psychoanalytic interpretations are so influential in a
theorisation of desire, it is important to understand the function of desire in analysis.
In Chapter Two, I examine the relationship between an analyst, Freud and his
analysand, H.D in order to discuss how desire functions in an analytic scene and in
the rewriting of this scene.
My use of the word "critical" refers to ways in which these scenes of desire
are handled theoretically, whether from a psychoanalytic or feminist position. In each
chapter, I address the critical interpretations, both from a psychoanalytic and a
feminist perspective, in order to demonstrate the similarities and differences in the
two approaches.
Before outlining the individual chapters, I would like to briefly mention the
"and" that joins the two ideas or writers in each heading. "And" has a notable history
in projects on psychoanalysis, feminism and literature;6 titles such as Shoshana
Felman's Psychoanalysis and Literature, Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and
Feminism, and Jane Gallop's The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and
Psychoanalysis, all reflect the way the two fields are interconnected and yet set at
odds with each other. The "and" in my chapter headings reflects the thinking that
6 See also. Shoshana Felman's explanation of "and" in "To Open the Question." in Psychoanalysis
and Literature The Question ofReading: Otherwise, ed. by Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press. 1977), pp.5-10: Juliet Mitchell. Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical
Reassessment ofFreudian Psychoanalysis (London: Penguin. 2000; originally published 1974); Jane
Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis (Ithaca. NY; Cornell University
Press. 1982). pp. xi-xv; Diane Elam. Feminism andDeconstruction : Ms. enAbvme, pp. 13-15.
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comes before my own and also gestures towards the possibility of reading the two
ideas listed in each chapter title in light of what we, as theorists, can learn from
reading them together.
The first part of Chapter One examines how Freud and Lacan connect lack to
the 'truth' of anatomy and the question of woman. The second part analyses the
alternatives to psychoanalytic interpretations of desire as theorised by French
feminists, Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous in order to assess the ways in which
'desire' and 'woman' remain caught in a static logic. In the final part, I consider
work by performance artist Carolee Schneeman and feminist theorist Diane Elam as
a way of discussing alternative perspectives to theorising desire.
In Chapter One, I also examine the 'lack' that is assigned to 'woman' in
psychoanalytic interpretations and the 'lack' that is cited within feminist critiques. In
doing so, I am not trying to dismantle phallocentric logic in order to rebuild another
restrictive logic in its place, rather I am examining the ways in which 'lack'
circulates in psychoanalytic and feminist critiques in order to rethink the way we, as
feminists, can approach 'lack.'
Psychoanalysis grounds its understanding of desire within the interaction
between analyst and analysand, for this reason, as well as others, it is important to
understand the processes and dynamics in the analytic scene. Chapter Two examines
the analytic scene between H.D. and Freud as represented in her Tribute to Freud
H.D.'s Tribute offers her readers a unique opportunity to gain an understanding of
how desire arises within analysis. Her Tribute also offers us, as theorists, a way of
examining the issues between feminism and psychoanalysis. In the second part of
this chapter, I explore feminist criticisms of Tribute to Freud in order to demonstrate
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the way critics behave as analysts in their quest to discover answers to female agency
and desire within H.D.'s text. I argue that Tribute not only demonstrates the
indeterminacy in writing about desire but also gestures towards ways that we, as
theorists, try to solve its ambiguity.
Moving from Freud to Lacan, the third chapter focuses on Lacan's
contribution to a theorisation of desire by reading some of his earlier works. Chapter
Three begins with an article written by Jacques Lacan about the Papin sisters
entitled, "Motifs du Crime Paranoique," as it illustrates the intersection Lacan draws
between 'knowledge' and 'woman.' Lacan's article on the Papin sisters also
demonstrates the way he builds 'truth' by assembling the signifiers of sexuality into a
conclusive diagnosis. His neatly assembled 'answer' to the enigma of female desire
is then used as 'truth' by the subsequent critiques of his article. I will argue in the
second part of this chapter that critiques of Lacan's article perform voyeuristic
readings of the Papin crime, which privilege the subtle suggestions of lesbian desire
over the reality ofmurder. In order to further discuss the intersection between sexual
desire and aggression, I will also address work by artist Jenny Holzer.
The fourth chapter analyses representations of desire and analysis in
Marguerite Duras's narratives, Moderato Cantabi/e and Le Ravissement de Lot V.
Stein. Duras's work offers an alternative way of thinking through important issues in
theorising desire and illustrates problems with existing models. She constructs
representations of women as lacking and yet she does not constitute this lack with
masculine desire, instead she leaves the 'lack' in place, both in her characters and
within the text itself. This is troubling to some of her critics, namely Julia Kristeva,
who argues that Duras's lack of any 'narrative cure' signals her failure as a writer. I
18
argue that this lack of a textual solution forces Duras's readers and critics to question
the desire in the text and how it functions within the lives of her characters I argue
that her resistance to provide a narrative 'cure' illustrates the way she leaves desire
open to interpretation.
The final chapter will focus on the possibilities for theorising desire that arise
in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. Like Irigaray and
Cixous, Deleuze and Guattari return to the fundamental 'truths' of psychoanalysis in
order to refigure interpretations of desire. However, instead of trying to rewrite or
correct psychoanalytic interpretations, Deleuze and Guattari question how these
'truths' function. For example, they ask whether the psychoanalytic 'cure' really
cures. In doing so, they not only suggest alternative ways to approach psychoanalytic
interpretations but they offer a model of thinking that does not simply oppose
psychoanalysis. Their thinking encourages theorists to look at how a text functions
rather than what it means. This is an important distinction in terms of desire. Instead
of trying to close down on a meaning for desire in texts, we, as theorists, can look at
how desire functions.
This chapter will also consider how Deleuze and Guattari's theory on the
'becoming-woman' has inhibited feminist theorists from recognising the potential in
their theoretical approach to desire. Although Deleuze and Guattari offer alternative
models to psychoanalytic interpretations of desire, they have been largely criticised
by feminist critics who see them as a threat to fundamental concerns in feminist
theory. I trace these arguments in order to suggest that although Deleuze and Guattari
present problems to feminist theory, they also gesture towards innovative ways of
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thinking about desire that deserve consideration. Although Deleuze and Guattari's
work appears at the end of this thesis their influence can be noted throughout.
Each chapter considers a theorisation of desire in relation to psychoanalytic
and feminist theory. Although 1 have tried to incorporate as many perspectives as
possible in my examination of desire, this thesis does not presume to have covered
every angle. Part of the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the present
frameworks used in a theorisation of desire do not adequately explain how desire
functions in theory or in fiction. In assessing these inconsistencies I am not
attempting to erect a new structure in their place. Instead, I am suggesting that the
only way forward or even 'sideways' is to maintain a continual engagement with
alternative interpretations and the questions that arise from them.
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1 Lack and Feminism
"Desire" is often accompanied by "lack" in critical discussions on desire,
whether from a psychoanalytic or feminist perspective. I have included 'feminism' in
the second part of the title because 'lack' is often taken from psychoanalytic
interpretations and used in the context of feminist alternatives to psychoanalytic
critiques on desire. At times this critical 'lifting' causes confusion about the term and
its use within interpretations of desire. As a way of moving beyond reductive
arguments between feminism and psychoanalysis over the term 'lack,' this chapter
examines various interpretations as well as alternative ways of approaching 'lack' in
discussions on desire.
This chapter is divided into three sections: the first part will examine how
Freud and Lacan connect lack to the 'truth' of anatomy and to the question of
woman. The second section will analyse the response to psychoanalytic
interpretations of desire as theorised by French feminists, Luce Irigaray and Helene
Cixous, in order to assess the ways in which 'desire' and 'woman' remain caught in a
static logic. The final part will consider work by performance artist Carolee
Schneeman and feminist theorist Diane Elam as a way of discussing alternative
perspectives to theorising desire.
DESIRE IN THEORY
Critical approaches to desire, whether they are deeply rooted in
psychoanalytic structures or attempt to posit an alternative construction, often begin
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by tracing the 'history' of desire. Even here, 1 am constructing a 'history' of what
comes before this study, in order to locate for my reader where it fits within the
present work on desire. Critical exploration of the theory or theories of desire that
aim to rewrite, rethink, refigure or revise often find themselves in the position of
having to remember the theories that precede their own. Often more time is spent in
confronting the influence of figures such as Lacan, Freud, Hegel and Deleuze than
the actual work of constructing an alternative approach. The strength and dominance
of a psychoanalytic perspective within theories on desire is unavoidable. Whether or
not one agrees with the fundamental concepts within psychoanalysis is secondary to
whether or not one confronts them when looking for alternatives. In their introduction
to Feminism and Sexuality, Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott tell their readers:
"Psychoanalysis retains a strong foothold within feminist theorising on sexuality. It is
still often treated as if it were the only perspective which can explain our individual
sexual desires. Its influence may be due, in part, to the lack of viable alternatives."7
Jackson and Scott acknowledge the difficulties that feminist critics have in
constructing interpretations of female sexuality that lie outside the confines of
psychoanalysis. They also allude to the 'viability' of these alternatives, suggesting
that critiques that do not refer to psychoanalytic structures are often considered to be
without enough critical merit to survive on their own.
However, part of the reason why psychoanalysis maintains a strong foothold
is due to the feminist use of psychoanalysis. Whether or not they agree with the
fundamental concepts that psychoanalysis theorises, feminist theorists often use
psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian psychoanalysis, as a critical reference point to
Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott, eds. Feminism and Sexuality: A Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press. 19%). p. 10.
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substantiate or articulate critiques on subjectivity, representation and sexuality and in
so doing validate its dominance.8 The works of feminist theorists Julia Kristeva and
Catherine Clement, for instance, demonstrates a strong allegiance to Lacan's
theoretical analyses.9
The influence of psychoanalysis may also seem a necessary one for those
attempting to construct "viable alternatives." The process of remembering the
theories that precede one's own reinscribe and locate the discussion within a
dominant logic. Perhaps there are few alternatives because these refigurings are so
entrenched in the act of re-membering and revising.
Elizabeth Grosz's essay entitled "Refiguring Lesbian Desire" provides a good
example of the problems and possibilities that arise in feminist revisions of female
desire. Her short and yet powerful reading sets up two of the most important issues in
a feminist approach to desire. First, I would like to draw attention to the
methodology Grosz uses Grosz's refiguring begins with a persuasive 'history' of
how desire has been understood from Plato to Deleuze 10 I am placing 'history' in
brackets to signpost that 1 do not believe that there is any one history of desire, nor
do I think Grosz believes this Instead, I would argue that there are multiple histories
of desire based upon differing agendas, be they feminist, psychoanalytic, economic
or philosophical. In order to talk about desire Grosz first discusses the way desire has
been theorised until now. In her essay, she traces the epistemology of desire from
8 See also. Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abvme. Elam writes: "Rather than follow in Freud's
patriarchal footsteps, a number of feminists have found Lacan's rereading of Freud a valuable
contribution towards an understanding of gender-roles as masks rather than norms." pp 45-46;
Elizabeth Grosz. Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London: Routledge. 1990).
9 See also Catherine Clement. The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan. trans. Arthur Goldhammer
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1983); Julia Kristeva. Desire in Language: A Semiotic
Approach to Literature andArt, ed Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press. 1980).1 '
Elizabeth Grosz. "Refiguring Lesbian Desire." in The Lesbian Postmodern, ed by Laura Doan
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1994), pp 67-84 (pp. 74-76).
23
Plato, Hegel, Freud and Lacan, and then later through the work of Spinoza and
Deleuze and Guattari This methodology exposes one way in which feminist theorists
become indebted to the discourses that precede their inquiry. In order to discuss
woman's desire, a feminist theorist must first approach how woman's desire has been
appropriated by other more dominant discourses.
Examining master discourses in an effort to rethink alternatives inevitably
inscribes a theorist within the framework s/he is attempting to revise. In her
influential essay entitled, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence
Intellectuals," Carol Cohn theorises her experience on the 'inside' of the debate
surrounding nuclear weapons and arms control." Her encounter allows her to reflect
on the way dominant discourses affect the way we, as feminists, think and speak.
Despite her efforts to remain an interested observer, Cohn finds herself becoming
entrenched in the language of the 'defence intellectuals.' Cohn describes her entrance
into what she terms, "technostrategic"12 thinking: "Part of the appeal was the thrill of
being able to manipulate an arcane language, the power of entering the secret
kingdom, being someone in the know.'"3 Cohn's honest revelation is perhaps closer
to home than most feminist theorists would care to admit. The desire to enter into the
secret realm of another discourse is potent and seductive, to know and to understand a
dominant discourse can lure even the most resolute patriot into enemy territory.
Determined to reclaim their own interpretations, many feminists enter into the study
of psychoanalysis without recognising the way in which it changes and modifies their
original inquiries and beliefs.
11 Carol Cohn. "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals." Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society. 12. 4 (1997). pp. 687-718.
12 Cohn. "Sex and Death." p. 690. footnote 6.
13 Cohn. "Sex and Death." p. 704.
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Cohn acknowledges that the price that comes with admission into this "secret
kingdom" is a transformation of your own language and ideas.14 Although this new
language gives Cohn access to ideas she was unaware of before, it also begins to alter
others. Cohn argues that part of the reason for this change is that the terminology
defence intellectuals use removes them from the reality of the subject matter they
discuss. "There is no reality of which they speak. Or rather, the 'reality' of which
they speak is itself a world of abstractions.'"5 This "world of abstractions" can surely
be extended to include psychoanalytic discourse. Anxious to protect and defend itself
from exposure, psychoanalysis fortifies its walls against intrusive observers. There
are so many terms to learn and concepts to understand that it often seems as though
one must be an analyst in order to fully understand psychoanalysis.
In The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan's influential text on the women's
movement, she asks: "How can an educated American woman, who is not herself an
analyst, presume to question a Freudian truth? [. . .] How can she presume to tread the
sacred ground where only analysts are allowed?'"6 Friedan's question responds to the
fear and anxiety in treading on the holy land of psychoanalysis. She touches on the
insecurity of not being 'allowed' to enter into the sacred spaces of a discourse one has
only a certain amount of understanding, a concern that reflects the issues Cohn's
essay identifies. Freidan's question also raises the issue of privilege and capability.
Can a literary critic 'use' psychoanalysis without having undergone both analysis and
training as an analyst? It is understandable that analysts find their literary colleagues
14 Cohn. "Sex and Death." p. 705.
15 Cohn. "Sex and Death." p. 709.
16 Bettv Friedan. The Feminine Mystique (London: Penguin Books. 1992; first published. 1963), pp.
91-92.'
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engagement with psychoanalysis to be, at times, either inaccurate or confused.17 And
yet, the encounter between literature and psychoanalysis continues to demonstrate
that the relationship between the two fields is a particularly productive one.18
In the conclusion to her essay Cohn identifies two strategies that feminists
must adopt in order to counter the influence of master discourses. She frames these
two projects as "deconstructive" and "reconstructive."19 The first step is to dismantle
the dominance of the discourse, and the second, to pursue alternative possibilities; a
strategy that echoes Michel Foucault's work. For example, in The Archaeology of
Knowledge, Foucault suggests that instead of entering into a dominant discourse in
order to study its internal mechanisms, essentially in order to dismantle its operations,
he argues that it is better to study a discourse in order to discover the problems that
arise in the unities it presents.20 He also argues that we, as theorists, must adopt a
strategy in which we interrogate the links that are made and assumed, instead of
building upon seemingly stable foundations.
The problem of renegotiation takes us to the second issue that Grosz's essay
raises. Her analysis of desire focuses specifically on whether "we can think beyond
the logic of lack and acquisition, a logic that has rendered women the repositories,
the passive receptacles ofmen's needs, anxieties, and desires?"21 Here Grosz points
1 See also Jacques-Alain Miller. "The Analytic Experience: Means. Ends, and Results," in Lacan and
the Subject ofLanguage, ed by Ellie Ragland-Sullivan and Mark Bracher (New York: Routledge.
1991). The relationship between psychoanalysis and literature is developed further in the beginning of
Chapter Two.
18 See also Shoshana Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," in Literature and Psychoanalysis
The Question ofReading: Otherwise. ed by Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press. 1977). pp. 94-207: Jane Gallop. The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and
Psvchoanalvsis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1982).
19 Cohn. "Sex and Death," pp. 717-718.
20 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnowledge, trans. A.M Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge.
1997: translation first published 1972). p. 26.
21 Grosz. "Refiguring Lesbian Desire," pp 69-70.
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out that the job left for feminists is to figure psychoanalytic lack beyond a negative
logic as well as beyond one that puts women's desires exclusively in relation to
men's desires One of the links that Grosz assumes however is between a
psychoanalytic use of the term lack and the feminist use of the term. Her assertion
that we, as feminists, need to think beyond the logic of lack and the way it renders
women as men's receptacles omits the step taken between the location of lack in the
female subject by psychoanalysis and how that lack functions within feminist
projects. As a result, moving beyond the psychoanalytic inscription of lack is equated
with the feminist project of liberation without a clear explanation of how the two
come together. To put this in another way, Grosz's statement is of a kind that most
feminists, myself included, would accept whether or not the link forged was entirely
justified. There is a way in which feminist writers on desire and women's sexuality
conflate terms that have a certain relevance to each other without fully developing
how the relationship functions. Perhaps part of the reason is that fully explaining the
terms can take away from the punch that a statement such as Grosz's delivers.
Taking the strategies suggested in these revisions into consideration, this
chapter will examine the lack that is assigned to woman in psychoanalytic
interpretations and the lack that is subsequently cited in feminist critiques. It will also
argue that the renegotiation of lack is part of a wider feminist project that aims to re-
address the phallocentric model of desire as theorised in psychoanalysis in order to
understand female sexuality. This wider project never stands a chance of
understanding female sexuality because it will always be understanding desire
through the very logic that it opposes. In order to move forward from interpretations
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of desire that posit woman as the receptacle of lack, it is necessary to cite these
interpretations: to lay them out before taking them apart.
In doing so, however, I would like to distinguish this project ffom others that
attempt to dismantle phallocentric logic in order to build a new logic in its place, in
other words, I am wary of the 'reconstructive' end of Cohn's strategy.
Reconstructive theory often reinscribes ideas such as 'desire' and 'woman' into an
equally restrictive and singular logic, whether feminist or psychoanalytic. The
underlying impulse in this methodology is to 'cure' or 'solve' the pathological logic
(phallocentric) with a new improved one (feminist). For example, Juliet Mitchell's
feminist reassessment of psychoanalysis in Psychoanalysis and Feminism
reconsiders the feminist engagement with psychoanalysis but does so in a way that
perpetuates feminism's dependency on psychoanalysis to think through its own
issues. In the 1999 introduction to her work, Mitchell praises Mari Jo Buhle's recent
work on psychoanalysis and feminism22 because it demands that the "phallocentric
model be remedied to understand female sexuality."23 The term 'remedies' suggests
that Buhle 'cures' the ailing phallocentric model of its symptoms by giving it a dose
of good old feminism. In this example, feminism becomes the healing analyst of the
poor, ailing psychoanalysis: she listens, advises, but ultimately she tells
psychoanalysis 'this is what this means, this is how you must interpret this' and 'you
are sick, I am your cure.' This textual 'curing' of psychoanalysis in feminist projects
will be examined in this chapter as well as throughout this thesis.
~2 Mari Jo Buhle. Feminism and Its Discontents: A Century ofStruggle with Psychoanalysis
(Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1998). Buhle's work provides her readers with an
exhaustive and well researched analysis of the relationship between psychoanalysis and feminism.
23 Juliet Mitchell. "Introductioa 1999." in Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A Radical Reassessment of
Freudian Psychoanalysis (London: Penguin Books. 2000: first published 1974). p. xxxii.
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Mitchell's comment also suggests that psychoanalysis can be fixed in order to
understand female sexuality, which means that she believes that by taking a second
look at psychoanalysis we, as feminists, can reinterpret what is there in order to
understand ourselves. This 'second look' shares some similarities to Luce Irigaray's
and Helene Cixous's work, both of which will be discussed later in this chapter. I
will argue that this 'second look' is problematic in that it necessitates using
psychoanalytic terms to understand or rather to re-understand female desire.
In order to examine the feminist reaction to psychoanalytic interpretations of
'lack' and 'woman,' it is necessary to analyse how these ideas circulate within
psychoanalytic theory. To do so, I will address Freud's and Lacan's work, paying
more attention to the latter as Lacan's work continues to have a stronger influence in
feminist revisions of desire.
FREUD AND OEDIPUS
Freud's use ofOedipus continues to generate discussion and debate, whether
in recent press or in new collections of feminist theory.24 For example, in a recent
collection entitled Deleuze and Feminist Theory, Claire Colebrook suggests that one
way forward for feminist theory is to rethink Oedipus.25 Why Oedipus7 Perhaps one
reason is because Freud's reading of Sophocles's myth continues to maintain a
dominant influence in western culture and theory. Arising from a combination of
24 For example, see also Paul Webster. "Blame the Parents not Oedipus, says Freud Critic," The
Obser\'er. 21 May 2000. World, p. 28.
25 Claire Colebrook and lan Buchanan, eds. Deleuze and Feminist Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press. 2000). p. 13.
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self-analysis and his case studies on infantile neuroses,26 the Oedipus complex
emerges as a unifying theory in Freudian psychoanalysis. In a letter to Wilhelm
Fliess, Freud writes: "the Greek myth seizes on a compulsion which everyone
recognises because he has felt traces of it in himself. Every member of the audience
was once a budding Oedipus in phantasy, and this dream-fulfilment played out in
reality causes everyone to recoil in horror, with the full measure of repression which
separates his infantile from his present state."27 Freud's letter reveals the way he
connects his own personal experience with a universal experience. His reading of
Oedipus the King draws together his theories on dream interpretation, wish
fulfilment, repression and subjectivity into a master discourse on human sexuality.
In Sophocles's Oedipus the King, Oedipus is the "solver of riddles" who
unwinds the tangled string of his own fate.28 Oedipus's insistence on interpretation,
on a cure or solution to the woes of his kingdom brings about his downfall. For in
doing so, he not only reveals answers, but uncovers truths about his identity and
sexuality: that he has killed his father, Lauis and married his mother, Jocasta.
Sophocles's text introduces the potentially destructive relationship between mother,
father and son as well as the dangers of answering the unanswerable. As the
concluding lines read: "It is dangerous to answer riddles, but some men are born to
answer them It is the gods' doing. They hide themselves in riddles. We must not try
to understand too much."29 Through his theorisation of the Oedipal complex, Freud
26
Sigmund Freud. "Letter to Fliess, No. 71, 15 October 1897" in The Origins ofPsychoanalysis:
Letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts andNotes: 1887-1902. trans. Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey. ed.
by Marie Bonaparte. Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris (London: Imago Publishing Company Ltd, 1954),
pp. 221-225; Freud and Breur. Studies in Hysteria, trans. AA Brill (Boston: Beacon Press. 1950).
" Freud. "Letter to Fhess No. 71, 15 October 1897The Origins ofPsychoanalysis, pp. 223-224.
"8
Sophocles. Oedipus the King, trans. Anthony Burgess (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota
Press. 1998; originally published 1972). p. 9.
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becomes the 'solver of riddles' in terms of human sexuality and yet the way he
solves these riddles become riddles in themselves.
For Freud, Oedipus the King dramatises the primal scene of desire and as
such, the Oedipus complex becomes the underlying foundation of psychoanalytic
interpretation.30 He argues: "Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of
mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to do so falls a victim to
neurosis."31 'Mastering' the Oedipus complex amounts to repressing desires for the
mother and transferring them into an identification with the father, repressing these
desires results in internalising them. In simpler terms, the Oedipus complex regulates
the family constellation of mother, father and child, thus keeping the dynamics of
sexuality and identification within the confines of the family.
The fact that Freud locates the origins of sexuality and subjectivity in the
interplay between mother, father and child is one of the reasons that feminism finds
such difficulties with the Oedipus complex. To establish lines of identification
running to the father and those of desire to the mother, as Freud does in his
theorisation of the Oedipal triangle, suggests that the father determines subjectivity
and the mother, sexuality. In locating the dynamics within the confines of the family,
Freud places emphasis on the distinct roles each family member must perform: the
father maintains authority, the mother nurtures and the child learns from each.
In his essay entitled "The Dissolution of the Oedipal complex," Freud
attempts to reassert the primacy of the Oedipal complex and its dissolution, otherwise
30 Freud writes: "With the progress of psychoanalytic studies the importance of the Oedipus complex
has become more and more clearly evident: its recognition has become the shibboleth that
distinguishes the adherents of psychoanalysis from its opponents." On Sexuality: Three Essays on the
Theory ofSexuality andOther Works, trans. James Strachey. ed Angela Richards (London: Penguin
Books. 1991; first published in Penguin. 1977). pp. 149-50. footnote 1.
31 Freud. On Sexuality, p. 149. flnte 1.
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known as the "castration complex," in the wake of increasing interest in Otto Rank's
The Trauma ofBirth32 In the essay, Freud outlines the "painful disappointments"33
that children must go through in order to 'master' the Oedipus complex and
successfully move through the castration complex. He argues that: "The little girl
likes to regard herself as what her father loves above all else; but the time comes
when she has to endure a harsh punishment from him and she is cast out of her fool's
paradise. The boy regards his mother as his own property, but he finds one day that
she has transferred her love and solicitude to a new arrival."34 It is important to note
here that the "mastering" required by each child is of a different nature The little girl
must recognise that she is not the apple of her father's eye, in other words, that she is
not his object of desire. On the other hand, the boy needs to realise that he does not
possess his mother, that she cannot be his object of desire. In this construction, the
little girl learns she cannot be the object of desire and the boy learns he cannot have
his object of desire. Already there is a difference in acquisition: the boy is
disappointed by what he cannot ha\'e whereas the girl is disappointed by what she
cannot be.
Freud argues that the "phallic phase" is happening at the same time as the
Oedipal complex, the organ that moves the child from the Oedipal complex into his
fear of castration is the penis. Freud suggests that initially the boy's fixation on his
penis leads him to masturbate. Because his parents, particularly his mother, are not
approving of this act they tell him that if he continues to masturbate he will lose his
penis. However, he does not recognise his fear of castration until he sees a little girl's
3~ Peter Gay. in The FreudReader, ed by Peter Gay (London: Vintage. 1995). p. 661.
33 Freud The FreudReader, p. 661.
34 Freud The FreudReader, p. 661.
32
vagina It is at this point, as Freud argues, that the little boy realises that the threats of
castration are possible. The boy sees in the girl someone similar and yet differentiated
by the lack of a penis.
Freud's theorisation of boys leads him to ask how girls develop out of the
Oedipal complex. He argues that the little girl masturbates her clitoris which
"behaves just like a penis to begin with."35 She is content until she discovers the little
boy's penis and recognises that she has '"come off badly.'"36 According to Freud, the
little girl's recognition of her lack makes her feel inferior. In order to make up for this
'lack' she imagines that she will eventually grow a penis like a boy's. After a while
she realises that this will not happen and transfers her desires for a penis into the
desire to have her father's child. Eventually she gives up on this desire too and
dissolves the Oedipus complex. Although Freud acknowledges that his theory on
female castration is imprecise and inadequate3' it is nevertheless elaborated on by
Jacques Lacan, as will be discussed later
Freud's theorisation of the Oedipal complex and its dissolution known as the
castration complex is fundamental to the way psychoanalysis locates sexual
difference in the operation of the genitals. Woman becomes lack because the little
boy does not see anything where the penis should be. This 'missing' penis
characterises her as negative, empty, and void. For Freud, this difference is a result of
biology or anatomy and it is a 'truth' that factors within his theorisation of the
Oedipal and castration complexes.
In her feminist polemic, The Female Eutmch, Germaine Greer approaches the
35 Freud. The FreudReader, p. 665.
36 Freud. The FreudReader, p. 665.
3 Freud. The FreudReader, p. 665.
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'truths' that Freud claims for the castration complex with characteristic flair, stating:
"This must be nonsense."38 Although Freud's ideas may seem ridiculous or may in
fact be "nonsense," as Greer suggests, they still maintain a hold over literary and
cultural readings of subjectivity, sexuality and, important to this thesis, desire. In
citing Greer's reaction, I am also suggesting that there has been little progress in
feminist criticism since the 70's that has managed to substantiate this claim for
"nonsense." Criticism has not enabled us, as feminists, to think around the way Freud
positions woman in his theorisation of sexuality. Subsequent theories, such as
Irigaray's or Cixous's, do not suggest that Freud's work is "nonsense;" rather they
suggest he is wrong when it comes to women, or, as Irigaray argues, that he has a
"blind spot"39 when it comes to recognising what woman has. To return to Jackson's
and Scott's claim that there are no "viable alternatives" it appears that this is largely
because critics find it difficult to validate a claim for "nonsense" or to move beyond a
cultural belief that at the centre ofFreud's theories there is some validity.
The way in which Freud has been enculturated in western society and Lacan
in critical theory makes it difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate terms like 'desire'
and 'woman' without acknowledging the ways in which these theories work and have
been adopted by other theorists. Before considering this point further, I will discuss
the ways in which Jacques Lacan privileges the castration complex in his revision of
Freudian psychoanalysis in order to give primacy to the phallus as well as to the
location of lack in female sexuality.
38 Germaine Greer. The Female Eunuch (London: Flamingo, 1999: first published. 1970). p. 105.
39 Luce Irigaray. Speculum of the Other Woman, trans Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University,
1985); Irigaray's chapter on Freud's work is entitled "The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry."
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LACAN AND HAMLET
In his critical study of Lacan, Malcolm Bowie suggests that Lacan's work on
Freud could be framed in the following ways: "either as an attempt to be
uncommonly faithful to the letter of the original texts, or as a simple catch-phrase
designed to disguise an entirely different purpose - that of building a new
psychoanalysis to rival Freud's own."40 It is likely that Lacan falls somewhere
between these two positions: between being faithful to Freud and forging his own
psychoanalysis complete with his own disciples. One of the most important ways in
which Lacan differentiates his work from Freud's is through his attention to the
signifying chains in language. Building on Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic
theories, Lacan states that the "unconscious is structured like a language"41 and in so
doing, he differentiates his project from Freud's by locating the fundamental
processes of psychoanalysis in language. As Bowie writes: "what Lacan is in fact
doing is mapping out for himself, by an inventive re-use of Saussurean diction, a
distinctive conceptual landscape in which these divergent accounts of language can
be dialectically counterposed."42 Lacan's attention to language marks his 'new'
approach to psychoanalysis and yet many of the conclusions Freud reaches,
particularly regarding woman, remain as 'truth' in Lacan's revision.
Lacan engages with Freud's Oedipus complex in a way that makes it difficult
to understand exactly how he understands Oedipus and how he uses it to privilege his
own theorisation of the castration complex. Shoshana Felman notes this ambiguity in
40 Malcolm Bowie. Lacan (London: Fontana Press. 1991), p. 158. Bowie is referring here to Lacan's
w ork up to the early 60 s.
41
Jacques Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed.
Jacques-Alain Miller (London: Penguin. 1994: first translation published. 1977). p. 203.
42 Bowie. Lacan. p. 65.
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her analysis of Lacan's use of Oedipus. She claims: "Nowhere in Lacan's writing is
there any systematic exposition of his specific understanding of the significance of
Oedipus."43 I include Felman's quote not only to substantiate my own reading of
Lacan, but to highlight Felman's use of the phrase "systematic exposition" as it
implies that although Lacan does engage and revise Freud, he does not do so in a
straightforward and clear manner. The absence of a direct link between Freud and
Lacan in Lacan's work is not surprising. At best Lacan's textual elusiveness can be
read as a way of explicating his theoretical arguments, at worst as a way of keeping
his reader from ever truly recognising its theoretical faults. The fact that Lacan does
not directly engage with the Oedipus complex can be read in connection with his
intent to move away from the importance Freud gives the Oedipal theory in order to
assert his own theories on the phallus and on the castration complex.
In order to explain Lacan's theory on desire further, I will focus on his essay
entitled, "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet," as it provides a good,
concise example of Lacan's theories on the phallus and castration as well as an
example of his enigmatic style. The essay exemplifies the way Lacan revises Freud
in order to dismantle the primacy of Oedipus and assert the importance of the
castration complex and the phallus as the prime signifier. Lacan privileges his
reading of castration over Freud's oedipalisation and in doing so, he situates
punishment or lack at the forefront of the exchange in desire. Lacan maintains that
Hamlet's lack of ability to act on his own desires is at the root of Shakespeare's
tragedy. He suggests that Hamlet loses his way in desire because he does not know
what he wants.
43 Shoshana Felman. Jacques Lacan and the Ach'enture of Insight: Psychoanalysis in Contemporary
Culture (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1987). p. 102.
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Lacan's choice of Hamlet may derive from the reference Freud makes to
Hamlet in The Interpretation of Dreams. In a footnote, Freud briefly compares
Oedipus to Shakespeare's Hamlet, noting that: "Hamlet can do anything - except take
revenge on the man who removed his father and took the latter's place beside his
mother, the man who shows him his own repressed infant wishes realised.'"" Whereas
Freud focuses his interpretation on Hamlet's relationship to his parents, that he
should revenge his father but he is too busy suppressing desires for his mother, Lacan
focuses on the way Hamlet loses his desire, 45 and how doing so undermines his
ability to enact revenge. Lacan makes several comparisons between Oedipus and
Hamlet, noting the similarities and differences in their plot structure. Most
importantly, he notes that each narrative begins with the crime of patricide, he writes:
"For Freud, the primal murder of the father forms the ultimate horizon of the problem
of origins. Note, too, that he finds it relevant for every psychoanalytic issue, and he
never considers a discussion closed until it is brought in."46 Here Lacan alludes to
Freud's over use of the Oedipal complex. He suggests that Freud drags in the Oedipal
theory whenever he can without considering whether or not it directly relates to the
issues at hand. However, Lacan's observation does more than imply Freud's
insistence on the Oedipus complex, it also suggests that Freud's dependence on the
Oedipal complex causes him to overlook a more important horizon: that of the
castration complex. In asserting his own reading over Freud's it is fitting that Lacan
44 Freud. The Interpretation ofDreams, trans. Joyce Crick (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999),
204. footnote 23: Freud also mentions Hamlet in his Letter to Fliess, No. 71, he writes: "I am not
thinking of Shakespeare's conscious intentions, but supposing rather that he was impelled to write
[Hamlet] by a real event because his own unconscious understood that of his hero." The Origins of
Psychoanalysis, p. 224.
45
Jacques Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation ofDesire in Hamlet." in Literature and
Psychoanalysis The Question ofReading: Otherwise, ed. by Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press. 1977). pp 11-52. (p. 12).
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chooses the story of a prince that struggles with finding a way to assert his authority
after the death of his father.
Lacan's interpretation ofHamlet is difficult to follow for any reader who is
unfamiliar with Lacanian psychoanalysis. As Lacan tells his readers: "This may
seem a bit abstract to those who have not accompanied us along the road that has led
up to this point ."4' The narrative structure ofHamlet serves as a loose framework for
Lacan to explicate some of the most fundamental concepts in psychoanalysis,
particularly those that directly affect the movement of desire, such as the 'Other,'
objet a and the role of the Phallus. Lacan broadly argues that Hamlet is caught
between avenging his father's murder and envying Claudius. At the centre of this
tension is Hamlet's desire for his mother. Lacan reads Gertrude as Hamlet's 'Other,'
the "primordial subject of the demand."48 Because Hamlet desires his mother he
cannot choose between his feelings of revenge and jealousy. However, unlike
Freud's interpretation of Sophocles's Oedipus, Lacan does not 'blame' Hamlet for
his repressed feelings, rather he suggests that Gertrude's own desires for Claudius
keep Hamlet from going through the castration complex and subsequently from
knowing what he wants.
In her reading of Lacan's essay in Speaking Desires can be Dangerous,
Elizabeth Wright suggests that the emphasis Lacan places on Gertrude marks a
different reading of the Oedipal drama from Freud's. Instead of focusing on
Hamlet's repressed desires and his inability to let them go, Lacan places the 'blame'
on Gertrude. As Wright suggests: "The (m)Other is showing no lack, and this is the
essential cause of Hamlet's inability to act He cannot conclude the Oedipal
4
Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamletp. 15.
48
Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamletp. 12
38
journey."49 Wright's analysis argues that Gertrude's failure to expose herself as
lacking undermines Hamlet's success. Hamlet's desires are privileged over his
(m)other's desires. In this way, Lacan does differentiate his reading ofHamlet from
Freud's; however, he still maintains that a woman must embody lack, that is, she
must strive to be the phallus whereas man must strive to have the phallus
Lacan's reading maintains that Hamlet's dependence on the 'Other,' Gertrude,
makes up the drama of the play. Hamlet is always acting "at the hour of the Other;"50
that is, he is always arriving too late at any final decision of what he should do. The
'Other' is supposed to help the subject articulate what it is s/he wants. As Lacan
argues in Ecrits. "That is why the question of the Other, which comes back to the
subject from the place from which he expects an oracular reply in some such form as
'Che Vuoi?\ 'What do you Want?,' is the one that best leads him to the path of his
own desire - providing he sets out, with the help of the skills of a partner known as a
psychoanalyst, to reformulate it, even without knowing it, as 'What does he want of
me9'51 Lacan's suggests that Hamlet is unable to ask his mother what it is she wants
and therefore is unable to take the appropriate action. The 'Other' holds the key to
desire, which is always fading away, unattainable and out of reach.
O PHALLUS
Crucial to Lacan's interpretation of Hamlet's desire is his stress on the role of
49 Elizabeth Wright. Speaking Desires Can be Dangerous: The Poetics ofthe Unconscious
(Cambridge. Polity Press. 1999), p. 84.
50 Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet." p. 19.
51 Lacan. Ecras: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge. 1977), p. 312.
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the phallus.52 In his essay, the "Signification of the Phallus," Lacan clearly states that
the phallus is to be understood as a signifier, not as a fantasy, an object, or even less
as an organ.53 As he argues: 'Tor the phallus is a signifier, a signifier whose function,
in the intrasubjective economy of the analysis, lifts the veil perhaps from the
function it performed in the mysteries."54 Although Lacan's reader may be initially
comforted by the definite terms he uses in defining the phallus, s/he will soon find
him/herself on slippery grounds again For Lacan, the phallus is the primary signifier
in the movement of desire As he writes: "What is it that the subject is deprived of?
The phallus, and it is from the phallus that the object gets its function in the fantasy,
and from the phallus that desire is constituted with the fantasy as its reference."55 The
phallus as signifier stands in for the impossible limit of desire. Desire in Lacanian
terms is a defence against the repressed desires of incest mastered during the Oedipal
and castration complexes The child's repression of desires for mother/father is
signified by the phallus; the phallus stands in where those desires are repressed.
However, the phallus is not visible, it is signified through language and engaged with
through the child's entrance into his/her exchange with the Symbolic and Imaginary.
Lacan argues that the subject is deprived of the phallus, and so, arising from
this lack, the subject imagines an object in the place where the phallus is veiled.
Lacan terms this fantasy the objet a The objet a stands in for the phallus and
structures desire in a similar way by acting as an end-point or limit for the subject's
52 See also Jacques Lacan. "'The Signification of the Phallus." Ecrits: A Selection, pp 281-291. For
further criticism of the role of the phallus in Lacan's interpretation of desire, see also Bowie. "The
Meaning of the Phallus." Lacan. pp. 122-157: Belsey, "Desire in Theory: Freud. Lacan. Derrida."
Desire, pp. 42-71.
53 Lacan. "The Signification of the Phallus." Ecrits: A Selection, p. 285.
54
Lacan. "The Signification of the Phallus." Ecrits: A Selection, p. 285.
55 Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation ofDesire in Hamletp. 15.
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desires In his essay on Hamlet, Lacan draws a connection between Ophelia and "O
Phallos," although he acknowledges that this kind of name play does not make for
good criticism.56 Lacan interprets Ophelia as Hamlet's "bait" 51 and argues that she
represents the objet a. He suggests that Hamlet loses the way of his desire partly
because he does not take the "bait," or Ophelia. As Hamlet's madness spirals, he
loses sight ofOphelia and of his relation to her in desire. She is no longer an object
of desire for him, as Lacan writes: "In short, what is taking place here is the
destruction and loss of the object ."58
Lacan argues that it is not until Ophelia has killed herself that she can resume
her role as Hamlet's objet a When Hamlet and Laertes meet at the scene ofOphelia's
grave, Hamlet engages Laertes in a struggle which Lacan notes is more charged and
aggressive than the final duel scene. Lacan argues that this is because Hamlet
competes with Laertes over the position ofmourner for Ophelia.59 Hamlet, safe in the
knowledge that Ophelia is dead, can now desire her as his ideal object In this way,
Ophelia can resume her role as the 'bait' dangling in front of the male subject and
take the blame for whether or not he decides to 'bite ' Her role may be read by some
as pivotal in that she determines the fate of the desiring subject, yet as "bait" she is
consigned to playing the object in a masculine economy. She is successful only
insofar as she functions in the realisation ofHamlet's desires, not her own.
Lacan's reading ofHamlet ultimately situates woman as the cause of
56 Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamletp. 20.
5 Lacan. "As a sort of come-on. I announced that I would speak today about that piece of bait named
Ophelia, and I'll be as good as my word." "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamletp. 11.
58 Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation ofDesire in Hamlet23; see also Lacan, Ecrit: A Selection, p.
58.
59 See also Wright's analysis ofmourning and desire in her reading of Lacan's essay on Hamlet,
Speaking Desires can be Dangerous, pjp. 77-85.
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Hamlet's confusion and of his inability to rise to his rightful seat. Although Lacan
may move away from Freud's understanding of anatomy as destiny in terms of sexual
difference, he still concludes that woman is lacking or rather, she must be lacking in
the movement of desire As Jacqueline Rose argues in Feminine Sexuality, for Lacan
it is "not that anatomical difference is sexual difference (the one as strictly deducible
from the other), but that anatomical difference comes to figure sexual difference, that
is, become the sole representative of what that difference is allowed to be.60 Lacan
positioning of Gertrude and Ophelia as 'Other' and 'objet a' to the subject Hamlet
supports the paradigm Freud raises in his theorisation of the 'castration complex.'
The girl must want to be the phallus, that is, she must strive to be like the phallus,
whereas the boy must want to have the phallus, in other words, he must try to possess
his object of desire. Although Lacan moves away from the 'truths' of anatomy, he
only does so in order to situate them in language.
LACAN AND THE QUESTION OF WOMAN
Lacan's approach to the question of woman, which Freud admits to knowing
very little, is specifically addressed in Encore In this text, one that continues to have
many feminist theorists justifiably upset, Lacan takes on the question of woman. As
he tells his readers: "What I am working on this year is what Freud expressly left
aside: Was will das Weib? What does Woman want?"61 It is fitting that Lacan's return
to Freud's question ofwoman is framed in the notion of an 'encore' for it is surely an
60
Jacqueline Rose, "Introduction D," in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the ecole freudienne,
ed by Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: Norton, 1985), p. 42 as quoted by Elam in
Feminism and Deconstruedon, p. 48.
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Lacan. The Seminar ofJacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality The Limits ofLove and Knowledge,
BookXX, Encore 1972-1973. trans. Bruce Fink, ed Jacques-Alain Miller (New York. W.W. Norton
&Co.. 1998), p 80. Subsequent references will appear in the text.
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area of research and inquiry that Freud left the stage too early to answer. Lacan refers
to the title both as an acknowledgement that he is "still here"62 and as an example of
the way love demands love: "[Love] never stops (ne cesse pas) demanding [love]. It
demands it . . . encore. 'Encore' is the proper name of the gap {faille) in the Other
from which the demand for love stems" (4). One should not overlook the dual
significance in Lacan's title. 'Encore,' French for 'still,' not only refers to Lacan's
continuing and dominant presence in the psychoanalytic community, but the demand,
'encore,' for a repeat performance: his. It is also reflective of the way in which
Lacan's disciples show him love and demand that love over and over again.63
In Encore, Lacan asserts that "woman does not exist," (7) a statement which
re-appears at the centre of most feminist critiques of Encore. Lacan writes: "There's
no such thing as Woman, Woman with a capital W indicating the universal. There's
no such thing as Woman because, in her essence [. . .] she is not-whole" (72-73).
Lacan continues to refer to the 'non-existent' woman as "not-whole" in other places
in the text, in fact he claims that their elaboration is the true subject behind Encore
(57). He argues that "Regarding female sexuality, our colleagues, the lady analysts,
do not tell us . . the whole story! (pas tout!), It's quite striking They haven't
contributed one iota to the question of feminine sexuality" (57-58). Lacan's italicised
emphasis on 'not' and 'whole' underline his choice of "not whole" to describe
woman and yet he does not justify his claim that women have contributed nothing to
62 Lacan. Encore, p. 1. He plays with the French definition, 'still.'
63 For further criticism of Lacan and his psychoanalytic reception, see Elisabeth Roudinesco. Jacques
Lacan and Co.: A History ofPsychoanalysis in France 1925-1985. trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (London:
Free Association Books. 1990); David Macey. Lacan in Context (London: Verso, 1988).
43
the study of female sexuality, a fallacious claim which can only be read as a kind of
theoretical bait, an invitation for the later criticism and uproar it produces.64
It is important here not to confuse Lacan's assertion that there is no universal
woman, or no essence to woman with feminist projects that resist essentialising the
category ofwoman. Although they appear theoretically similar, they are not the same.
Lacan equates woman with pre-discursive lack, that is, he argues that Woman (with a
capital W) cannot be represented in language. Although feminist projects that seek to
eliminate reductive definitions ofwoman may carry with them similar resistances to
representing woman, they are not relegating her to an abstract beyond or to a place
that she is barred from entering, as Lacan does. Feminism is a political movement and
as such may resist representing a definitive woman only insofar as one image of a
woman can not incorporate the multiplicity of women in its structure. Lacan, on the
other hand, understands woman in relation to his theorisation of the phallus.
The question that underlines the question of woman for Lacan is how does a
woman experience sexual ecstasy. Lacan is sure that women experience an enjoyment
similar to men but he is determined that it is unspeakable and un-representable. He
argues that woman experiences a "supplementary" (73) jouissance to man's
experience of jouissance, a "feminine jouissance" (77) that belongs to woman only
and yet does not signify anything, nor does it exist (74). That is, she knows that it
happens (although he suggests that it only happens to some), but she is unable to
know what it means or to speak about it (74). To elaborate on this point, Lacan refers
his readers to Bernini's statue of Saint Teresa: "you need to go to Rome and see the
64
Lacan writes in Encore. "Perhaps it wasn't entirely about me that people were speaking when they
said that, according to me. ladies don't exist, but it certainly wasn't what I had just said" (61) as if to
play with the claims he makes and the meaning that is made of them Here he has substituted 'woman'
with 'ladies' which changes the original statement entirely.
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statue by Bernini ["The Ecstasy of St. Teresa"] to immediately understand that she's
coming. There's no doubt about it. What is she getting off on? It is clear that the
essential testimony of the mystics consists in saying that they experience it, but know
nothing about it" (76). Placing the emphasis on what she is 'getting off on' returns the
focus onto the operation of the genitals. In a sense what Lacan asks is how (not what)
is she getting off without a penis/phallus. The implicit suggestion in Lacan's
observation is that women are not able to knowingly stimulate their own bodies to
reach orgasm: they 'know nothing about it' ('it' referring to orgasm).
In his description of the statue Lacan implies that woman knows nothing, at
least nothing that she can fully understand about pleasuring herself But this is true
only insofar as her knowledge and desire are linked to the signification of the phallus.
Under the signifying structure of the phallus, women and men are barred ffom fully
knowing and understanding the dynamics ofjouissance. Lacan's refusal to allow men
as well as women access to the hidden knowledge of the phallus can be read as a
progressive or equitable move forward. And yet, his denial of sexual difference in
language ('there is no sexual relationship' (35)) combined with his insistence that
woman "does not exist," problematise his relationship to feminist theory, as French
feminists Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous demonstrate.
THE FEMINIST RESPONSE PART ONE
Given the contentions made by Freud and Lacan, such as Lacan's "woman
does not exist," it is not surprising that their theories have generated debate amongst
feminist theorists. Among the more well known are French feminists Luce Irigaray
and Helene Cixous. In the second part of this chapter I will examine the way Irigaray
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and Cixous approach the theoretical position Freud and Lacan take with regard to
"lack."
IRIGARAY
In 1974, the same year that Juliet Mitchell publishes Psychoanalysis and
Feminism, Luce Irigaray publishes Speculum of the Other Woman, a critical look at
female sexuality from Freud to Plato. Speculum directly challenges the discursive
dominance of a masculine history of ideas. Irigaray begins with Freud and his "blind
spot" of female sexuality and ends with Plato. She reverses the chronological
progression in order to question a masculine framework of ideas. She explains this
methodology as an attempt to upset a phallocentric order and yet admits that doing so
does not allow the question ofwoman to be answered.65
Not long after the publication of Speculum, Irigaray is fired from her teaching
position in the Department of Psychoanalysis of Vincennes University and expelled
from the Freudian school. Although there are always other possible reasons,
Irigaray's dismissal appears related to the publication of Speculum because her work
directly challenges Freud's and Lacan's views on female desire. In her essay
appropriately entitled, "Women's exile,"66 she writes: "The meaning of this
expulsion is clear: only men may say what female pleasure consists of. Woman are
not allowed to speak, otherwise they challenge the monopoly of discourse and of
theory exerted by men."6' The discursive dominance of masculine ideas is at the
65
Irigaray. This Sex Hhich is Not One. trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca. Cornell University Press.
1985), p. 68. Subsequent references will appear in the text.
66 In Speculum ofthe Other Woman. Irigaray claims that woman is an exile from the/her economy of
desire, p. 43.
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Irigaray, "Women's Exile." Inleniew with Luce Irigaray. trans. Couze Venn, in The Feminist
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forefront of Irigaray's project and is perceived as the greatest threat to the
articulation ofwomen's desires.
Irigaray's work involves refraining and rewriting psychoanalytic
interpretations of female desire as well as stressing the fundamental importance of
sexual difference. Her questions are well considered and help to draw out the integral
debates between psychoanalysis and feminism However, these questions also expose
the inherent contradictions in Irigaray's argument which are symptomatic of the
larger difficulties in feminist attempts to refigure psychoanalytic interpretations of
women's desire. For example, in This Sex Which is Not One, a more localised attack
on psychoanalysis, Irigaray asks: "Must we go over this ground one more time?"
(69) referring to the sacred ground of psychoanalysis. Her question is an essential
one to ask as well as to answer However, in order to do so Irigaray takes 'another
look' at psychoanalysis which inscribes her argument into a psychoanalytic
framework. For this reason, her answer becomes a 'yes' by default.
In This Sex Which is Not One, Irigaray addresses the lack that psychoanalysis
equates with woman. She asks "So woman does not have a sex organ?" (28) and
answers that they have at least two: two lips that touch each other without any
external help. Using the metaphor of 'two lips,' or as a metaphor for metonyme as
one critic suggests,6* Irigaray stresses that woman's sexuality is not only double, but
plural (28). Irigaray's 'another look' at psychoanalysis draws her readers attention to
the 'truth' psychoanalysis gives to anatomy insofar as it determines sexual
difference. Offering another reading, of woman's genitals as two lips instead of as
68 See also Diana Fuss. Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (New York:
Routledge. 1989). p. 66.
47
lack, offers an alternative to the psychoanalytic interpretation.69 In doing so, she
challenges the psychoanalytic claim of "anatomy as an irrefutable criterion of truth"
(70-71) and offers an image to replace the lack assigned to women in psychoanalytic
readings. However, in order to posit this alternative image she draws attention to the
importance of the genitals in desire and sexual difference. Offering "two lips" instead
of a lack does not necessarily refigure the importance psychoanalysis gives to the
operation of the genitals; it just replaces one image with another. The fact that
psychoanalytic theory sees lack and lrigaray's second look finds plurality still means
that the genitals are determining women's relation to desire. In other words, Irigaray
does not suggest that psychoanalysis is mistaken or 'wrong;' rather she implies that
they have missed what is there.
Although Irigaray reconceives woman as lacking or repressed and instead
imagines her as multiple, her refiguring is predicated on an essentialised version of
woman that may be as restricting as the models psychoanalysis offer. Whether
Irigaray's work essentialises woman or does not dominates most of the recent
criticism on her writing.70 Although I cannot do justice to all the competing
arguments for or against claims that Irigaray's work essentialises woman, I would
like to cite one essay that demonstrates some of the key issues in the debate. In
"Irigaray Through the Looking Glass," Carolyn Burke argues that Irigaray's theories
are largely formulated in response and in reaction to her rejection of Freud and
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Lacan. Because her ideas are structured by those she opposes, she runs the risk of
reinscribing Lacan's (and Freud's) concepts into her own alternative. Burke also
suggests that this phenomenon could be interpreted as representing a father-daughter
relationship between psychoanalysis and feminism She argues: "Lacan is like the
paterfamilias of the psychoanalytic family who refuses to acknowledge the
independent wisdom of his daughters. The daughter, in turn, seeks a way out of her
overdetermined transference to this rejecting father-lover by turning upon the terms
of her allegiance."11
Although I agree with Burke's initial suggestion that Irigaray reinscribes her
theories within those she opposes, I disagree with Burke's analysis that this dynamic
is linked to a father-daughter transference. It is important to note here that Burke is
finding fault or lack in Irigaray's argument by inscribing her analysis in
psychoanalytical processes. On the one hand the metaphor of father-daughter can be
considered fitting since Irigaray's return to psychoanalytic theories, such as the
castration complex, do circumscribe her own attempts at alternatives within its
framework. In this way, Irigaray does become linked with a psychoanalytic 'family.'
However, to situate the dynamics involved in confronting a dominant discourse
within the confines of the family reduces Irigaray's attempt to find alternatives to the
rebellious and misguided antics of a teenager. Burke's suggestion of Lacan as father-
lover and Irigaray as daughter highlights the very familial dynamic that undermines
the possibility of liberating desire from the dominant influence of psychoanalysis
because it keeps her efforts under the constellation of the Oedipal complex. To use
Irigaray own words: 'Indeed, in [Freud's] view, woman never truly escapes from the
1 Burke. "Irigaray Through the Looking Glass." p. 41; See also Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction.
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Oedipal complex. She remains forever fixated on the desire for the father, remains
subject to the father and to his law, for fear of losing his love, which is the only thing
capable of giving her any value at all" (87). Burke's essay which proposes a feminist
psychoanalysis of Irigaray's feminist alternative to psychoanalysis should make clear
the ways in which these two fields are inextricably linked to each other. This
example should also draw attention to the many difficulties and possibilities the
encounter between psychoanalysis and feminism produces.
One possibility to consider in Irigaray's reassessment of psychoanalysis is her
examination of psychoanalytic discourse. In This Sex Which is Not One, she argues
that although Freud focuses on sexuality he does not construct an interpretation of
the way discourse is sexualised (73). Her attention to the sexualised discourse of
psychoanalysis leads her to examine alternative ways of dealing with the
phallocentric dominance of psychoanalysis. She suggests that possibilities lie in
introducing women's writing into the dominant discourse and in destroying the
discursive tools that give men mastery In particular, Irigaray suggests that mimicry,
a role historically assigned to the feminine, is a possible 'way out' for women that
would allow them to recover the place of their subordination without being reduced
to it
In her essay, "Cosi Fan Tutti," in This Sex Which is Not One, Irigaray takes
up Lacan's position in Encore specifically. She patches together quotes from Encore
with her own responses which produce a montage of psychoanalytic and feminist
ideas Only one footnote appears in the beginning of the essay which explains that
the quoted passages throughout the essay come from Lacan's Encore12 For this
: See also Burke. "Irigaray Through the Looking Glass." p. 46; Elizabeth Weed. "The Question of
Style," Engaging with Irigaray. pp. 79-109.
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reason, her reader may find it difficult to separate Irigaray's thoughts from Lacan's.
Instead of addressing Lacan's theories in a literary sense, she fuses her work to his
and his to hers which gives her reader a sense of how mimicry can function in
feminist criticism of psychoanalysis.
Irigaray begins her essay by criticising psychoanalysis for its monosexual and
monological discourse. She argues that psychoanalysis insists that there is only one
way of representing sexuality and that is through the signification of the phallus.
Irigaray turns to look at Lacan's Encore because, as mentioned earlier, he focuses on
the question of woman, and because Lacan's use of linguistics distinguishes his
project from Freud's emphasis on the operation of the genitals. Lacan moves away
from Freud's biological account of difference in order to focus on how sexual
difference is represented in language.
Although Lacan differentiates his project from Freud's by locating difference
in language, Irigaray argues that he still maintains the monologic view that does not
allow women to articulate their own desires. In order to substantiate her claim, she
refers to Lacan's reference to the statue of St. Teresa and writes: "In Rome? So far
away? To look9 At a statue9 Of a saint9 Sculpted by a man9 What pleasure are we
talking about9 Whose pleasure9 [. . .] But how can one 'read' them when one is a
'man'9 The production of ejaculations of all sorts, often prematurely emitted, makes
him miss, in the desire for identification with the lady, what her own pleasure might
be all about. And. . his?" (91). Irigaray astutely notes the way Lacan appropriates
and names the pleasure of a woman who literally has no voice, nor subject to speak
of. She also counters his references to female orgasm ("she's coming") with a
ridiculing allusion to premature ejaculation. However her question, "But how can
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one 'read' them (women) when one is a 'man'9" suggests not only that women's
discourse and experience solely belong to women but also the opposite, that male
discourse and experience solely belongs to men. By arguing that men cannot
understand women and have no right to do so, one must also agree that women do
not understand men and have no right to try. This paradigm also suggests that there is
an essential 'man' and 'woman.' Unfortunately, Irigaray's counter claims against
Lacan put her in danger of repeating the very logic she confronts with tenacity and
determination. Her desire to construct an alternative conception of women's desire
runs into the same problems of singularity and restriction that she attempts to combat
in psychoanalytic discourse. Although the process of rewriting may capture
Irigaray's alternative insights within its framework, the bravado in which she writes
offer readers an example of the style and strength necessary to counter the
dominance of psychoanalytic interpretations.
HELfeNE CIXOUS
Helene Cixous's work continues to have a monumental impact on feminist
theory, both in Europe and in America. Because the scope of this project can not
adequately deal with the breadth of Cixous's work, I will focus on three aspects of
her work in particular that I feel elucidate the psychoanalytic use of lack in desire as
well as posit alternative ways of interpreting female desire. Firstly, Cixous
encourages women to write their own stories, to voice their own desires. Her call to
writing can be viewed as similar to Irigaray's insistence that women find a way to
dismantle the discursive dominance of a phallocentric order. However, Cixous
differentiates her project by suggesting that by writing women will remove
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themselves from a place of silence.73 Cixous does not define what this feminine
practice of writing is or should be, rather she gestures towards what it could be. As
Verena Andermatt Conley writes in her critical study of Cixous: "Cixous herself
performs in relation to texts what she invites the reader to do, that is, to accompany
her, remark certain terms, follow turns, and risk new formulations."74 Cixous's
writing is celebratory and poetic: "We, coming early to culture, repressed and choked
by it, our beautiful mouths, stopped up with gags, pollen, and short breaths, we the
labyrinths, we the ladders, we the trampled spaces, the stolen and the flights - we are
'black' and we are beautiful" (69) Woman in Cixous's loving hands is both victim
to a phallocentric order and yet capable of toppling it over with her dark and
mysterious forces. Cixous reclaims the binary opposites that masculine logic has
confined women within, celebrating their positive and productive energies.
The other concept Cixous puts forward is a refraining of'bisexuality.' Cixous
theorises bisexuality as the presence of both sexes in one body: masculine and
feminine. Starting from the genitals she imagines this plurality extending to every
other part of the body: "the multiplication of the effects of desire's inscription on
every part of the body and the other body" (85). The plurality that Cixous's imagines
can be likened to Irigaray's theorisation of the "two lips," although Cixous's example
suggests that desire can be found all over the body as opposed to localised in the
genitals.
Drawing on the psychoanalytic interpretation that women want to be the
phallus, Cixous argues that this puts woman in a better position than man to
73 Cixous. The Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing (Minneapolis: The University ofMinnesota
Press. 1986), p. 93. Subsequent references will appear in the text.
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experience and realise this form of bisexuality. Man, busy with his desire to possess
the phallus and afraid of castration or of being feminine, is disadvantaged in
Cixous's refiguring. In this example, as well as in others, Cixous takes the negative
inscriptions that psychoanalysis gives to woman and looks at them in a positive and
productive way. To cite another example, Cixous takes the suggestion that woman is
supposed to become the Other in the movement of desire and argues that this
admission (of the Other) is what allows her a way to love herself and to write about
that self-love.
Although these re-interpretations are positive and productive within feminist
theorisation of psychoanalysis, they position woman at times above and beyond man.
Cixous lifts woman up to a place that is cosmic and without boundaries, unlike her
male counterpoint. For example, in The Newly Born Woman, she counters Lacan's
assertion that woman is "not-whole" by suggesting that she has an "endless body,
without 'end,' without principal 'parts;' if she is a whole, it is a whole made up of
parts that are wholes, not simple, partial objects but varied entirety, moving and
boundless change, a cosmos where Eros never stops travelling, vast astral space"
(87). Whilst Cixous's work is a necessary deconstruction of the oppositions erected
by phallo-centered discourse, her writing also reifies these oppositions and creates a
category of'woman,' a definition of'woman,' that does impose limits, even in their
limitlessness, and certainly essentialises. To follow Cixous's call for desire as life
affirming against the psychoanalytic (mis)interpretations of desire as lack only
returns the logic back to where it first originates, with psychoanalysis. Although
Cixous's arguments cast light on some of the dark shadows psychoanalysis draws on
female sexuality it does so at the expense of male sexuality. Moreover, even for
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women Cixous's terms can be constricting and limiting, for not all women possess or
want to possess the cosmic fluidity that Cixous imagines.
Despite the difficulties Cixous's alternative theorisation runs into, her
theories also present possibilities that deserve further consideration. For instance, in
The Newly Born Woman, Catherine Clement and Helene Cixous suggest a
therapeutic if not revolutionary power exists in the ability to laugh. Clement alludes
to the power of laughter, a hysteric's laugh, in her rendering of guilt: "All laughter is
allied with the monstrous [. . .] Laughter breaks up, breaks out, splashes over" (33).
Cixous elaborates and extends Clement's suggestion to incorporate Medusa's image:
"All you have to do to see the Medusa is look her in the face, and she isn't deadly.
She is beautiful and she laughs" (69). The image Cixous offers is seductive as well as
powerful. The frightening face ofMedusa with her hair of snakes and her stony stare
is transformed into a laughing, mobile figure of feminine joy. Cixous's "laugh of the
Medusa" not only demonstrates the eloquence of her prose but the power ofmyths to
keep us from looking in certain places or from staring too long into the eyes of the
dark, feminine for fear that she will turn us to stone.
"Sorties," Cixous's half of The Newly Born Woman takes these myths to task,
undoing and unravelling the fantastical power they have over our cultural
imaginations. Motivating her critique of myths is one of the most pervasive and
influential myth of all: Oedipus. Although she does not directly deal with the Oedipal
myth, she does deal with the castration complex, which is the dissolution of the
Oedipal complex. She challenges the myths by suggesting that we, as feminists,
should be able to laugh at their ridiculousness, although she acknowledges that their
continuing presence makes it difficult to do so: "We have been frozen in our place
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between two terrifying myths: between the Medusa and the abyss. It would be
enough to make half the world break out laughing, if it were not still going on" (68).
For Irigaray and Cixous, woman is cosmic, open, multiple and without
boundaries. Her language is also understood in these terms: without limits, multi-
layered, and essentially different from man's. In short, they revise woman as the
opposite of what Freud and Lacan suggest. Instead of a small, black hole, their
'woman' is cosmic; instead of 'object', she is limitless and boundless. However,
'she' is still being told who she is and how she desires. 'She' is still being understood
and constructed through a discourse that bases itself on psychoanalytic structures.
Irigaray argues in This Sex Which is Not One that "[Woman's] desire is often
interpreted, and feared, as a sort of insatiable hunger, a voracity that will swallow
you whole. Whereas it really involves a different economy more than anything else,
one that upsets the linearity of a project, undermines the goal-object of a desire,
diffuses the polarization toward a single pleasure, disconcerts fidelity to a single
discourse" (29-30). Although many feminists may agree with Irigaray's
interpretation, the implication in this statement is that there is an 'authentic' female
desire that psychoanalysis has misunderstood
The projects Cixous and Irigaray construct suggest the dominance
psychoanalysis continues to have in the narrative understanding of desire. They rely
on the structures Freud constructs and Lacan revises to build the foundations for their
own interpretations of female desire. In doing so, their arguments are precariously
balanced upon the very grounds they oppose. In many ways, they only strengthen
what is there by giving credit to the dominance of its logic. Whether desire is
constructed by Lacan as 'lack' or by Irigaray as 'two lips,' it is necessary to move
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away from suggesting that desire needs to be conceived of as 'good' or 'bad.' This is
a very complicated thing to do whilst trying to theorise desire, a word 'desire' that
carries with it a response from the reader.
THE FEMINIST RESPONSE PART TWO
Irigaray and Cixous engage with the 'truths' of psychoanalysis as well as with
a wider feminist project, one that suggests that another look at psychoanalysis can
allow feminists to rethink and refigure the dynamics of female desire However, as
the last section examined, their strategy runs the risk of reinscribing itself into the
very boundaries it attempts to expand. In the next section, I will consider the work of
two feminists, Carolee Schneeman and Diane Elam, in order to explore ways in
which a feminist engagement with psychoanalysis can move away from the circular
debate on lack.
CAROLEE SCHNEEMAN
Carolee Schneeman is well known for her work in performance art as well as
for her feminist insight. Her daring and often controversial work confronts ideas
about the female body in performance as well as many other potent issues within
feminism. As a graduate of the University of Illinois and a painter, Schneeman
entered into the kinetic environment of the New York 'Happenings' in 1961. In
Against Interpretation, Susan Sontag describes these 'Happenings' as "an art of
radical juxtaposition."'5 'Happenings' were a radical juxtaposition of sounds, smells,
positions, words, and movements. They often took place in an artist's loft instead of
5 Susan Sontag. Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 1994). p. 263. Her chapter is entitled:
"Happenings: an art of radical juxtaposition."
57
a conventional stage. There was no plot or discourse to follow, everything happened
in the present and through a series of actions and events. Drawing out of her
experience both as a female performer in male dominated 'Happenings' and as an
artist interested in "flesh as material,"76 Schneeman's first installation piece,
"Eye/Body," (1963) engages directly with feminist and sexual issues.
In her brilliant exploration of The Explicit Body in Performance, Rebecca
Schneider introduces her readers to Carolee Schneeman's work as well as to her
unique contribution to performance art and feminism Schneider argues that out of
the "impasse" created by the rift between poststructuralists and feminists who
advocated a female essence, came a feminist "both/and" that allows for critical
agency and mobility that Schneeman pursues in her work.77 As she writes: "Like a
Brechtian 'not, but' this feminist 'both/and' makes room for critical inquiry, political
agency, and discursive mobility. This double agency was arguably present as
'messiness' in Schneeman's work even in the early 1960's [. . .] [Schneeman]
wanted her body to remain erotic, sexual, both 'desired and desiring,' while
underscoring it as clearly volitional as well: 'marked, written over in a text of stroke
and gesture discovered by my creative female will.'"78
The connection Schneider makes between Schneeman's work and a feminist
"both/and" is a very important one to consider. Schneider draws attention to the way
Schneeman's work engages with both positions in the movement of desire: the
desirer and the desired. This "both/and" can be likened to Irigaray's "double gesture"
in that each paradoxically take two sides with equal strength. Irigaray confronts
6 Rebecca Schneider. The Explicit Body in Performance (London: Routledge. 1997). p. 31.
Schneider. The Explicit Body. p. 36.
8 Schneider. The Explicit Body, pp 36-37.
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psychoanalysis on a local and global level and is both constructivist and essentialist
at the same time. For Schneeman, this double movement relates to the way the body
can be positioned as object and subject in desire. Her work suggests that there is
value in allowing seemingly opposing sides to operate in conjunction with each other
instead of insisting on one or the other
Schneeman's work maintains a feminist "both/and" approach and yet extends
this strategy to suggest other possible ways of approaching dominant discourses. In a
departure from her performance work, Schneeman deals with the relationship
between 'woman' and 'desire' in her piece entitled, "Vulva's Morphia"79 (1981-
1995) (see figure #1). The circular logic of desire, from Freud to French feminism, is
visually represented beginning with biology and ending with Feminist Constructivist
Semiotics. She takes her viewer through the progression of 'new' theories
constructed on the subject of female desire. The progression follows a circular logic,
ending in much the same place it began, thus explaining and parodying the repetitive
and cyclical nature of theories on female desire. They circle back to the beginning,
never escaping from the inscription of lack, void and always connected to the
phallus/patriarchy. Desire, as detailed in Schneeman's work, is understood through
the position it takes within phallic discourse It is a circle that continues to spin as
definitions of'woman' and 'desire' are embroiled within phallocentric logic.
Schneeman plays with the dominant discourse of desire, attempting to explain
"how the circle of confusion is caused." The first two, of the six, descriptives
supported by pictorial representations of vaginas and women read: "Vulva reads
biology and understands she is an amalgam of proteins and oxytoxin hormones
79 Carolee Schneeman. "Vulva's Morphia. 1981-1995." in Feminimasculin: Le Sexe de I 'art (Paris:
Editions du Centre Pompidou. 1995), p. 111.
VULVA'S SCHOOL
Vulva reads biology and understands she is an amalgam of proteins and oxytocin hormones
which govern all her desires ...
circle of
Vulva deciphers Lacan and Baudrillard and discovers she is only a sign, a signification of
the void, of absence, of what is not male ... (she is given a pen for taking notes ...)
Vulva strips naked, fills her mouth and cunt with paint brushes, and runs into the Cedar
Bar at midnight to frighten the ghosts of de Kooning. Pollock. Kline , . .
Vulva dect xles Femin isl Const rut t i\ ist Sent iot i< s and t e.tli/es she has no ant he tit ic feelings
at all: even llet eroiit sensations ate lonstttuted In paiii.uslial projei tions. impositions,
and < ondil toning
Carolee Schneemann, Vulva's Morphia, 198 Id 995
FiGrUCLE: toMe
Fig. I HOW THE CIRCLE
Bw Be Bn
OF CONFUSION IS CAUSED
Vulva reads Masters and Johnson and understands her vaginal orgasms have not been mea¬
sured by any instrumentality and that she should only experience chloral orgasms ...
Vulva recognizes her symbols and names on graffitii under the railroad trestle: slit, snatch,
enchilada, beaver, muff, coozie, fish and finger pie ..
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which govern all her desires" and "Vulva deciphers Lacan and Baudrillard and
discovers she is only a sign, a signification of the void, of absence, of what is not
male. . . (she is given a pen for taking notes . . Schneeman's work presents a
visual 'history' of female desire over the last decade (or one narrative). She parodies
the way biologists, theorists, painters and even feminists have used vulva as their
own muse. Her character, "Vulva," reads, deciphers, recognises, and decodes the
ways in which she is meant to symbolise, signify, and frighten. She is instructed by
others on who she is, how she must feel, and what she must do; hence Schneeman's
title: "Vulva's School." The piece rather obviously suggests the ways women are
told about their desires: through theories on sexuality, through mass media, through
culture, and even through feminist politics. It also serves as an interesting
counterpoint to the strength and dominance of the phallus who deciphers Lacan and
learns that he is the signifying force in the logic of desire and language.
The pictorial images that accompany Schneeman's 'history' construct their
own history, a history of the vulva in art. From basic drawings, like those that run
down the centre column, to those that depict the vagina in abstract form, to 'real'
pictures such as of a 12 month old girl and a woman masturbating, each depict both
the subject and the differing representations of female sexuality. The images are
primitive, abstract, figurative, demonstrative, and realistic. They represent the variety
of thoughts on the vagina from the medical, to the abstract, to the intimate.
Combining both a visual and textual 'history' of the vulva, Schneeman reminds us of
the interrelationship between art and theories of women's desire.
Beginning each line with "Vulva," Schneeman gives female desire an agency
within the influential external forces she cites. "Vulva strips naked, fills her mouth
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and cunt with paint brushes, and runs into the Cedar Bar at midnight to frighten the
ghosts of de Kooning, Pollock, Kline. . Here, and in other lines, Schneeman
awards vulva agency - she is sticking the paintbrushes in and frightening the painters
that depict her. Schneeman may also be making allusions here to her own
performative work in which she covers her naked body with paint, grease and chalk
as if to declare, as Schneider puts it: "If I am a token, then I'll be a token to reckon
with."80
Schneeman's learning vulva is running naked at midnight, as opposed to
being chased. She is the subject of their paintings, a receptacle for their own art;
however, in Schneeman's version, vulva becomes a curious and precocious subject
trying out something new. She is always on to the next idea, even if with
reservations.
However, 'vulva' is also pictured with a gaping hole. The pictorial images are
necessary both in reference to this chapter and in Schneeman's argument because it
is important to remember that visually the vagina resembles a hole, a gap, a lack,
which is where the psychoanalytic theory originates. It is important not to locate the
physical solely in theory or language because it misses the obvious connection
between the hole in the woman's vulva and the presumption that it needs to be filled
with a man's penis. It sounds very crass put in these terms, which perhaps is why
terms like 'lack' and 'gap' are used in psychoanalysis.
Each line of "Vulva's Morphia" ends in ellipses, suggesting to the viewer that
once vulva has read, deciphered, decoded or recognised the theory presented to her,
she is off and running to another one. The ellipses also gesture towards the temporary
80 Schneider. The Explicit Body. p. 35.
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and fleeting nature of each theory. They displace a sovereignty of any one meaning,
definition, or theory on female desire by suggesting that there is always another
around the corner, and always one that will be read, deciphered, and then ultimately
rejected by the learning vulva.
Through this piece, Schneeman offers her viewers an education in the
theorisation of desire. Her learning and uneven tempered vulva suggests that we, as
theorists, artists, and as women, must not subscribe whole heartedly to any one
discourse or field of thought on woman's desire, not even those offered by women.
On the one hand, the sentences which lay out each field of thought are organised to
suggest a linear 'history,' a path that each learning vulva takes in order to 'arrive' at
what appears to be an infinite end in that it is characterised by an ellipses.
Schneeman's work demonstrates the way the debate over 'lack,' with Freud and
Lacan on the one side and Irigaray and Cixous on the other, is 'past down' and
carried on through the work of feminist artists and theorists. Her piece also suggests
that the only way forward or even sideways, is to keep moving and to keep learning
new ways in which to approach the subject of female desire.
DIANE ELAM
In order to pursue this 'sideways' style of learning, I turn to feminist theorist,
Diane Elam, whose work on the question of woman as well as on feminist politics
offers another approach to the problems inherent in a theorisation of desire. Elam's
work raises central issues and problems in theorising feminism as well as
deconstruction, postmodernism and romanticism 81 In Feminism and Deconstruction:
81 See also. Diane Elam. Romancing the Postmodern. Feminism Beside Itself, ed. by Diane Elam and
Robyn Wiegman.
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Ms. e?i Abyme, Diane Elam sets up a "disruptive linkage"82 between feminism and
deconstruction. Instead of curing one with the other, or teaching one to the other, she
places them side by side to learn from their points of intersection. Her "disruptive
linkage" provides a structure that can be extended to think 'in between' the complex
theories of psychoanalysis and those argued by feminists. It also allows for
alternative interpretations to enter, as no one discourse is privileged.
Elam argues that any attempt to define 'woman' completely only succeeds in
demonstrating the infinite possibilities of the category itself. She argues that,
"women both are determined and are yet to be determined"83 and explains this
contingency by recasting the term 'mise en abyme,' a form of endless deferral, to
include a feminist understanding, which she terms the "ms. en abyme." Elam uses
the term "ms. en abyme" to suggest that attempts at determining or categorising
women through representation do not end in an arrival of a distinct 'woman.' Instead,
these attempts suggest both the infinite possibilities ofwomen and the failure of such
attempts at a final meaning ofwoman.
Elam's work offers feminists an alternative perspective on the debates raised
by theorists such as Irigaray and Cixous. As discussed earlier, Irigaray and Cixous
each rely on a static image of female subjectivity that inhibits other possibilities from
arising. Although the 'woman' they envision is in line with feminist ideology, their
arguments suggest that there is a 'right' and 'wrong' representation of woman
instead of problematising the category ofwoman altogether.
Elam's critique of the question of 'woman' is very useful in terms of theorising
desire. Her work moves beyond 'identity politics' and raises issues and problems in
8~
Elam. Feminism and Deconstruction. p. 13.
83
Elam, Feminism and Deconstruction. p. 27.
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using a singular representation to construct a political movement. Although her
argument centres on the relationship between feminism and deconstruction, her ideas
can also help us rethink desire. The "ms. en abyme" problematises the relationship
between subject and object in representation. In the "ms. en abyme," the movement
between subject and object is fluid and unstable. The object's endless regression into
itself escapes the subject's hold which leads to a destabilisation of the subject itself.
Following out of this logic, woman can be neither subject nor object: an important
(de)construction of the discursive structures of desire and politics.
In Elam's refiguring, woman as a category does not have to fit within the role
of subject or object. This interchangeability is similar to the "and/but" Schneider
refers to and yet it is different in the way it is put in motion: subject and object
infinitely change place in the structure of the "ms. en abyme."84 Using the framework
of the "ms. en abyme," desirer and desired can be figured as always in motion, as
endlessly changing roles with each other instead of as fulfilling particular roles set
out for them in a static and fixed logic. The fluidity of these roles is particularly
important to a feminist rethinking of desire. Instead of trying to refigure woman as
subject, as opposed to object or "receptacle" to man's desire, as Grosz suggests, it is
possible to reconsider the role of desirer and desired as infinitely changing positions
in the economy of desire. That is, neither man nor woman determines or is
determined by a position in desire. Placing the dynamics of desire into abyme allows
us, as theorists, to look at the problem of desire from a different angle. Instead of
trying to elevate woman to a position equal to man or even higher, or to cure the lack
she is given by psychoanalysis, it is possible to focus on how each position in desire
84 Elam. Feminism and Deconstruction, p. 28
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functions as well as how desire creates connections and builds foundations. In other
words, we can think about the productive possibilities in the movement of desire
instead of limiting ourselves to the worn-out debates on whether or not woman is
lack or limitless.
Elam alludes to these possibilities in her conclusion to Feminism and
Deconstruction when she writes:
To put this another way, we don't need more lessons in how to be a
woman; feminism is no longer only the search for an authoritative,
subjective, speaking position. In a sense, then, we have to learn to
negotiate outside the horizon of authority. No more authoritative
deconstructions of literary texts, no more authoritative statements on the
essence of woman. To speak without recourse to the meta-language of
authority is to speak as singularities, to attempt to do justice in singular
cases, rather than to be just once and for all. It is this dispersal of the
modernist horizon of social justice that feminism and deconstruction
work for. That work is not without its moments of achievement, but it is
an endless work, an abyssal politics. . 85
I have quoted this final passage at length for several important reasons: the first is to
respond to Elam's call to move beyond authoritative horizons. The question of
authority and the need to abandon its imposing horizon is an important and relevant
one for feminist politics. Because feminism has often relied on friction from a
dominant and authoritative other to structure its politics, it has been placed in the
position of repeating and reinscribing itself within the very logic it seeks to revise, as
8? Elam. Feminism and Deconstruction. p. 120.
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demonstrated in Irigaray's and Cixous's work. The circular logic that develops from
this oppositional strategy does not liberate desire, rather it enforces new limits and
definitions onto its readers.
Another important issue that Elam raises is that of social justice. Although
not directly related to this project on desire, her call to approach justice in singular
cases instead of as "once and for all" can be linked to the universal models that
psychoanalysis insists upon in its theorisation of sexuality. Instead of following
Freud's grand narrative of Oedipus or Lacan's refiguring of the castration complex, it
is necessary to move away from grand and totalising remedies to human sexuality.
Moving away from the desire to answer conclusively and definitively for all, allows
the dynamics of an argument to enter as well as alternative possibilities to arise.
Finally, I would like to draw a comparison between the ellipses that come at
the end of each statement in Schneeman's piece and the ellipsis that brings a open
closure to each chapter in Elam's text. In both cases, the ellipses can be read as a
gesture towards the multiple possibilities that are available to theorists if they
abandon the need for conclusive endings and continue to negotiate words such as
'desire' and 'woman.' In Schneeman's piece, these ellipses stand in for the vast
amount of work that has been done on each statement, in Elam's work, the ellipsis
can be interpreted as giving space to the "endless work" that still needs to be done.
It will not help feminists to continue to debate over whether or not Freud and
Lacan are 'right.' To negotiate the term "lack" always means an engagement both
with lack and with the history it carries with it, a long and complicated history. It is
important for feminists to abandon projects that aim to fill or 'cure' the "lack"
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psychoanalysis assigns to 'woman.' It is also necessary to move beyond a feminist
politics that uses woman as a static image to stabilise its foundations.
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2. H.d. and Freud
Psychoanalysis derives its understanding of desire from the interaction
between analyst and analysand For this reason, as well as others, it is important to be
aware of the processes and dynamics in the analytic scene. A written account of the
analytic sessions between the founding 'father' of psychoanalysis and a woman
imagist poet promises a unique perspective both on the scene of analysis and on the
problematic relationship between Freud and his theories on women. Although H.D.'s
Tribute to Freud may not deliver an answer to Freud's interpretations of 'woman,'
her Tribute does demonstrate the role desire plays in the correspondence between
analyst and analysand. Because she is a woman writing about her experiences with
Freud, her Tribute has been taken up by feminist critics as both an example ofwider
claims about women's writing and as a way of talking about psychoanalysis and
feminism. I argue that H.D.'s Tribute not only illustrates her vision of a recognition
between the sexes but also reminds her readers of the limitations in any one reading
of desire.
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first part focuses on the
relationship between H.D and Freud in her Tribute to Freud and the second part
focuses on H.D.'s feminist critics. H.D.'s narrative assumes a dual position of
analysand and analyst in which H.D re-reads and re-understands herself, Freud and
the relationship between them In doing so, her work illustrates the dynamics of the
analytic scene and the way desire is formulated in analysis. The second part
examines feminist criticism of H.D.'s text, particularly from Susan Stanford
Friedman, and more recent criticism from Dianne Chisholm and Claire Buck. I will
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argue that their attempts to establish subjectivity in H.D.'s Tribute or to level the
terrain between H.D. and Freud in order to make wider claims for feminism overlook
the possibilities in the recognition between 'man' and 'woman' that H.D. envisions.
READING PSYCHOANALYSIS AND LITERATURE
In his essay entitled "The Analytic Experience: Means, Ends, and Results,"
Jacques-Alain Miller critiques the academic usage of psychoanalytic terms and
analytical writing in the interpretation of literary texts. He returns again and again to
the phrase "I use Lacan"86 to draw attention to the problematic position literary critics
take in their readings of literature and psychoanalysis. To him, the phrase "I use
Lacan to read X" is synonymous with "I am the analyst of a dead analysand," or 'T
am the analysand of a dead analyst."8" To a certain extent, Miller's claim makes
sense. In a way, critics do become analysts to a dead analysand when they engage in
a reading of Freud's or Lacan's work and, at the same time, when critics use Lacan,
or Freud, they also become analysands to a dead analyst. However, the extent to
which Miller's claims make sense is in relation to how he frames his understanding
of literary criticism within the structure of the analytic experience. That is, Miller
understands the dynamics of literary criticism insofar as they operate within a
psychoanalytic structure. In doing so, he misses the alternative possibilities that
literary criticism and psychoanalysis have to offer each other.
Miller's critique of the academic use of psychoanalysis stems from the
distinction he draws between the analytic experience and the act of interpretation by
a literary critic. For Miller, the literary critic is working with dead objects that will
86
Jacques-Alain Miller. "The Analytic Experience: Means. Ends, and Results." (pp. 85. 86, 88).
8
Miller. "The Analytic Experience." p. 88.
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never be able to talk back if questioned or answered. In contrast to the literary critic,
Miller argues that the discourse between analyst and analysand is performative and
works toward a cure. As he discusses: "[The literary critic's] work takes place in the
space, in the distance, in the cleavage, in the splitting between what an author wrote
and what we know of what he meant And that is enough to justify the use of the
word interpretation'™ Here Miller demonstrates that his understanding of literary
theory is in relation to its failure to talk back or 'cure' the text of its symptoms. In
locating the critic's medium as the "splitting" between the language of the text and
the author's intention, Miller tries to draw a parallel between this "splitting" and the
splitting between what an analysand says and what s/he means in analysis. As
analyst, Miller argues that he can read and interpret his patient's speech in order to
make meaning, whereas he finds the literary critic's task impossible because s/he
does not have the advantage of being able to interpret the performative aspect of the
text. Judith Butler's explanation of performative speech in Excitable Speech: a
Politics of the Performative89 may be a useful way to counter Miller's claims.
However, what is important here is both how Miller reads literary criticism's failures
through a psychoanalytic framework, and how doing so prevents him from
appreciating the possibilities that arise when the two are read together.
Instead of "using Lacan to read X," or instead of applying psychoanalytic
models to the narrative structure of the text, which only succeed in producing a
'Lacanian' or 'Freudian' reading, critics can read for what one critic calls the
"interimplications."90 Text and theory can be read together instead of one on top of
88 Miller. "The Analytic Experience." p. 87.
89 Judith Butler. Excitable Speech: a Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge. 1997).
9(1 Dianne Chisholm. H.D. 's Freudian Poetics, p. 2. Chisholm's work will be discussed further at the
end of this chapter.
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the other. A 'hierarchical model' of theory, one that organises itself around a master
or dominant discourse, is not inverted, rather it is levelled so that the two can be in
discourse. Theory is not used to elicit meaning from the text, rather to be in dialogue
with it. And yet, this dialogue between critic and text is not meant to function in an
analytic way, that is, in a way that seeks to 'cure' or solve the text; rather this
dialogue encourages connections to be made and multiple ideas to emerge.
This multivalent approach to reading is not confined to the critical study of
psychoanalysis and literature. As discussed in the last chapter, Diane Elam's work
brings seemingly opposing movements together in order to read them side by side.91
Instead of reading one field as a master discourse to another, it is possible to consider
the arguments in each at the same time, without privileging one over the other. This
'sideways' look at theoretical fields allows a critic to move beyond some of the
underlying implications of readings that do "use" Lacan or of those that use feminist
theory to "cure" psychoanalysis. As discussed in the first chapter, projects such as
Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism suggest that psychoanalysis can be
'fixed' in order to better understand female sexuality.
As discussed briefly in the last chapter, Elam's "ms. en abyme" stems from
her rethinking of feminism and deconstruction. The "ms. en abyme" problematises
the relationship between subject and object and in so doing, provides theorists with a
model to rethink subject and object roles, as Elam outlines the "ms. en abyme:"
The infinitely receding object in the mise en abyme closes down the
possibility of a stable subject/object relation. On the one hand, the object
cannot be grasped by the subject; it slips away into infinity. On the other
91
Elam follows Ihis approach in Feminism Beside hself. Romancing the Postmodern, and in Feminism
and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme.
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hand, this produces a parallel regression in the subject or viewer of the
mise en abyme. As the object recedes into itself, the subject is
destabilised, it loses not merely its capacity to grasp the object but also its
grasp on itself. The subject thus is faced with its inability to know what it
knows, to see what it sees. In this sense, the subject becomes the subject
of a representation that exceeds it. Seeing that they have been fooled,
viewing subjects see themselves as fools, objects of a visual joke.92
In Elam's rendering of the 'mise en abyme,' neither object nor subject has the upper
hand in the pursuit of knowledge. This interchange is particularly important in light
of feminist politics, as Elam argues, as it disrupts the authority in both positions and
keeps the question of woman both determined and yet to be determined.93 Feminist
projects that seek to establish subjectivity in their analyses, often overlook the
limitations and problems that arise within the subject position As Elam humorously
explains: "Debbie may not be doing Dallas or the dishes this time, but when Debbie
does driving she is still conforming to pre-existing, restrictive criteria in order to take
up the subject position 'woman.' Moving from the back seat to the front is not the
same thing as getting out of the car."94 Instead of trying to read 'woman' as subject
instead of object, to move her from the "back seat to the front," it is important, as
Elam points out, to get out of the car altogether.
Getting "out of the car" necessitates a critical evaluation of the frameworks
and structures that contain subject and object positions. Two such frameworks are
feminism and psychoanalysis. Elam's model of the "ms. en abyme" can be extended
9~ Elam. Feminism and Deconstruct!on. p. 28.
93
Elam. Feminism and Deconstruction. p. 27.
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to help us, as theorists, to understand the problems that arise in the meeting place
between literary criticism, feminism and psychoanalysis. The "ms. en abyme"
reminds us to be wary of projects which attempt to close down or define the question
of woman, or, to build upon Elam's examination, of desire. Instead of reading for
subjectivity, as many earlier feminist criticisms do, it is possible to examine how a
narrator such as H.D. in her Tribute to Freud, takes on the role of object and subject,
desirer and desired and most important to her relationship with Freud, as analysand
and analyst. Understanding the fluidity and interchangeability between these
opposing roles allows us to approach a text such as H.D.'s in order to see what it
creates and how it functions, instead of trying to assert what it means or represents.
H.D., a "writing signet or sign manual"95 for Hilda Doolittle (1886-1961) is
not as well known or read as her modernist counterpoints such as Ezra Pound, D. H.
Lawrence and Gertrude Stein. For this reason, it is necessary to briefly introduce her
writing which includes poetry, memoirs, essays, novels, translations, and, important
to this chapter, a tribute. H.D.'s writing often draws on her own personal
experiences, such as in Palimpsest (1926) and Nights (1935) as well as references
from Greek mythology such as in Helen in Egypt (1961) and in her poetry. Her
writing also demonstrates a strong interest and understanding of the psyche. For
example, in Notes on Thoughts and Vision and the Wise Sappho (1919), H.D.
elaborates on what she calls the "over-mind" and 'jelly-fish consciousness' in order
to pursue her own ideas on mind-body dualism and its affects on the creative
95 H.D.. Tribute to Freud (London: Carcanet Press. 1985). p 66 Subsequent references will appear in
the text.
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process.96 Her interest in psychoanalysis may have began as early as 19109" and led
her to analytic sessions with Havelock Ellis, Mary Chadwick, Hanns Sachs, and
Sigmund Freud.
H.D.'s wrote about her sessions with Freud in "Writing on the Wall," later
published as Tribute to Freud in 1956. More recent publications also include a more
autobiographical account of H.D.'s session entitled "Advent." In order to avoid
confusion, when referring to Tribute I am referring to "Writing on the Wall" unless
otherwise stated. Tribute to Freud weaves stories from H.D's analytic sessions with
Freud, with memories from her travels in Greece, and recollections of her family.
She explains her style as follows: "I do not want to become involved in the strictly
historical sequence. I wish to recall the impressions, or rather I wish the impressions
to recall me. Let the impressions come in their own way, make their own sequence"
(14).98 The way in which she allows impressions to narrate her Tribute reflect the
influence the structure of the psychoanalytic session has on her writing. As different
images are described, they are framed within a greater context, given significance
and linked to other events that have come before or will come later. Situating her
recollections within a greater structural meaning is reflective of the analyst's role,
who takes his patient's recollections and 'makes sense' of them within a wider
96 H.D.. Notes on Thoughts and I 'ision and the Wise Sappho (San Francisco: City Lights Books.
1982). p. 19. In the "Introduction." Albert Gelpi notes that Notes on Thoughts was originally written
in 1919 in notebook form with the inscription "July, Scilly Islands." p. 7. Subsequent references will
appear in the text
9 Susan Stanford Friedman. Psyche Reborn: The Emergence ofH.D. (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press. 1981). 17. Friedman also notes that H.D.'s relationship with Frances Brvher, who at
one time thought of becoming an analyst, was particularly influential in H.D.'s decision to seek
analysis with Freud, pp. 17-20.
98 As part of a 'cure' to H.D. s writing block. Freud suggest that she write a history of her life without
"embellishment or distancing masks." In her letters to Bryher. H.D. refers to this 'cure' as the "damn
vol." and expresses great frustration over having to write a "straight narrative." Psyche Reborn, p. 30.
Perhaps the style H.D adopts in Tribute is partly a resistance to write another "straight narrative." a
desire to let the events come as they do in her mind
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framework.
The narrative structure of HD.'s Tribute also suggests a movement between
the person she was in her analytic sessions with Freud during 1933 to 1934 and the
person she is when she writes Tribute to Freud. In her Tribute, H.D is returning to
the scene of analysis with Freud which initiates a revision of the analysis, or solution
that is initially proposed in the primary scene. Here I am referring to the 'primary
scene' as the analytic sessions H.D. has with Freud that she describes through her
impressions. She uses these impressions to construct what I am calling a 'secondary
scene' of analysis in which she reframes the primary scene in order to analyse both
herself and Freud. In her discursive return to the primary scene of analysis, H.D.
revises her position as analysand or student and asserts (inserts) herself as analyst.
The narrative glance is focused on the analyst in the primary scene, Freud, and on
herself as analysand. She looks at Freud looking on her 'former' self. The
construction of a secondary scene of analysis places the primary scene in a field of
representation. The narrative constructs a representation of the past and commands it
to perform again, this time under her direction However, as Miller argues, this
approach places H.D in a position of being an analyst to a dead analysand.
In her influential work on H.D. in Penelope's Web: Gender, Modernity,
H.D. 's Fiction, Susan Stanford Friedman explains the dynamics of H.D.'s text in a
similar way, taking note of the way H.D.'s narrative constructs two separate 'I's:
"H.D's texts about her analysis with Freud split the autobiographical subject, to
construct an 'I then' who was engaged in the talking cure with Freud and an 'I now'
who repeats that initial experience as a writing cure. Each text doubles the analysis
by recreating the primary scene of analysis in the past and then establishing a
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secondary scene of analysis constituted in and through the act of writing."99 As
Friedman suggests, H.D's subjectivity is split between the 'cured' narrator who has
already finished her analysis with Freud and the student who is still undergoing
analysis in the narrative Doubling back on herself, H.D. creates a rupture in the
constitution of her identity. She is both the woman she is now and the woman she
was then.
For example, within H.D.'s analysis of herself, she writes "I owned myself'
and then right after contradicts this statement by adding: "I did not really, of course
[. . .] But I had something" as if to demonstrate how the "I now" can look back on
the "I then" with a greater understanding of herself and of her relation to Freud (13).
H.D. is not only establishing herself as a woman writer, but she is rewriting the way
in which she knows herself in relation to Freud. She can re-enter the analytic scene
of the past and construct for herself what she wants it to be; a dialogue between
Freud and H.D, a passage into knowing herself and her place within psychoanalysis.
As she writes: "[Freud and I] had come together in order to substantiate something"
(13).
The autobiographical style of H.D.'s Tribute to Freud may seduce a literary
critic into playing the role of analyst. As a critic, I look upon H.D. looking upon
herself and her analyst, Freud. According to Miller's argument, I, as literary critic,
become analyst to my 'dead' analysands, H.D. and Freud, or I become an analysand
to my dead analysts, H.D. and Freud. However, by casting my reading into the "ms.
en abyme" 1 will draw out the precarious and unstable nature of analysing H.D.'s
analysis of her analytic experience. Instead of arguing towards a definitive
99 Friedman. Penelope's Web: Gender, Modernit\\ H.D. 's Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1981). p. 293.
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subjectivity for H.D. in order to gain feminist ground, I will examine the recognition
H.D. proposes between her poetic vision and Freud's psychoanalysis.
PART ONE: READING H.D. AND FREUD
ANALYST AND ANALYSAND
H.D. saw Freud on two separate occasions in Vienna between 1933 and 1934.
The first session took place from March la through June 12th in 1933, and the
second from October 31st to December 2nd, 1934. 100 H.D. begins her Tribute to
Freud by explaining that her return is marked by J.J. van der Leeuw's death, the man
whose analytic session with Freud came before her own. Upon hearing about van der
Leeuw's death in a plane crash, H.D. returns to see Freud in order to express her
sorrow, to which he replies: "You have come to take his place" (6). It is left unclear
whether "his place" refers to van der Leeuw's analytic session, for H.D. and van der
Leeuw have "exchanged 'hours'" (8) before, or whether H.D imagines she will take
van der Leeuw's place as the heir to psychoanalysis, a role she always expected van
der Leeuw would fulfil: "I felt all the time that he was the person who would apply,
carry on the torch - carry on [Freud's] ideas, but not in a stereotyped way" (6).
Although H.D. cites her reason for returning to Freud as a way of telling him
that she is sorry for van der Leeuw's death, her inclusion of Freud's response that
"she wants to take his place" suggests somewhat implicitly that his analysis of her
return is a more accurate reading. H.D.'s fond recollections of van der Leeuw have
less to do with the intimacy of their friendship - for as she admits they were
100 Louis H. Silverstein. "HerselfDelineated: Chronological Highlights of H.D.," in Signets: Reading
H.D.. ed. by Susan Stanford Friedman and Rachel Blau DuPlessis (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press. 1990). pp. 32-45. (pp. 40^t4).
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strangers (8) - than as a means of establishing herself as Freud's heir. Comparing
van der Leeuw to the winged messenger Mercury (7), H.D. suggests that his death
gives her a reason to return to the work she began with Freud in 1933 and yet not as a
patient, but as a student. The way in which H.D frames her return to Freud as both
an apology and as an acceptance of van der Leeuw's place suggests that she desires
to begin a 'new' relationship with Freud as his heir to psychoanalysis.
H.D makes it clear that she and van der Leeuw were not in analysis as
analysands, but as Freud's students, hence her belief that she or van der Leeuw was
in line to be Freud's 'heir.' Friedman makes an allusion to H.D.'s position as Freud's
student as opposed to his patient in Penelope's Web: "During the 1930's, Freud took
only analysands whom he considered 'students' of one kind or another. Most likely,
he assessed the potential of an analysand not only in terms of personal neurosis, but
also in connection with what he or she might contribute to the future of
psychoanalysis.'"01 The position that H.D. assumes in her narration as student, not
patient, not only changes the dynamics of her analytic sessions with Freud, but
affects the way she reffames and rewrites these experiences in Tribute to Freud If
she was Freud's 'student' at the time of her analysis, then her return to the scene
through writing signals the "I now" as someone who has not only learned from
Freud, but someone who now has the ability to analyse the situation in a manner that
Freud would approve of, or would even be impressed with.
H.D leaves a trace in her rewriting of a desire to establish herself as
'different' from other patients that have undergone analysis with Freud, as well as to
101 Friedman. Penelope's U'eb. p. 291; Friedman includes a reference to Smiley Blanion's Diary ofMy
Analysis with SigmundFreud, ed. MG. Blanton (New York Hawthorn Books. 1971). pp.5. 35 in the
text.
78
suggest that her relationship with Freud was different than that of purely
analyst/analysand. H.D. insists on her uniqueness amongst the people that are
protecting Freud, such as Princess George of Greece and those that attempt to
chronicle the events of his life, like Hann Sachs and Walter Schmideberg (14-15).
She appears particularly jealous of the role Princess George plays in Freud's life,
telling her readers that "I cannot compete with her. Consciously, I do not feel any
desire to do so. But unconsciously, I probably wish to be another equal factor or have
equal power of benefiting and protecting the Professor" (43). H.D.'s confidence in
using psychoanalytic terminology is evident in this example She recalls her
impressions in order to analyse both her conscious and unconscious desires.
However, in this example, as in the one concerning J.J. van der Leeuw's death, her
desire to be close to Freud or to assume a position that is separate from other people
in his life, is relegated to unconscious motives. In both examples, she states a desire
to assume a role in relation to Freud that is both unique and privileged (his heir), and
yet she is careful to put these desires either in the context of Freud's analysis of her
or in the realm of the unconscious. In doing so, she creates a distance between her
desires and her responsibility for them. If her desires are unconscious or if they are
part of Freud's analysis, not her own, then she cannot be held accountable or judged
unfairly for secretly desiring a unique position in Freud's life.
The narrative movement between Freud's analysis of H.D. and H.D.'s
analysis of herself displaces any real 'authority' or any 'one' way of analysing
H.D.'s desires. This movement between analyses also problematises the transference
between Freud and H.D. Although, the word transference does not appear in
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Tribute,™2 it is a fundamental part of the analytic experience and one that has been at
the centre of psychoanalytic debates since its conception.103 In terms of the analytic
scene, the underlying link in transference is between the analyst's desire and the
patient's desire. Transference occurs when the patient transfers his/her affections to
the analyst. In other words, the patient learns to love by loving the analyst first and
by seeing the analyst as the "subject who is supposed to know." 104 The analysand
must accept the analyst as the "subject who is supposed to know" in order for
her/him to transfer his/her desires. S/he must imagine that the analyst is the guardian
of the truth that s/he desires to discover. Although H.D. refers to Freud as a
"guardian" (103, 111) or "Door-Keeper" (98), the implicit suggestion is that he is a
reference point for her ideas, not a locus point for all truth and knowledge.
In one of their initial meetings, Freud tells H.D.: '"The trouble is - I am an
old man - you do not think it worth your while to love me'" (16) As if to say, I aw
an old man, how will you be able to transfer your affections to cm old man like me?
H.D. explains her first reaction as follows: "The impact of his words was too
dreadful - I simply felt nothing at all. I said nothing. What did he expect me to say?
Exactly it was as if the Supreme being had hammered with his fist on the back of the
couch where I had been lying. Why, anyway, did he do that9 He must know
everything or he didn't know anything" (16). Her references to the "Supreme being"
and to the fact that Freud must know everything or nothing at all, recall the position
102 Friedman notes that the word 'transference' does not appear in Tribute, although she argues that
H.D. alludes to a maternal transference, w hich will be discussed later in this chapter. Penelope's Web.
p. 315.
103 See also, Jacques Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, pp. 157-9; Sigmund
Freud. The FreudReader ed. Peter Gay. "Anna O." 60-78: "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of
Hysteria ("Dora"), pp. 234-239.
104 Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, pp. 230-243.
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of the analyst in transference.
H.D's description of her reaction to Freud's demand for love carries with it
the trace of the rewriting she is performing. She remembers her reaction: "I said
nothing," and includes an analysis of her feelings which reveal the knowledge gained
from doubling back. In her return to the primary scene, she is implying that Freud did
not perform the role he was supposed to as analyst. She later explains this
'confusion' of roles as a result of the impending war. Arriving at her appointed time
despite the Nazi occupation of Vienna, Freud is very surprised to see H.D. and asks
her why she has come. She replies: "What did he expect me to say? [ . . .] My being
there surely expressed it9 1 am here because no one else has come As if again,
symbolically, I must be different [. . .] I did not know what the Professor was
thinking. He could not be thinking, 'I am an old man - you do not think it worth your
while to love me.' Or if he remembered having said that, this surely was the answer
to it" (61-62). Her gesture is at once directed towards Freud and, at another, outside
the experience of analysis. Perhaps she expects Freud to step out of his role as
analyst and become patient to her listening and loving ears. The scene of analysis,
particularly between a man (analyst) and woman (patient) sets up desire in the
transference that is always negotiated and mediated by the analyst. In order for H.D.
to 'see' herself as an equal to Freud surely the roles would have to, at least once, be
reversed. Although the moment is not described or realised, the act of going back to
analyse Freud through her writing imposes a scene of analysis, although as Miller
suggests, she can only be the analyst to a "dead analysand."
H.D. suggests that what she is doing in her Tribute is different and in some
respects, more important and more in tune with what the Professor would want. She
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writes: 'T did not want to murmur conventional words, plenty of people had done
that. If I could not say exactly what I wanted to say, I would not say anything [. . .]
The flowers and the words bear that in common, they are what I want, what I waited
to find for the Professor"(63). She draws attention to the flowers that she waits to
find for Freud knowing that gardenias are his favourite and that unlike other friends,
she will not send anything in substitution for what she knows he desires most. Her
attention to detail seems, at least in part, a need to be more than just a student or
patient of Freud's. She tries to carve out a unique role for herself, there are
protectors, biographers, friends, family, but she wants to be something different
altogether. The prevalence of the T in her explanation draws attention to her desire
to be unique to Freud's life. The 'I' also draws attention to the fact that this tribute is
more for H.D.'s benefit than for its benefactor: this is her project, her way of
addressing Freud She waits to find the words that will capture the knowledge she
has gained of herself, and perhaps more importantly in this instance, of Freud's
desires.
H.D's return to the scene of analysis can be read as a lover's return to
familiar places and ideas shared. It is hard not to read H.D.'s descriptions of Freud as
a sign of her love for him: "Maybe he laughed at the jokes, I don't know. His
beautiful mouth seemed always slightly smiling, though his eyes, set deep and
slightly asymmetrical under the domed forehead (with those furrows cut by a master
chisel), were unrevealing. His eyes did not speak to me" (73). There are several ways
of interpreting H.D.'s admission that Freud's eyes did not "speak" to her. She could
be indicating that Freud did not return her gaze. Lying on a couch with Freud at his
desk it would be hard to see into his eyes. In their article titled "Bergasse 19: Freud's
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office," Diana Fuss and Joel Sanders draw attention to the physical layout of the
analyst's office in order to explain the connection between the architecture of
Freud's room and the workings of the analytic mise en scene. As Fuss and Sanders
explain: "The consulting room chair stands as a fundamentally uninhabitable space, a
tribute to the imposing figure of the analyst who remains, even to the searching eye
of the camera, totally and enigmatically other."105 Perhaps Freud's eyes do not
"speak" to H.D. because she cannot see them from her perspective.
H.D.'s impression can also be read as a sense of frustration that she cannot
be an analyst to Freud. In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
Jacques Lacan writes in reference to the gaze that: "From the outset, we see, in the
dialectic of the eye and the gaze, that there is no coincidence, but, on the contrary, a
lure. When, in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and always
missing is that - You never look at me from the place from which 1 see you"]06
H.D.'s awareness that Freud's eyes did not "speak" to her could suggest that he does
not put himself in H.D.'s position, from the 'place from which she sees him.' As long
as this is true, then they are just analyst and analysand. I am suggesting that she both
desires to be recognised by Freud and yet can only achieve this recognition through
rewriting the events between them in analysis. In her return to the primary scene of
analysis she can enact the love, the reciprocity, and the recognition that she originally
desires and that she imagines is there from the beginning.
105 Diana Fuss and Joel Sanders. "Bergasse 19: Freud's Office," in Stud: Architectures ofMasculinity
ed. by Joel Sanders (New York : Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 112-137. (p. 134).
1(16 Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, pp. 102-3.
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SYMPTOM AND INSPIRATION
Within her re-writing and remembering of her analysis with Freud, H.D. draws
a distinction between her 'methodology' and Freud's, suggesting their mutual ability
to heal and cure, however different their strategies may be: "So again I can say the
Professor was not always right. That is, yes, he was always right in his judgements,
but my form of rightness, my intuition, sometimes functioned by the split-second
(that makes all the difference in spiritual time-computations) the quicker" (98). The
'I' here is the "I now" that looks back at herself, and in this case, at Freud. In her
return to the scene through writing she can identify that he was not always right and
yet she does so in order to suggest that her own form of analysis functions at a level
different from his own, and yet with similar powers to cure.
In Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H.D., Susan Stanford Friedman notes
the way H.D. combines Freud's analytic terminology with her own rhetoric. She
notes that: "H.D. paired [Freud's] word 'symptom' with her own 'inspiration,' a
word choice that vividly contrasts their different purposes in their collaboration to
decode the unconscious [. . .] As 'signs' rather than 'symptoms,' these visions
brought messages that could reaffirm her belief in and her knowledge of 'highest
truth.'"10' Friedman marks out a very important distinction between Freudian analysis
and H.D.'s integration of analysis into her writing and analysis of herself. The
pairing of the word 'symptom' with 'inspiration' changes the implications in the
process of a 'cure' in analysis. 'Symptom' implies a degeneration or failure,
something is not working or functioning properly which causes the body or mind to
break down and exhibit 'symptoms' of this failure These 'symptoms' are used in
10
Friedman- Psyche Reborn, p. 101.
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analysis both to diagnose and cure. In pairing 'symptom' with 'inspiration,' H.D.
suggests that the ailment can lead towards a greater understanding of self and/or her
art: a breakthrough instead of a breakdown. Inspirations, as opposed to symptoms, in
H.D's interpretation, lead to a questioning, a path, a desirable search for truth and a
notion of self.
H.D.'s belief in the power of inspiration is evident throughout the text,
particularly in regards to the "writing on the wall" she sees in Greece. She argues
that Freud understands her most "dangerous 'symptom" (41) to be the "writing-on-
the-wall" that she sees in Corfu at the end of April 1920. H.D. describes the images
she sees projected onto her hotel wall as "colorless transfers" (45). The first image is
the torso of a person who she imagines may be her brother, for he had recently died
in the war (45). The second image is of a goblet or cup, which she imagines
representing the "mystic chalice" (45) and the third is a simple design of two
entwined circles. Although the images lend themselves to various interpretations,
H.D. does not offer any particular ones to her reader. She is more interested in how
Freud understands these images to be "dangerous symptoms" rather than what each
one stands for individually.
H.D. connects the "writing on the wall" with her earlier experiences,
suggesting that they are all interrelated and connected to her sessions with Freud:
"But there I am seated on the old-fashioned Victorian sofa in the Greek island hotel
bedroom, and here I am reclining on the couch in the Professor's room, telling him
this, and here again am I, ten years later, seated at my desk in my own room in
London [. . .] Here is this hieroglyph of the unconscious or subconscious of the
Professor's discovery and life-study, the hieroglyph actually in operation before our
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very eyes. But it is no easy matter to sustain this mood, this 'symptom' or this
inspiration" (47). In this example, H.D has created a 'third scene' which
replaces/displaces the original 'primary' scene of her analysis with Freud. She
suggests that this earlier event inspires her interest in analysing her impressions, or in
this case, her visions. In this way H.D. pairs her "inspiration" with Freud's
"symptom" and his analysis of these visions with her own The only consistency in
the "no clock-time" (47) of H.D.'s impressions is H.D.: she fixes herself at the
horizon of the past, the present and the future.
H.D.'s "writing on the wall" or "dangerous symptoms," as Freud diagnoses
them, refer the reader back to H.D.'s visit to Corfu with Bryher in 1919-1920 and
also make reference to her notebooks from this time period, later titled Notes on
Thoughts and Vision It is no coincidence that these notebooks are a recording of
H.D.'s theories on the psyche, what she terms the "over-mind" or 'jelly-fish
consciousness' (19). In her Notes, H.D. imagines the "over-mind" as a sort of hat, a
"cap of consciousness," (18) that hovers over the head. She extends this metaphor to
suggest that long feelers, like tentacles, extend from the "over-mind" down around
the body. According to her model, the centre of consciousness shifts between the
brain and the "love-region" of the body (19-20) She argues that vision arises in two
ways: from the brain and from the womb or love-region which she believes to be
responsible for the majority of dreams and visions (20). H.D. implies that women are
more able to have visions and dreams because of their womb, although she does offer
the 'love region' as a male counterpoint She does not explicitly sex this difference,
but the emphasis on the womb implies that women are more inclined to experience
visions than men.
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Referring back to the "writing on the wall" in her hotel room in Greece, H.D.
constructs an alternative way to read her analytic sessions with Freud. She suggests
that there were early signs or visions that led to her meetings with Freud. In this way,
she further develops her role as prophetess or visionary and their meetings as part of
a fated or destined happening. In the beginning she refers to the possibility that she is
meant to be Freud's heir, a possibility she develops through her 'difference' from the
other people in Freud's life, and through the similarity in their methodology. In
connecting her visions with her analytic sessions, H.D not only establishes her
unique position in regards to Freud but suggests that she has something to offer his
way of thinking that can and will change the face of psychoanalysis.
One of the clearest examples of H.D.'s desire to establish her own
interpretation of the psyche appears in a dream she has about an Egyptian princess, a
Pharaoh's daughter. It is not surprising that H.D. chooses an Egyptian princess to
associate with herself. Her interest in Egyptian and Greek mythology is present in
much of her work. She is introduced as "a fair young Greek revisiting earth" in one
collection of her poetry.'08 In the dream she narrates to Freud, a princess walks down
a long, marble staircase that leads to a river bank and to a small child who lies in a
basket or ark. H.D. admits that this dream comes from a picture she adored as a
child, entitled "Moses in the Bulrushes," and yet she implies that its implications
extend beyond childhood memories. In her dream analysis, H.D. asks: "Do I wish
myself, in the deepest unconscious or subconscious layers of my being, to be the
founder of a new religion9" (37). Again H.D. distances herself from her desires, this
time by phrasing them in terms of a question. Posing this secret desire in the context
108
Hughes Mearnes. "Introduction." in H.D. The Pamphlet Poets (New York: Simon and Shuster.
1926), pp. 5-6.
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of a question allows her to introduce the possibility without committing to the task of
actually finding a "new religion."
Perhaps more interesting than her veiled desire to find a "new religion," is the
way she frames her dream analysis within an Oedipal triangle with Freud as father,
H.D. as mother, and her dream as child: "A girl-child, a doll, an aloof and silent
father form this triangle, this family romance, this trinity which follows the
recognised religious pattern. Father, aloof, distant, the provider, the protector - but a
little un-get-at-able, a little too far away and giant-like in proportion, a little chilly
withal, Mother, a virgin, the Virgin, that is, an untouched child, adoring, with faith,
building a dream, and the dream is symbolized by the third member of the trinity, the
Child, the doll in her arms" (38). Instead of imagining herself as the child, or
daughter to Freud, as some may expect or even theorise, H.D. imagines herself in the
role of mother and therefore as wife to Freud. Interestingly she writes in the very
beginning of her Tribute: "1 said I had not met the Frau Professor but had heard that
she was the perfect wife for him and there couldn't be - could there?-- a greater
possible compliment" (3). I am not suggesting here that H.D. wanted to be Freud's
wife, for that position was taken, however, what is implied in her dream analysis as
well as in her attempts to construct a symmetry between them, is that she desires to
be his compliment, his Other, and for the two of them to work together to create her
dream (child)
A "WORDLESS CHALLENGE"109
H.D. imagines the relationship between herself and Freud as one of difference
109 H.D.. Tribute to Freud, p. 99.
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and similarity; they are separate and yet connected. She describes their interaction
with the phrase "wordless challenge," a phrase that expresses both the silent and
perhaps psychic exchanges between them, as well as the effect H.D. imagines her
presence has on Freud. She outlines the "wordless challenge" as follows: "The
wordless challenge goes on, 'You are a very great man. I am overwhelmed with
embarrassment, I am shy and frightened and gauche as an over-grown school-girl
But listen. You are a man. Yofi is a dog. I am a woman. If this dog and this woman
'take' to one another, it will prove that beyond your caustic implied criticism - if
criticism it is - there is another region of cause and effect, another region of question
and answer" (99). H.D.'s "wordless challenge" can be rephrased to read: I am a
woman, and although I may be shy and scared in the presence of someone I admire
and respect, I will not abandon my own set of beliefs in order to conform to yours.
For you are a man, not a God. And you need to listen to what I have to offer you,
because there is another way of understanding the unconscious, another way to cure
the psyche, and I have discovered something, something that I have brought for you
to understand and learn.
H.D.'s "wordless challenge" is a central focus in H.D.'s Tribute. It is a demand
that Freud listen to what she envisions. H.D. demands that Freud listen to what she
has to say by reconstructing their meeting with each other. Returning to these
'scenes' through writing allows her to turn the scene of analysis around. In doing so
she proposes another way of recognising each other, another way of analysing for the
'truth,' one that is complimentary to psychoanalysis.
H.D.'s vision involves recognition of the separate but connected forces in life
and death. She represents her understanding of dualistic thinking with her 'signet:'
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the figure of the thistle and the serpent. In a way similar to the '"writing on the wall,"
H.D frames her discovery of the thistle and serpent in connection with Freud. She
suggests, once again, that she was destined to meet him at some point and knew this
at an early age. She begins her explanation of how she first encounters the thistle and
serpent by writing: "I did not know exactly who he was and yet it seems very
obvious now" (64). In doing so, H.D. emphasises their interconnected lives. She first
imagines the image of the thistle and the serpent in a dream she has when she is
eighteen or nineteen. At the time she tells her closest friend, Ezra Pound, who
convinces her that her dream is a flashback from the past or a prophesy of the future.
He also connects the image with "Asklepios, the 'blameless physician"' (65) the
name she later gives to Freud in the dedication to Tribute: "To Sigmund Freud:
blameless physician."
H.D. weaves the image of the thistle and serpent through the important events
in her life in order to signify its relevance to her relationship with Freud. She sees the
thistle and serpent in the Louvre during her travels to Europe and in Corfu, when she
sees the "writing on the wall." Most importantly, she sees the thistle and serpent
within Freud's collection of statues and objects on his desk. However, H.D. does not
tell Freud about this image and its importance to her life when she finds it amongst
his favourite pieces. For H.D. this private discovery is a confirmation that she is
meant to meet Freud as well as a 'sign' that she and Freud have a unique relationship
with each other.
She emphasises this connection with a small digression into the linguistic
etymology of the word "signet." She writes: "Sign again - a word, gesture, symbol,
or mark intended to signify something else. Sign again - (medical) a symptom,
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(astronomical) one of the twelve parts of the Zodiac. Again sign - to attach a
signature to, and sign-post - a direction post"(66). Musing on the word "sign," H.D.
pairs the psychoanalytic usage with a creative and artistic one ('symptom' with
'inspiration') as well as suggesting the way different, and even opposing,
interpretations can be contained within one word.
In his introductory essay to H.D's Notes on Thought and Vision, entitled "The
Thistle and the Serpent," Albert Gelpi describes H.D.'s signet as, "not separate and
antagonistic, but paired,'"10 and an "essential contradiction and connection.'"11
Gelpi's interpretation applies not only to H.D.'s thistle and serpent signet but also to
her approach to psychoanalysis through her relationship with Freud. Although they
are very different from each other, what H.D stresses in her Tribute is that there is
also an inherent connection between them. Through her examples, such as the
"writing on the wall" and the symbol of the thistle and serpent, H.D. suggests that
fate destines their meeting and by writing these experiences in her Tribute she
ensures that they will remain connected
One problem worth noting in H.D.'s vision of a 'new religion' in Tribute to
Freud is that the recognition she imagines only happens through her impressions and
construction of a secondary analytic scene. The absence of Freud's work from
Tribute to Freud places stress on Freud as a man, rather than Freud as the founder of
psychoanalysis. In describing Freud as a 'man' not analyst, H.D. can facilitate
recognition between them Through her analysis of events and of her position in
relation to Freud, she can imagine the possibility of a recognition that places her on a
110 Albert Gelpi. "The Thistle and the Serpent." in the introduction to H.D. s. Notes on Thought and
Tision and the Wise Sappho (San Francisco. City Lights Books. 1982). p. 13.
11'
Gelpi. "The Thistle and the Serpent" p. 14.
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level footing with Freud, however her relationship remains within her poetic vision,
not in discourse with Freud. As Miller argues, H.D is always analyst to a dead
analysand.
"DIALECTICS OF RECOGNITION"112
In her Notes on Thought and Vision H.D argues that: "We must be 'in love'
before we can understand the mysteries of vision [. . .] We begin with sympathy of
thought. The minds of the two lovers merge, interact in sympathy of thought" (22).
H.D.'s vision of recognition between man and woman 'in love' anticipates Irigaray's
most recent work in I Love to You: Sketch ofa Possible Felicity in History Drawing
from her work on sexual difference and influenced by her re-reading of Hegel,
Irigaray imagines a felicity in history contingent on the possibility of recognition
between the sexes. Her argument centres on a relation between man and woman that
encourages a positive form of recognition. She writes: "Recognition is the act that
could enable the hierarchical domination between the sexes to be overcome, which
could restore woman and man, women and men, to their respective identity and
dignity, and which should bring about relations that are cultured, spiritual and not
merely natural, relations founded upon a form of indirection or intransitivity. And so:
I love to you, rather than: I love you.'"13 Through recognition, Irigaray suggests that
it is possible to be in a dialectical relationship that is not all encompassing, nor
possessive, instead it encourages dialogue and discourse.
112 The phrase 'dialectics of recognition' comes from reading Luce Irigaray's J Love to You and
Helene Cixous's "First Names of No One." The Helene Cixous Reader, ed Susan Sellers (London:
Routledge. 1994), p. 33.
113 Luce Irigaray. I Love to You: Sketch ofa Possible Felicity in History, trans. Alison Martin (New-
York: Routledge. 1996). pp. 101-102.
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Irigaray outlines her understanding of recognition in order to clarify that she
does not intend for 'man' and 'woman' to become interchangeable or reducible to
each other. Part of the recognition she envisions includes a distinct sexed identity,
which she terms a "generic identity."11'' Before outlining the problems with Irigaray's
model, it is important to clarify the way she imagines this relationship between man
and woman will function. Statements such as: "I go towards that which enables me to
become while remaining myself,'"15 underline the separate and yet connected
movement between the 'I' and the 'You' in Irigaray's vision Instead of constructing
a union between man and woman in which one becomes part of the other, Irigaray
formulates a dialectical relationship between the sexes which encourages
communication, not hierarchy.
Irigaray's sketch for a recognition between the sexes contains many similarities
to H.D.'s "wordless challenge" to Freud as well as to the ideas H.D. puts forward in
her Notes on Thought and Vision For example, H.D. writes: "These jelly-fish, I
think, are the 'seeds cast into the ground.' But as it takes a man and woman to create
another life, so it takes these two forms of seed, one in the head and one in the body
to make a new spiritual birth" (50). H.D. harks to nature and the laws of procreation
to theorise a dialectical relationship between man and woman in which each come
together to create a "new spiritual birth." "Spiritual" because in H.D.'s vision this
will not be a child, but a dream, a new way of thinking that is born of opposite and
yet connected forces.
In both Irigaray's and H.D.'s model of recognition, 'man' and 'woman' are
distinct and separate individuals. Their union is not designed to make them 'whole'
114
Irigaray. 1 Love to You, p. 65.
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Irigaray, I Love to You. p. 104.
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or 'one' rather it is to bring together difference in order to produce something from
the encounter. Tribute to Freud frames a meeting of this kind, to repeat H.D's
words: "[Freud and I] had come together in order to substantiate something" (13). By
returning to their analytic sessions as well as to events H.D. constructs as linked to
Freud, such as the symbol of the thistle and the serpent, she constructs a recognition
between herself and Freud in language.
H.D.'s and Irigaray's sketch for recognition is dependent upon sexual
difference. As Irigaray writes: "Only the recognition of the other as sexed offers this
possibility.'"16 Sexing the recognition sets up limitations for the possibilities both
envision. For example, situating a recognition between man and woman locates the
possibility for a happy history within a heterosexual framework. Arguments against
Irigaray's tendency to situate her theories within a heterosexual matrix have been
argued in particular by Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell.117
Introducing recognition between a 'man' and a 'woman' also implies that there
is such a thing as a man or a woman As mentioned in the last chapter, Irigaray is
often criticised for her tendency to essentialise the position of woman in her
theoretical formulations. She fails to problematise her construction of a "generic
female identity" or to engage with arguments such as Diane Elam's in Feminism and
Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme which open up the question of woman and explore
the impossibility of defining woman conclusively.
Although H.D does not call for a generic 'man' or 'woman' in her Notes on
Thought and Vision, as Irigaray's recognition does, she does stress the importance of
116
Irigaray. 1 Love to You. p. 105.
11 See also "The Future of Sexual Difference: An Inteniew with Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell."
Pheng Cheah and Elizabeth Grosz. Diacritics 28.1 (1998). pp. 19-42.
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"womb" vision over "vision of the brain" (20). As discussed before, H.D argues that
vision arises from two places: the brain and the womb (20). Although she does add a
"corresponding love-region of a man's body" (20) to counter the importance she
places on the womb she still maintains that "the majority of dream and of ordinary
vision is vision of the womb" (21). The distinction H.D draws is subtle and can be
read as inconsequential. However, considering the stress psychoanalysis places on
the role of the Phallus, I would argue that H.D is trying to establish a way in which
women are equal to men (if not better) in their ability to understand the "mysteries of
vision" (22).
H.D. needs to determine a way to read men and women as equal in order to
suggest that their union will lead to a greater understanding of life and death. Like
Irigaray's recognition, H.D.'s vision relies on a heterosexual union, her vision for
spiritual knowledge is predicated upon a mental union between man and woman. She
argues that "We must be 'in love' before we can understand the mysteries of vision,"
(22) the "we" implicating 'man' and 'woman.' In other words, the key to the
"mysteries of vision" can only be unlocked by a "sympathy of thought" between the
sexes. Like Irigaray's "I Love to You," H.D.'s idea is based on a recognition of love
and mutual understanding.
PART TWO: FEMINIST CRITICISM OF H.D.'S TRIBUTE TO FREUD
Before we, as feminists, jump to pull together the threads of a new feminist
analysis in H.D.'s works, it is important to consider the way in which we would be
reinscribing ourselves into another restrictive framework. Instead of trying to glean
through H D.'s texts in order to discover what we may imagine to be a 'true' or 'real'
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feminist form of analysis, or to use H.D. as a representative of feminism to re-read
Freud's patriarchal influence on her, I suggest that we find in Tribute to Freud a
possibility for recognition that may help us to move beyond 'us' and 'them'
arguments in feminism and psychoanalysis. As H.D. writes in Notes on Thought attd
Vision. "My sign-posts are not yours, but if I blaze my own trail, it may help to give
you confidence and urge you out of the murky, dead, old, thousand-times explored
old world, the dead world of overworked emotions and thoughts" (24). In order to
get out of the "murky, dead, old, thousand-times explored old world" it is necessary
to confront and recognise the limitations placed on alternative approaches without
reinscribing ourselves within new restrictions. One way of doing so is to investigate
the feminist criticism of Tribute to Freud in order to examine the ways in which it
simultaneously limits and expands the possibilities of reading feminism and
psychoanalysis together.
DESIRE IN TRANSFERENCE
Throughout my reading of Tribute to Freud, I have made references to Susan
Stanford Friedman's texts as they comprise an authoritative and exhaustive body of
criticism on H.D.'s writing. Friedman's work is particularly influential to feminist
interpretations of H.D's work, as earlier criticisms often pay more attention to the
effect male writers, such as Ezra Pound and D.H. Lawrence, have on H.D.'s work
rather than acknowledging her own contribution.118 Friedman's work is part of earlier
feminist projects that read for a distinct feminist subjectivity in order to establish a
writer such as H.D. in her own right. A project such as Friedman's is an essential
118 For example, see also Joseph Riddel. "H.D.'s Scene of Writing- Poetry as (and) Analysis." Studies
in the Literary Imagination, 12.1 (1979). pp. 41-59.
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part of moving beyond criticism that reduces women writers to their relations to
male writers, and yet her criticism inscribes its own restrictions and limitations even
in its emancipatory intentions.
Friedman's work on H.D. is largely developed through Psyche Reborn: the
Emergence of H.D. and Penelope's Web: Gender, Modernity, H.D. 's Fiction. The
title references to Greek mythology, to the interwoven style ofH.D.'s writing, and to
the idea of rebirth capture some of central issues in Friedman's criticism of H.D.'s
writing. The scope of this project cannot adequately consider each argument
Friedman develops, so I will focus in particular on a chapter from Penelope's Web
entitled "Desire: Working through the Maternal," as it demonstrates the way
Friedman becomes like an analyst to H.D.
Friedman suggests that the "new religion" H.D. desires and hints towards in
Tribute to Freud is authorised by her identification with Freud-as-father, but emerges
from her desire for Freud-as-Mother.1,9 As she argues: "Freud-as-Mother brought
back to the daughter what had been lost under the Law of the Father: the primal
Mother of the daughter's pre-Oedipal desire."120 To construct her reading of H.D.'s
maternal transference, Friedman draws heavily on an intertext between Tribute to
Freud, "Advent," and H.D.'s letters to her companion Francis Bryher.121 She argues
that there is a measurable degree of intimacy or honesty in these works, from Tribute
as the most public account and H.D.'s letters as the most private. Friedman reads
these works together as proof that H.D. is working through a maternal transference as
well as through her lesbian desire. She tells her readers that "clues exist in Advent"
119 Friedman. Penelope's Web. p. 313.
120 Friedman. Penelope's Web. p. 313.
121 Friedman concentrates more on the autobiographical half of Tribute to Freud entitled "Advent."
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but, as she goes on to write, "[H.D's] letters to Bryher are explicit.'"22
Friedman reads through a paternal and maternal transference between H.D and
Freud, situating H.D. as a daughter to Freud the father-mother. According to
Friedman, Freud becomes the parent H.D. never had, enabling her creative process as
well as encouraging her to think through her "new religion.'"23 Theorising H.D. as
daughter to the parental Freud places H.D. in a position where she is always learning
from Freud and always curbed by his authority and experience. Maintaining H.D. in
the position of daughter also inhibits recognition from taking place. H.D.'s successes
as daughter will always be read in terms of how they reflect Freud as parent not in
terms of how they may effect Freud as a thinker. In other words, if H.D. is Freud's
daughter than she is limited by the dynamics of the Oedipal constructs, she is always
in resistance or acting in relation to her desire, as Friedman theorises, instead of
acting on her own terms. Although it is clear through her work that Friedman wants
to establish H.D.'s subjectivity or her independence from Freud, by placing H.D. in
the role of Freud's daughter she does not succeed in doing so.
Friedman's emphasis on a maternal transference also implies that H.D.'s desire
for her mother masks her lesbian desire, an analysis that stems directly from Freud's
theorisation of lesbianism in "Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a
Woman.'"24 In his essay, Freud argues that lesbians refuse to accept their own
castration or their mother's and "love other women as a way of returning to the Pre-
Oedipal stage of desire.'"25 Friedman links Freud's theories with H.D.'s writing,
drawing particular attention to the letters H.D. wrote Francis Bryher
122 Friedman. Penelope's Web, p.319.
123 Friedman. Penelope's Web, pp. 327-328.
124 See Freud. Case Histories 11: The "Rat" man, Schreber, A Case ofFemale Homosexuality, ed
Angela Richards (London: Penguin Books. 1991).
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However, the letters to which Friedman refers have largely been altered by
Bryher's editing. Friedman suggests that Bryher wanted to edit out H.D.'s references
to orgasm over the "Mother/Lover'"26 image that is implied in what remains of
H.D.'s letters. As Friedman writes: "For posterity, Bryher may well have preferred
that H.D.'s desire for the Mother/Lover remain in the 'pure mythological state' of the
textual dream, with its erotic consequences in 'real' orgasm erased.'"27 Although
Friedman's analysis is plausible, it relies on the assumptions she makes of both
H.D.'s and Bryher's desires Because Bryher did cut out certain sections, Friedman's
textual analysis relies heavily on conjecture and therefore it is difficult to
substantiate. It is also problematic to use letters as means for analysis. Again Miller's
critique comes to mind: Friedman becomes analyst to a dead analysand
Friedman's examination of H.D.'s letters impose Freud's analysis and in so
doing, retrieve secret desires that may or may not have been there to begin with. In
doing so, Friedman becomes what Shoshana Felman calls a "Freudian critic," in that
she fills in the missing words of H.D.'s prose with the solution of sexual desire.128 As
Felman argues in "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," the "Freudian critic" pulls
answers from an imagined hiding place, "not so much to give an answer to the text as
to answerfor the text.'"29 By reading H.D.'s prose as confirmation of both a maternal
transference and lesbian desire, Friedman offers an answer for the text as it appears
no question has really been posed by the text.
Perhaps more problematic than reading H.D.'s maternal transference as a
125 Friedman. Penelope's Web. p. 320.
126 Friedman. Penelope's Web. pp. 321-322.
12 Friedman Penelope's Web. p. 322.
128 Shoshana Felman "Turning the Screw of Interpretation." pp. 104-105.
129 Felman "Turning the Screw of Interpretation" p. 105.
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symptom of lesbian desire is Friedman's suggestion that H.D.'s desire for her mother
is "the development of a gynopoetic empowered by the Mother/Muse.'"30 Friedman
argues that H.D.'s writing is an expression of her desire for the lost Mother.131 In
doing so she sets up an alternative reading of H.D. and Freud's relationship as one
governed by gynocentric rules instead of patriarchal ones. However, imagining Freud
as mother instead of father does not change Freud's role as authorising and mediating
H D.'s creative process. Freud is still placed in a position of authority in relation to
his daughter H.D.
Friedman implies that by changing the structure from a patriarchal to a
matriarchal arrangement she is giving H.D a feminist framework for her writing. She
may in fact be doing this; however, in associating Freud with a mother figure as
opposed to a father figure, H.D. is no more independent or unrestricted by the desire
of her parent(s). In changing Freud from father to mother, Friedman is still
attributing H.D.'s creative success to Freud's influence, in this case to his analysis of
her maternal transference. As Friedman argues: "By decoding her love ofGreece and
the Greek islands as a desire for the pre-Oedipal Mother, Freud had facilitated the
feminisation of her most potent symbol of creative inspiration."132 Feminising a work
does not necessarily mean that it becomes feminist In the case of H.D., whether or
not Freud is her 'mother' or her 'father,' he is not in a position to recognise the
extent to which her work can affect psychoanalysis.
Linking H.D.'s writing with a pre-Oedipal desire for the "Lost Mother/Muse,"
Friedman connects H.D.'s prose with a pre-discursive lack. Despite her intentions to
130 Friedman. Penelope's Web. p. 322.
131 Friedman. Penelope's Web. p 326.
132 Friedman. Penelope s Web. p 326.
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move H.D.'s writing away from patriarchal or reductive readings, Friedman's use of
psychoanalytic theories reinscribe H.D.'s writing and desire back into a limiting and
restrictive framework. Using gynocentric logic is only the counterpoint to using a
phallocentric or patriarchal logic, and therefore not necessarily capable of
recognising the multi-layered possibilities in H.D.'s writing.
FREUD AND H.D. AS "WE"
Instead of imagining Freud in the role of parent to H.D., Dianne Chisholm's
work in H.D. 's Freudian Poetics: Psychoanalysis in Translation examines the
possibility of a 'we' or "intertext"133 between H.D. and Freud. The difference
between the 'we' she imagines between H.D. and Freud and the recognition I have
suggested earlier, is that in her reading one stands in for the other as opposed to
imagining them each as separate identities. Chisholm cogently argues for a re¬
reading of Freud and H.D in terms of translation. In her reading of Tribute to Freud
she offers "the first full-length reading of the intertext 'H.D.-Freud,' or what [she]
call [s] H.D.'s translation of Freud."134 That is to say, that Chisholm reads H.D. and
Freud "side by side in search of interimplications,"135 a reading that demonstrates the
possibilities that reading 'side by side' offers.136 Chisholm distinguishes her work
from other feminist criticisms ofH.D.'s writing both in her approach and in the way
she imagines the "intertext" between H.D. and Freud.
Chisholm takes a passage from Tribute to Freud in particular to demonstrate
the 'we' that she believes exists between H.D. and Freud. The excerpt reads: "We can
133 Chisholm. Freudian Poetics, p. 1.
134 Chisholm. Freudian Poetics, p. 1.
135 Chisholm. Freudian Poetics, p. 2.
136 Chisholm derives her readings from Felman's essay "Turning the Screw of Interpretation."
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read my writing, the fact that there was writing, in two ways or more than two ways.
We can translate it as a suppressed desire for forbidden 'signs and wonders,' breaking
bounds, a suppressed desire to be a Prophetess, to be important anyway,
megalomania they call it - a hidden desire to 'found a new religion' which the
Professor ferreted out in the later Moses picture" (51). In this passage, H.D points
towards the multi-layered aspect of her writing as well as towards the multiple
interpretations it solicits. For Chisholm, the 'we' is a signpost for the interdependency
between Freud and H.D: "This process of writing, reading, translating is
emphatically collective: the 'we' who engage in the process are H.D. and Freud.
Neither functions without the other: it is H.D.'s dream text that is read in the light of
Freud's dream interpretation."137 Chisholm also argues that the 'we' includes the
reader in a subversive reading of the text in which Freud authorises H.D.'s repressed
desires to be a Prophetess, allowing her to consider her megalomaniac ambitions. As
she explains: "Freud collaborates in authorizing her dream of writing visionary
poetry, a kind of 'projective verse' that has the capacity to signify more than merely
the neurosis or nostalgia of a modern, discontented ego."138
There is evidence in Tribute to Freud to support Chisholm's argument of
interdependency between H.D and Freud For example, H.D. writes: "'Look,' I
would say to this Kindly Being, 'those two on your shelf there - just make the
slightest alteration of the hour-glasses. Put H.D. in the place of Sigmund Freud (I
will still have a few years left in which to tidy up my not very important affairs)"
(74). She suggests that she would trade her life for his. But this gesture seems more
Romantic than proof of their interdependency. And it is H.D. sacrificing herself for
13 Chisholm. Freudian Poetics, p. 10.
138 Chisholm. Freudian Poetics, p. 11.
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Freud. Would Freud do the same9
In order to counter Chisholm's analysis of a 'we' between H.D. and Freud, I
will add Jacques Derrida's suggestion in Resistances of Psychoanalysis that "This
logico-grammatical modality seems interesting because, among other things, it is
always me who says 'we'; it is always 'I' who utters 'we,' supposing thereby, in
effect, in the asymmetrical structure of the utterance, the other to be absent, dead, in
any case incompetent, or even arriving too late to object."139 In Derrida's analysis,
unlike Chisholm's, the 'we', far from implying a collective understanding, implies a
singular and perhaps predatory relationship to the act of interpreting. Following
Derrida's analysis of 'we,' H.D. is not participating in a dual reading of her own
words; instead she is revising the analysis in the full knowledge that Freud will be
too late to object. "The one signs for the other," as Derrida suggests. Chisholm's
critique, like other feminist critiques of H.D's work, attempts to establish H.D. on
an equal par with Freud The notion of translation places H.D. and Freud in an equal,
but also an interdependent relationship In such a relationship, as Derrida suggests in
his analysis of 'we,' one will always sign for the other, one will always possess the
other, thereby negating the possibility of an egalitarian correspondence.
Chisholm's 'we' operates differently from a recognition between H.D. and
Freud. And yet, each depends upon the return H.D makes to her analytic experiences
with Freud. Following Diane Elam's model of the "ms. en abyme" allows us to think
of H.D. and Freud as infinitely receding the other's grasp. They are neither subject
nor object to each other, rather they are caught in a play between the two positions.
139
Jacques Derrida. Resistances ofPsychoanalysis, trans, by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford
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H.D. AND FREUD
Claire Buck's work in H.D. and Freud: Bisexuality and a Feminine Discourse,
revises and builds upon Friedman's feminist criticism in order to problematise
feminist readings of H.D. 's work. Whilst Friedman argues for H.D.'s status as a
woman writer (amongst many other cogent ideas), Buck investigates the model(s) of
the self that H.D. constructs through her writing.'40 Buck's approach is
interdisciplinary. She interweaves feminist theory and psychoanalysis with H.D.'s
writings, claiming that "H.D.'s writing is exemplary of the question which
psychoanalysis has posed both women and feminism since the 1970's.'"41 The
'question' as Buck refers to it is really a series of questions raised within feminist
revisions of Freudian psychoanalysis, questions that revolve around the reception of
theories such as the castration and the Oedipus complexes.
Buck argues that early feminist work on H.D., such as Friedman's,
demonstrates how H.D. could make use of Freud's theories on sexuality and
subjectivity (amongst other conceptual issues) without relegating herself to the
position of lack that the castration complex insists upon.142 However, Buck argues, as
I have, that Friedman's argument is predicated on a system that is itself heavily
invested in phallocentric logic. Buck points out that in readings which counterpose
woman as defined by lack to woman defined as whole are one in the same: "The
dependence of both readings on the same structure prevents either argument from
successfully countering the other.'"43 This circular logic does not liberate feminist
140 Claire Buck. H.D. and Freud: Bisexuality' and a Feminine Discourse (London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf. 1991). p. 3.
141 Buck. H.D and Freud, p. 98.
142 Buck. H.D. and Freud, p. 98.
143 Buck H.D. and Freud, p. 100.
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readings on H.D from conservative (and by some accounts, anti-feminist) readings;
it only moves the reader in a circle from one side to the other. Arguing against
phallocentric logic by using it only strengthens its dominance.
Whereas I agree with Buck's analysis, I do not necessarily agree with her
'solution' - a word I put in brackets as I am not suggesting that Buck sees Lacanian
theory as a cure for a structural dependency on psychoanalysis, but rather as one
answer Buck suggests that Lacanian psychoanalysis can offer a new approach to
reductive arguments. As she writes: "It is here that I would argue that Lacanian
theory, with all its problems, remains important for feminist work on sexual
difference.'"44 Buck argues that by positing sexual difference in the field of
representation, the intersection between H.D's work and psychoanalysis can move
beyond the binary oppositions of lack and wholeness 145 Diane Elam's "ms. en
abyme," with its unique feminist slant, helps to problematise the 'answer' Buck
imagines she finds within Lacanian theory.
The "ms. en abyme," as discussed earlier, upsets any direct correspondence
between subject and object in the field of representation. This model is particularly
important in light of feminist politics as it does not insist on woman as a stable
subject or object, for each position carries its own limitations and restrictions. Instead
of declaring that "woman does not exist," as Lacan does in Encore, and as discussed
in the first chapter, we, as theorists, can leave woman "both determined and yet to be
determined.'"46 Using the model of the "ms. en abyme" to think through the
relationship between H.D. and Freud allows us to move beyond static definitions of
144 Buck. H.D. and Freud, p. 100.
145 Buck. H.D. and Freud, pp. 100-101.
146 Elam. Feminism and Deconstruedon. p. 27.
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analyst and analysand or, as Buck mentions, beyond the binary opposition of lack
and wholeness, without inscribing the intersection between H.D. and Freud within
another phallocentric logic (Lacan's).
Buck argues that Tribute to Freud offers a reading of what it is like to be
engaged in the process of defining and understanding the role of woman or
femininity in psychoanalysis. H.D.'s text does not offer meaning or answers,
according to Buck, rather, she offers her readers a work-in-progress.147 Buck suggests
that "In Tribute to Freud the representation of the analytic scene itself dramatises the
processes of reading as relationships of desire in which psychoanalysis loses its own
position of mastery as a reader of a feminine text of gaps, holes and lacks.'"48
Although I would agree that what H.D. offers her readers is a 'work-in-progress' and
a dramatisation of the reading of desire, I would not go so far as to suggest, as Buck
does here, that these readings destabilise the mastery of psychoanalysis. Instead I
would argue that the conception of 'one' reading or 'one' meaning in the account
H.D. offers is destabilised. The possibility of multiple readings negates the
possibility of any one reading. And so, it is not only psychoanalysis that loses its
mastery, but also a purely feminist reading. What H.D. leaves us with is not a victory
for feminism over a dominant psychoanalysis, but ambivalence towards the
possibility of any one meaning, reading, or notion of'truth.'
In Buck's argument as well as in Friedman's and Chisholm's, there is a desire
to make wider claims for feminism through H.D.'s interaction with Freud in her
Tribute. It is difficult to resist trying to read a new way of approaching the precarious
relationship between feminism and psychoanalysis in the encounter between a
147 Buck. H.D. and Freud, p. 100-102.
148 Buck. H.D. andFreud, p. 102.
woman writer and the 'founding father' of psychoanalysis, particularly given the
problematic history between psychoanalysis and feminism. My own reading
demonstrates a similar impulse to find a way of bringing the two writers together, of
theorising a way of moving beyond the 'us' and 'them' arguments. However,
perhaps what H.D.'s text performs most explicitly is the impossibility of any one
reading of desire or any one analysis of the complex relationship between analyst and
analysand.
H.D. gestures towards this indeterminacy by relating the analytic scene to a
game In "Advent," the more meditative account of H.D.'s sessions with Freud, she
writes:
But it is true that we play puss-in-a-corner, find one angle and another or
see things from different corners or sides of a room. Yes, we play hide-
and-seek, hunt-the-slipper, and hunt-the-thimble and patiently and
meticulously patch together odds and ends of our picture-puzzle We spell
words upside down and backward and crosswise, for our crossword
puzzle, and then again we run away and hide in the cellar or the attic or in
our mother's clothes-closet. We play magnificent charades. But the
Professor insisted I myself wanted to be Moses; not only did I want to be
a boy but I wanted to be a hero (119-120).
Drawing a parallel between games such as "hide-and-seek" and "hunt-the
slipper," H.D. implies that analysis involves finding a hidden something or
someone. Her analogy implies that psychoanalysis plays games, language
games ("crossword puzzle"), in order to formulate an answer or to find the
hidden secret of the analysand's desire. H.D. suggests that the scene of analysis
is like "charades;" Freud guesses what H.D desires based on the signs she
gives him and yet, as she adds, he continues to insist that she not only wants to
be a boy but also a hero. An inherent part ofH.D.'s text is to suggest that the
scene between analyst and analysand is playful, indeterminate, and also naive to
alternative ways ofunderstanding desire.
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3. Lacan and The Papin Sisters
H.D,'s suggestion that the game of hide-and-seek is analogous to the analytic
scene reminds us, as readers, that in analysis there is something to be found. That
'something' is positioned in psychoanalytic interpretations as the 'truth.' Where there
is a 'lack' there is also the implication of a 'truth' - to be found, discovered,
uncovered - "unveiled," as Derrida would say.149 Chapter Three demonstrates the
way Lacan simultaneously constructs a 'gap' for 'truth' and fills it with desire.
This chapter begins with a selected examination of Jacques Lacan's early
work, including excerpts from his doctoral thesis and an article entitled, "Motives of
Paranoiac Crime: The Crime of the Papin Sisters." I have chosen to look at Lacan's
work in particular because it is used frequently in feminist interpretations of issues
such as identity, subjectivity, the body and desire. As discussed in the last chapter,
feminist theorists such as Claire Buck turn to Lacanian theory for what they imagine
to be an alternative way to theorise the aforementioned issues. "Motives of Paranoiac
Crime: The Crime of the Papin Sisters," written by Lacan in 1933, is unique because
it is not based on Lacan's clinical work, but on a cultural event that moved most of
France. For this reason, as well as others, it is an ideal piece to consider and one that
demonstrates both the desire to 'make sense' of 'woman' and of 'desire' as well as
the impossibility of doing so.
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The critical returns to Lacan's article, discussed in the second part of this
chapter, demonstrate the way Lacan's critics behave as "Freudian critics," a term
Shoshana Felman uses to explain how critics read for the 'truth' of a text and often
answer with sexual desire. In critiques of Lacan's article, critics often look for the
'truth' in his work, thus giving him an authority he may not deserve. These critics
also place the notion of sexual perversion at the forefront of their arguments. In the
case of Lacan's article on the Papin sisters, critics pay more attention to the implicit
lesbian desire than to the horror of the crime the sisters commit. In order to draw out
these assertions, I will examine Jenny Holzer's project entitled Lustmord. Holzer's
work in Lustmord, voices the position of the observer, the victim and the perpetrator
in sexual crime. She also uses the body as a canvass in order to remind the viewer of
the physicality in violence, a site critics of Lacan's article overlook in their analyses.
DESIRED READINGS
Lacan's interest in surrealism, 'madwomen' and their writing shape his
approach to his doctoral work and to his analysis of the Papin sisters' case. His
earlier work also develops a theoretical framework that becomes central to the
interpretation of his influential "Mirror Theory." In her essay on women, surrealism
and self-representation, Whitney Chadwick draws surrealism and psychoanalysis
together believing they both hold the criminal, mad woman as a focal point of
inspiration. As she argues: "The surrealists [. . .] were indebted to Freud's and
Lacan's theories of the connection between vision and sexuality. The female
visionary - childlike, criminal, or mad - became the central figure in both surrealism
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and the emerging literature of psychoanalysis after World War I.'"50 As Chadwick
points out, the intersection between surrealism and psychoanalysis converges on the
figure of the mad or criminal woman, a figure that is a central focus in Lacan's early
work.
In one of his first publications,151 Lacan writes about a woman called
"Marcelle C." who Lacan diagnoses with "erotomania, paranoid delusions and
mental automatism52 In his critical reading of Lacan's work entitled Lacan in
Context, David Macey draws a connection between Lacan's work on "Marcelle C "
and surrealist concerns. He notes in his description of Lacan's article that "a parallel
is drawn between the writings of 'Marcelle' and the results obtained by the
surrealists in their experiments with automatic writing.'"53 Lacan elaborates further
on his study of "Marcelle C." in an essay he writes for the surrealist journal the
Minotaure, whose regular contributors include writers such as Paul Eluard and Andre
Breton as well as work by artists such as Salvador Dab, Pablo Picasso and Man Ray.
Lacan's article on "Marcelle C.," entitled, "Le probleme du style et les formes
paranoiques de l'experience," develops his theories on paranoid writing and style. He
uses writing from his patients such as "Marcelle C." to theorise a paranoid style of
writing, a theory he develops further in his doctoral thesis.
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It is not surprising given Lacan's interest and collaborative work with
surrealists such as Dali and Breton that Lacan's doctoral thesis receives greater
attention and interest from surrealist circles than from psychoanalytic circles.154 The
second part of Lacan's doctoral thesis, entitled "The case of Aimee, or self-punitive
paranoia" (1932), reviews his case studies on Aimee, a name he takes from his
patient's second novel. Aimee provides Lacan with the perfect opportunity to
continue the work on paranoid writing that he begins with "Marcelle C.," as well as
to develop his own style of writing, one largely inspired by those of his paranoid
patients. As Catherine Clement contends in her influential Lives and Legends of
Jacques Lacan. "[Lacan] learned a profound lesson from his paranoid female
patients: in order to make oneself understood, it is sometimes necessary to play with
a dangerously 'open' language.155 There is an implicit suggestion in Clement's
statement that Lacan's interest in these 'madwomen' is partly fuelled by his own
desire to discover the secrets of their 'mad' style. That is, to be able to write as they
do or to capture a certain amount ofmystery within his own writing.
Lacan begins his doctoral work on Aimee following her arrest for attempted
murder He begins his case history with the following description of Aimee's attempt
to kill Huguette Duflos,156 a celebrated actress: "The Assassination attempt On 10
April at eight o'clock in the evening Mme Z , a celebrated Parisian actress, [. . .] was
accosted at the stage-door by a stranger, who asked her: 'Are you Mme Z?' When
she replied in the affirmative, the stranger, according to Mme Z., assumed a different
facial expression, quickly took a knife out of her handbag and, with a look of hatred,
154
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155Catherine Clement The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan. p. 59.
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Huguette Duflos. p. 113.
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raised her arm ready to strike her.'"51 Lacan writes the event in the style of a
detective story or a murder mystery. He characterises Aimee as a deeply disturbed
and calculating woman determined to seek her revenge on "Mme. Z "
After her failed attempt at killing Duflos, Aimee is taken to the Saint-Anne
asylum, under the care of Clerambault, Lacan's supervisor.158 Lacan uses Aimee's
writing, like he does with "Marcelle C.'s" to theorise reasons for her madness. In
order to reach a diagnosis, he uses information taken from clinical intakes and, more
important for this critique, the novels Aimee wrote before she was imprisoned.
At the time of her arrest, Aimee had written two novels which Lacan
describes as "well-written.'"59 In his thesis, Lacan not only includes a plot synopsis
of Aimee's second novel, but also an excerpt from her novel, making her, in some
ways, the famous writer she fantasised about becoming. Lacan's thesis then not only
contains his recording of events, but the materiality of Aimee's novel. He includes
his analysis of her 'life' story (case history) and her fictional story. In the excerpt
Lacan includes, Aimee writes:
Coming out of the theatre one night I saw a procession go by. The main
figure in this was an old hag whose thighs must have been entered by
millions over the years. There she was with her retinue of parasites,
15 Jacques Lacan. "The case of Aimee. or self-punitive paranoia." (Second part. Le cas Aimee ou la
paranoia d'auto-punition. of De la Psvchose Paranoiaque dans ses Rapports avec la Personality)
(Paris: Le Francois) in The Clinical Roots ofthe Schizophrenia Concept: Translations ofSeminal
European Contributions on Schizophrenia, ed. by John Cutting and Michael Shepherd (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1987). pp. 213-226. (p. 213).
158 In Downcast Eyes. Jay argues that Lacan's interest in vision most likely comes from Clerambault's
influence. He also notes that Clerambault "reserved his most dramatic visual aa for the last Hating
lost his eyesight through cataracts, he decided on November 17, 1934. to end his life. Sitting in an
armchair in front of a mirror, he shot himself in the mouth." p. 340.
159 Lacan. "The Case of Aimee." p. 217. Lacan writes: "From a literary point of view the first is better
than the second, but both are well written."
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procurers and pimps [.. .] I was told that this was how things went on
round here [ . . .] Poets came up one by one to talk to the old hag.
Passers-by would grab hold of her thighs and the owner of the main
newspaper in the city had his way with her in front of everyone. I
couldn't go on. The procession stopped me. I asked people what the
whole thing meant, but no one would tell me. It must be a secret of the
theatre [. . .] It really is too crude, Madame, but you do it nonetheless.
You would never regard it as sinful. The whole thing is like a flying
brothel, the sort of thing you can buy in special bookshops.160
There is something Bahktinian and carnivalesque in the images the narration evokes.
The 'Madame,' whose "thighs have been entered by millions" is the spectacle of the
show; one that is outside the theatre and staged in the narration, not the event itself.
The narrator becomes an unknowing director, taking the old hag through this fantasy
whilst claiming naivete and innocence for herself. She maintains that the "secret of
the theatre" comes from outside, someone 'tells' her what happens. The fact that the
narrator continues to look at the procession, although repulsed by what she sees,
suggests both her disgust and attraction Initially the reader is led to believe that the
narrator can not go on looking at images, such as a man and woman having sex ("I
couldn't go on") because of her own disgust. And yet this blocked passage is
followed with the admission that it is because "the procession stopped me;" they
limit her search for the meaning of the event, for the hidden "secret of the theatre."
The procession is responsible for the boundaries that keep her from the knowledge
she seeks. No one will give her answers although she is clearly asking questions.
160 Lacan. "The Case of Aimee," p. 218.
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Perhaps the knowledge she seeks can be found in the "special bookshops" she
refers to at the end. These "special bookshops" are designed for the indulgence of
pornographic or sexually explicit material, and yet shunned by the more 'proper'
elements of society. The reference to "special bookshops" may remind the reader of
different kinds of writing and reading, particularly those with a sexually explicit
content. The allusion also draws attention to the location of this extreme and
grotesque sexual desire in text, the texts in "special bookshops," and the text of
Aimee's novel (not to mention the text of Lacan's thesis). There is an implicit
suggestion of a binary opposition between desires of attraction and repulsion,
wanting to know more about this "secret of the theatre" and yet afraid to discover
what it means.
The tension between the binary opposition of repulsion and attraction in the
text may recall, for some readers, Helene Cixous's work in The Newly Born Woman.
In "Sorties," Cixous argues that writing contains the self and the other, both in
harmony and in friction with each other. She writes: "Writing is the passageway, the
entrance, the exit, the dwelling place of the other in me - the other that I am and am
not, that I don't know how to be, but that I feel passing, that makes me live - that
tears me apart, disturbs me, changes me, who? - a feminine one, a masculine one,
some9 - several, some unknown, which is indeed what gives me the desire to know
and from which all life soars. This peopling gives neither rest nor security, always
disturbs the relationship to 'reality,' produces an uncertainty that gets in the way of
the subject's socialization. It is distressing, it wears you out; and for men this
permeability, this non-exclusion is a threat, something intolerable.'"61 If we apply
161 Helene Cixous and Catherine Clement, The Newly Born Woman, pp. 85-86.
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Cixous's argument to Aimee's text we can read the conflict of attraction and
repulsion to represent the tension in her life, the struggle between her desire to be a
writer, to have a sense of freedom, and the reality of her situation: mother of one
child, married and employed by the railway station. The friction between what she
desires to be and what she is may lead to the conflict Cixous suggests between
something that makes you live and something that drives you apart.
Lacan recognises the tension between what Aimee is and what she wanted be,
however, he reads the presence of an 'Other' in Aimee's writing as a manifestation
of her desire for her ego ideal He argues that Aimee, in striking the actress, Huguette
Duflos, was in actuality striking her ego ideal and thus herself: "The sense of
freedom and social ease which writers, actresses and women of the world reputedly
possess were the very qualities which [Aimee] dreamt of obtaining. They were her
ideal, and at the same time the object of her hate. In striking the actress, Aimee
struck her externalised ideal, in the same way as someone driven by passion strikes
the unique object of their hate and their love.'"62 It is possible that an uncertainty of
identity leads Aimee to attack Huguette Duflos. Aimee's narrator attacks the old hag
textually, and the 'real' Aimee attacks with her own hands.
However, Lacan goes further with his analysis to suggest that there is a
sexual element to the friction he notices between the self (Aimee) and her ego ideal.
Lacan argues that this tension is symptomatic of a repressed homosexuality. In order
to substantiate his analysis, Lacan reads over the events in Aimee's history to locate
the moments that may support his hypothesis. Largely dismissing other details in
Aimee's case history - that she was married, that she sent love letters to the Prince of
162
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Wales, that her first love was the town's 'Don Juan'163 - all these signifiers of
heterosexuality are subjugated to the relationship she has with her mother and later
with her sister who comes to live with her and her husband. He suggests that
Aimee's relationship with her mother and sister exemplified a latent or repressed
homosexuality.
However, in substantiating his theories on repressed homosexuality, Lacan's
reading appears to overlook or dismiss other details of Aimee's life which exemplify
early experiences with paranoia. After losing her first child, Aimee blames her best
friend, believing her to be responsible: "Her child was born dead It was a girl,
asphyxiated by having the cord around its neck. She was devastated. She blamed it
all on her enemies, and in particular on a woman who for three years had been her
best friend.'"64 After giving birth to her second child, Aimee becomes preoccupied
and perhaps paranoid that someone will kill her son. When she is arrested she
explains that she believes that Huguette Duflos and a famous writer ("P.B.") are
conspiring to kill her son.165 For Lacan, all these reasons are 'flimsy.'166
The point here is not to assert an alternative motive or diagnosis, nor to solve
the crime on my own terms, rather it is to highlight the way Lacan reads the case for
what he is looking for, the way he places the events of Aimee's life into hierarchical
order according to his own theoretical assumptions. Instead of arriving at an answer,
Lacan goes back in search of the answer he is looking for: sexual desire. In doing so,
163 Lacan. "The Case of Aimee." pp. 214, 217, 222.
164 Lacan. "The Case of Aimee." p. 216.
165 Lacan. "The Case of Aimee." pp 216-217.The irony here, as Elisabeth Roudinesco notes in
Jacques Lacan & Co., is that Aimee's son. Anzieu, becomes a psy choanalyst, analysed and trained
under Lacan (although Lacan claims not to have made the connection at the time of requesting
Anzieu). It is also worth noting that Aimee worked as Alfred Lacan's (Jacques Lacan's father) cook
for ten years, pp. 120-121.
166 Lacan. "The Case of Aimee." p. 216.
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he does not discover the 'truth,' rather, I would argue, he assembles the 'truth.'
Perhaps Lacan is not willing to tolerate allowing the "secrets of the theatre," the
night that Aimee confronts Huguette at the theatre door, to remain a secret. Like
Aimee's narrator he asks questions, wants to know what it all means, and yet also
like her narrator, he is ultimately barred from ever knowing the 'real' reason Aimee
has for attacking Huguette Duflos that night.
READING THE MURDER SCENE
Lacan's work on Aimee appears again in an essay he writes for the Minotaure
on the Papin sisters entitled, "Motives of Paranoid Crime: The Crime of the Papin
Sisters." It is interesting to note that this edition of the Minotaure is full of pictures of
women in compromising positions: photographs from Man Ray of women in cages,
sketches of women being raped during war, and women looking with innocent eyes
towards the viewer. Perhaps the most unsettling is Salvador Dali's "Le Phenomene
de l'extase," a photographic collection of women in different stages of sexual
ecstasy .16" Each snapshot features a woman caught in a moment ofwhat appears to be
pure bliss. Within the collage of women in orgasmic poses is a picture of Bernini's
statue of St. Teresa, a statue that Lacan will later write about in Encore. The image
anticipates Lacan's theorisation of female desire, as discussed in the first chapter, as
well as his interest in answering Freud's infamous question, "what does woman
want?"
Lacan's interest in the Papin sisters varies from his work on "Marcelle C." or
Aimee primarily because the Papin sisters were never patients of Lacan's. Although
l6" Salvador Dali. "Le Phenomene de l'extase," Minotaure. 3 / 4 (1933). pp. 76-77.
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Lacan's handling of the case may imply that he had contact with the two sisters, he
did not. In this example, he is in the position of observer, not analyst. This distinction
is important because Lacan's reading of the case is dependent on other people's
observations, not his own. And yet, the way Lacan treats the case does not take into
account the distance that existed between him and the Papin sisters.
Lacan's article on the Papin case begins with a dramatisation of their crime, a
beginning that shares similarities with his presentation of Aimee's case:
Each [sister] seized an adversary, tore her eyes from their sockets (a deed
unheard of, it was said, in the annals of crime), and brained her. Next,
with the aid of what could be found within reach, hammer, tin pitcher,
kitchen knife, they assailed the bodies of their victims, bashing their
faces, baring their genitals, and deeply slashing the thighs and buttocks of
one in order to soil with blood the members of the other. Then they
washed the instruments of these atrocious rites, cleansed themselves, and
retired to the same bed.168
The two sisters, Christine and Lea brutally murdered the two women they worked for
in a bourgeoisie home in Le Mans, France. There appears to be no motive for the
crime, apart from a power failure, which the two maids may have believed to be their
fault. They gave the court no motive nor expressed hatred towards their victims, in
other words, they left the public searching for answers to their mysterious crime.
Doctor Benjamin Logre was the only expert used in the Papin's defence. He offers
several diagnoses for their crime: "notions of persecution, sexual perversion,
epilepsy or hystero-epilepsy" (8). Lacan pays respect to Logre's analysis, both
168
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through his dedication and by suggesting that it is Logre's analysis that allows
someone like him to offer an alternative analysis without actually seeing the Papin
sisters as patients. In other words, in citing Logre's diagnoses Lacan is reminding his
reader that Logre offered the courts a diagnosis without actually analysing his
patients, and so Lacan suggests that he can offer an alternative analysis without
examining the Papin sisters Lacan implies that he is as qualified as Logre to interpret
the two sisters, if not more so, because of his previous case study on Aimee.
Lacan's analysis of the two sisters focuses primarily on Christine's behaviour
after she is separated from her younger sister Lea in jail. He notes the way Christine
has hallucinations, tries to tear her eyes out, behaves erotically, and believes that her
victims are still alive (7-8). Christine's behaviour, according to Lacan, displays
classic symptoms of a paranoid delirium. However, it is not what Christine does as
much as what she says that interests Lacan. She declares: "I really think that in
another life I must have been my sisters' husband" (9). This comment along with the
fact that the two sisters retired to the same bed after the crime interests Lacan most in
his analysis.
For example, Lacan poses the rhetorical question: "And what significance
cannot be found in the exclusive affection of the two sisters, the mystery of their life,
the eccentricities of their cohabitation, and their fearful reconciliation in the same
bed after the crime9 Our precise experience of these patients yet gives us pause
before the assertion, which some people pass over, that sexual relations actually
existed between the sisters" (10). His question can, perhaps, be re-formulated to read:
what can we, as analysts/critics, not read into the dark silent spaces of female
sexuality9 What Lacan asks is what significance cannot be made of the strange
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circumstances that surround the Papin case. He asks his reader how s/he could come
to a conclusion of anything else given the signifiers all point towards a sexual
relationship
Lacan's style here and in other places employs a journalistic tone, marking a
strong contrast to his later, more psychoanalytical texts such as Ecrits and The Four
Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis. It should remind the reader of the context
in which Lacan's analysis appears. Readers of a journal such as Minotaure would
most likely be interested in the sisters' 'secret life' and the crime itself rather than the
specifics of analytic terms and conditions. Perhaps Lacan's subtle suggestion of two
women in bed together is a way of tantalising his readers.
Lacan believes that the two women suffer from a rare condition called
Delires a deux, a type of madness that strikes two people at the same time with the
same condition: a "paired delirium" (10). Although other experts in the case argue
that this diagnosis is impossible, Lacan dismisses their assertions and insists that his
diagnosis is well founded (10). He suggests that they both suffer from self-punitive
paranoia, a condition similar to the one he diagnoses Aimee with: "The emotional
ambivalence toward the older sister commands all the self-punitive behaviour of our
'Aimee case'" (11). Lacan's references to Aimee refers his reader back to his
theorisation of self-punitive paranoia, a diagnosis he seems wary to give fully to the
Papin sisters. The distinction Lacan makes between the Papin sisters and Aimee is
that the two sisters cannot individuate themselves from each other, that is, they do
not have identities separate ffom one another, and therefore cannot hurt themselves.
As he argues: "But it seems that between them the sisters could not even cover the
distance necessary to bruise themselves. True Siamese twins in spirit lames
121
siamoises), they formed a world forever closed, reading their dispositions after the
crime, Doctor Logre said, 'one would think one were seeing double'" (11). For
Lacan, the sisters' spiritual twinning means that they cannot actually hurt themselves,
and so they hurt the mirrored image of themselves: the mother and daughter they
murder.
In his theorisation, Lacan implies that identity and consequently desire is
predicated upon a specular and spatial relationship to an Other. In the case ofAimee,
he locates the Other as Aimee's ego ideal, whom she punishes instead of punishing
the 'real' object of her desire: herself. Underlying both cases is both Lacan's
insistence on narcissism as well as his sexing of the arrangement as homosexual, or
incestual (Lacan conflates the two). Lacan writes with regard to Aimee that "each of
the persecutors was really nothing other than a new image, always a mere prisoner of
Aimee's narcissism, of this sister whom our patient had made her ideal. Now we
understand what the glass obstacle was that prevented her forever from knowing that
she loved all these persecutors, although she cried out that she did: they were only
images" (11). The "glass obstacle" to which Lacan refers anticipates his later work in
"Le Stade du Mirror" or "The Mirror Stage."
THE "GLASS OBSTACLE"
In his work on the denigration of vision in twentieth-century French thought,
Martin Jay suggests that Lacan's "Mirror Stage" is heavily influenced by Lacan's
early case studies of paranoid women and violence. Jay understands the link between
Lacan's early work on criminal madwomen and his theorisation of the "Mirror
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Stage" to be a result of the way Lacan understood specular identification."169
Although no conclusive connections can be drawn between Lacan's early work on
Aimee and the Papin sisters and his theorisation of the "Mirror Stage," bringing them
side by side elicits parallels and intersections that are convincing.110
Lacan stresses that the "Mirror Stage" is a moment of identification: "We
have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that
analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject
when he assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently
indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term imago.By this Lacan
means that this stage, this recognition and assumption of the mirrored image,
precedes a dialectical relationship with an Other, and a realisation of subjectivity in
language.172 In other words, Lacan understands this moment as preceding social
inscription, a phase the ego progresses through. The mirror stage establishes the
relationship between the subject and his/her sense of reality.173 Lacan's theory
outlines the movement from the "specular /" to the "social 7"174 - an / that must be
mediated, and in a sense, contained, by an Other (or through the awareness that an
Other exits).
Lacan derives his understanding of the effects spatial awareness has on
identity largely from Henri Wallon's work on transitivism. Wallon studies the way in
which children develop their emotional responses to other children. He notices that
169 Jay. Downcast Eyes. p. 349.
110 For an interesting article on the problematic 'origins' and chronological ordering of Lacan's
"Mirror Stage." see also. Jane Gallop. "Lacan's 'Mirror Stage:' Where to Begin." SubStance,
No.37/38 (1983). pp. 118-128.
171 Jacques Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 2.
172 Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 2.
173 Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 4.
174 Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 5.
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children, at a young age, have trouble differentiating themselves from each other.
That is, if a child hits another he often cries because he has not individuated himself
from the other child. Wallon terms this phenomenon 'transitivism,' and understands
it to be a necessary and healthy progression into subjectivity. Lacan, on the other
hand, notices the danger of spatial distance and argues that without knowing the self
from the other, aggression develops. In her article on the differences between
Wallon's work and Lacan's, Shuli Barzilai writes: "Wallon's detailed experiments
clearly established a conceptual paradigm for Lacan's understanding of the mirror
stage. Yet Lacan decisively parts company with Wallon - and this departure is
arguably the core of his theoretical innovation - on two points: the status of the
mirror and the identity of the specular image.'"15 In a departure from Wallon's
findings, Lacan argues that the inability to individuate self from other leads the
subject into aggression, not towards healthy subjectivity as Wallon suggests.
To return to the Papin article, the "glass obstacle" to which Lacan refers
functions as the first stage in identity development, a step that Lacan believes the
Papin sisters do not take. According to Lacan's analysis, Christine imagines Lea's
image to be her own, and vice versa. The two are unable to individuate from each
other and thus they are led to aggressively attack the two women who serve as their
Other. Seeing the mother and daughter as the mirrored image of themselves, Lacan
argues that the Papin sisters acted out against them instead of their true object:
themselves.
Judith Butler considers the subject and its relationship to desire from a variety
175 Shuli Barzilai. "Models of Reflexive Recognition: Wallon's Ongines du Caractere and Lacan's
'Mirror Stage, " in The Psychoanalytical Study of the Child, Vol. 50 (New Haven: Yale University
Press. 1995). pp. 368-382. (p. 372).
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of theoretical perspectives in Subjects ofDesire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth
Century France When she arrives at Lacan she writes: "Desire is, then, the
expression of a longing for the return to the origin that, if recoverable, would
necessitate the dissolution of the subject itself. Hence, desire is destined for an
imaginary life in which it remains haunted and governed by a libidinal memory it
cannot possibly recollect.'"76 Read in this way the murder signals the breakdown of
Lea and Christina Papin's subjectivity as a result of fulfilling their desire; one that is
lesbian, incestual, transgressive, and murderous. This is the way Lacan reads the
event: as a result of the aggression manifested from a jealous battle for identification
and as a realisation of sexual desires.
The paradox however is that if the two sisters are unable to individuate and
thus, under his "Mirror Theory," unable to assert their own identity and desires then
how are they able to choose one another as a love object? Lacan's veiled assertion
that there were sexual relations between the sisters, based on the evidence that they
spent all their time together and retired to their bed after the murder, suggests what
he terms homosexual desire. However, if as Lacan argues, they stop at a crucial point
in their development -"They did not evolve beyond the first stage (11)" - which
renders them unable to distinguish self from other, then how can they desire?
Lacan, as discussed in the first chapter, theorises desire as the desire of the
Other. And yet, in the case of the Papins, there is no Other except the two women
they murder. In this case, what Lacan is also suggesting is that there was a lesbian
desire on the part of the Papin sisters for the two women they killed, or to put it in
other terms, these two women represented the desire they could not have (and that
P6 Judith Butler. Subjects ofDesire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France (New York:
Columbia. 1987). p. 187.
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they imagined to exist), and so they killed them in anger (and perhaps denial).
However, this hypothesis is still dependent on the two sisters acknowledging an
Other outside themselves, which is not allowable within Lacan's diagnosis.
There is a confusion, perhaps indeed, among the terms and arrangements in
Lacan's analysis. To insert a definitive reading would perhaps jeopardise his other
work on self-punitive paranoia, and after all, he did not actually meet these two
sisters. Lacan delays his veiled assertion of sexual relations between the sisters until
the very last moment in the article In many ways it functions as a tease to the reader
as s/he leaves the article with the notion of sexual perversion, of two "twin" sisters
together in bed. In doing so, he manages to distance his reader from the brutality and
horror of the murder Instead of the graphic descriptions of the crime that the article
opens with, no doubt for dramatic effect, Lacan ends the article with a description of
a fantastical square dance: "That fateful evening, under anxiety of an imminent
punishment, the sisters mingled the mirage of their illness with the image of their
mistresses. They detested the distress of the couple whom they carried away in an
atrocious quadrille" (11). The alliteration of the first sentence mesmerises its reader.
Lacan employs words and phrases that could be used to describe a romantic evening
such as; "mingled," "mirage," "couple," and "quadrille," to temper those that
actually capture the brutality of the event, words such as "punishment," "illness," and
"atrocious." Even "punishment" and "illness" refer more to the victim status the
Papin sisters acquire in Lacan's article and in surrealist circles than to the victims of
the murder.
The concluding lines in Lacan's article reveal more of his own desire than the
presumed desire he assigns to the Papins. He writes: "The sacrilegious curiosity
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which from the beginning of time has anguished man moved them in their desire for
the victims and in their attempt to track down in the dead women's gaping wounds
what Christine in her innocence later described to the court as "the mystery of life"
(11). Lacan pays particular attention to the "gaping wounds" of the Papin's victims,
attaching a sexual and metaphysical meaning to the women's genitals. In drawing out
Christine's expression, Lacan links her quest for knowledge (of the mystery of life)
to his own quest for the secret knowledge of the criminal, madwoman. Although
Lacan characterises Christine's comment as 'innocent,' in his retelling of the events
her words become part of an answer to why they committed the crime and why they
sought to find the answer to their own desires in the two women they killed.
THE "INFATUATED OBSERVER"177
At the end of his essay on the 'Mirror Stage,' Lacan concludes that: "The
sufferings of neurosis and psychosis are for us a schooling in the passions of the soul,
just as the beam of the psychoanalytic scales, when we calculate the tilt of its threat
to entire communities, provides us with an indication of the deadening of the
passions in society."178 Tying Lacan's initial admission of his "reflections" on
paranoiac knowledge with his concluding ode to the knowledge society has yet to
gain from the sufferings of the neurotic and psychotic, knowledge that, if understood
correctly, serves to help liven the passions of society, offers a neatly bound relation
between subjectivity, psychosis, and women, one that although not explicitly offered
by Lacan, is, I would suggest, there implicitly.
1 Clement The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan. p.80.
178
Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 7.
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As Catherine Clement writes: "[Lacan] took the view that [the Papin sisters']
criminal madness was not so much a disturbance as a 'social masterpiece' (chef-
d'oeuvre social). Their inspiration inspired Lacan, hidden no longer, shamanism
proclaimed itself, even to Lacan himself."1^9 This is a point that Clement develops
exceptionally well. Clement presents her reader with a Lacan that is not offered in
most critiques. It is Lacan as shaman, mystic, poet180 and in part, as madman - if
only, to be the one who can understand these 'madwomen.' As she argues: "Only a
person willing to hear what these women are saying, a person willing to become
crazy in order to understand them, can gain access to this meaning and yet remain
within the confines of the human community from which the patient has been cast
out. The message is clear: Lacan proclaims it to himself.'"81
Clement's representation of Lacan, although expertly constructed, is perhaps
a bit too nostalgic and clearly romanticised. Writing in the wake of the backlash that
cast Lacan from his status as high priest, Clement appears to be saving Lacan by
emphasising his 'sensitive side.' She is not following in the line of others who have
become strict and dogmatic disciples, that is clear, but her incantations and memories
carry with them a tone of loving dutifulness.182 She begins her critique by referring to
her daughter, and it is hard not to read Clement as a sort of daughter to Lacan,
remembering him 'honestly' and with the kind of compassion reserved for parents.
1 9 Clement The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan. p. 56.
180 In 1933. Lacan published a sonnet entitled "Hiatus irrationalis," in Le Phare de Neuillv, 3/4;
reprinted in the Magazine litteraire, 121, February (1977), p. 11, as cited in Macey. Lacan in Context.
Macey writes: "This is apparently Lacan's only venture into poetry; sty listically, the sonnet is
somewhat reminiscent of the work ofPierre Jean Jouve," pp. 212-213.
181 Clement The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan, p. 58.
182 Roudinesco in Jacques Lacan & Co. reminds her readers that Catherine Clement organised a
special edition of the feminist journal L Arc on Jacques Lacan. "At the request of Catherine Clement,
who had long been interested in female paranoia Lacan had agreed to republish the pari of his thesis
concerning the attack against the actress Huguette Duflos and the anamnesis of the case." p 525.
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Her critique is even reassuring for some feminists who, having read only negative
things about Lacan, can now see a new side to him that has otherwise been neglected.
In any case, Clement provides her readers with an interesting story ofLacan and 'his'
madwomen within the chapter appropriately titled, 'The Ladies' Way.'
Lacan may have mimicked the language ofmadwomen, as Clement contends,
however, he does not go so far as to 'give up his knowledge.' He remains the analyst
above all, the 'subject who knows.' In "Aggressivity and Psychoanalysis," a seminar
closely linked to the 'Mirror Theory,' Lacan develops the need for the analyst to
relate, as much as possible, to the patient's state ofmind by imagining that a request
for help emerges from the patient: "'Take upon yourself,' the patient is telling us,
'the evil that weighs me down; but if you remain smug, self-satisfied, unruffled as
you are now, you won't be worthy of bearing it.'"183 This admission can explain and
support Clement's representation of Lacan as madman to 'his' madwomen. And yet,
as Lacan goes on to say, this call for help only masks the patient's 'truth' which he
imagines as "I can't bear the thought of being freed by anyone other than myself."184
Writing about La Mysterique Luce Irigaray contends that: "It is in order to
speak woman, write to women, act as preacher, and confessor to women, that man
usually has gone to such excesses [. . .] That he has given up his knowledge in order
to attend to woman's madness. Falling - as Plato would say, no doubt, - into the trap
of mimicking them, of claiming to find jouissance as 'she' does."185 Lacan takes on
this position of 'mad man' in order to answer a call for help that he imagines comes
from his 'mad' women, and yet he is careful not to fall too deeply into a "trap of
183 Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 13.
184 Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 13.
185
Irigaray. Speculum ofthe Other Woman, pp. 191-2.
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mimicking them" or to jeopardise his authority on the secret knowledge or jouissance
ofwoman
Although Lacan does not fall into a trap of "mimicking" these madwomen, he
does fall into the tricky position of wanting to get close to a 'secret knowledge' they
possess while maintaining a critical distance and authority. As Clement cleverly
describes his actions: "Lacan does not really make the connection between the poetic
and the pathological. He dances about, he behaves seductively. From infatuated
observer to therapist, he is first too far away, then too close. He stands aloof or
swoops down close, dives and climbs, stumbles but regains his footing."186 The issue
that Clement raises here and elsewhere in her critique is the notion of distance - and
it is an essential one according to Lacan in the process of identification.
For Lacan, it is because there is not enough distance, or not an appropriate
amount of distance, between the Papin sisters that causes their flight into murder.
Unlike Henri Wallon, Lacan believes the inability to differentiate self from other
leads to aggression, and in the Papin sisters' case, to murder. Their over-
identification and inability to distinguish one from the other causes what Lacan
believes to be a "psychic inversion.'"8" This condition is based on Freud's thesis that
paranoia is a defence against homosexuality.188 Lacan, in his interpretation of the
crime, takes Freud's theory on 'inverted psyche' in order to extend it through the
Papin sisters. As discussed, Lacan imagines that the two sisters' desire for each other
became projected onto the double of mother and daughter (Mme. and Mile.
186 Clement The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan, p. 80.
187 Clement The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan, p. 75.
188 See also Victor Burgin' s In/Different Spaces: Place andMemory in Visual Culture (Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1996). pp. 126-30 for a further elaboration on the connection between
Lacan's analysis of the Papin sisters and Freud's work with Schreber.
130
Lancelin). On the one hand, he theorises the dangers of spatial distance and yet, on
the other hand, he appears to lose sight of his critical focus, that of delire a deux, in
an attempt to insert desire into his reading. He "dances about" and "behaves
seductively," as Clement argues, he lures his readers in, encouraging them to take a
closer look at the Papin sisters, and then he jumps back to assume his role as analyst.
"CRAZY TALK"
As analyst, Lacan must analyse the language of the Papin sisters in order to
'make sense' of their crime and of their madness Language is an integral element in
the scene of analysis. Psychoanalysis relies on the medium of speech for its analysis.
Jacques Lacan writes: "whether it sees itself as an instrument of healing, of training,
or of exploration in depth, psychoanalysis has only a single medium: the patient's
speech."189 The sisters' silence is another 'symptom' according to Lacan of their
paranoia or "underdeveloped" sexuality. Their silence is also interpreted as an
aggressive, powerful element in the case. Lacan writes in "The Crime of the Papin
Sisters" that "this silence could not be empty, even if it was obscure in the eyes of
the actors" (7). His reference to the Papin sisters as "actors" recalls Lacan's use of
the word "drama" in his description of the anticipatory moment in the "Mirror
Stage." Lacan writes: "The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation - and which manufactures for the
subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies
that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call
orthopaedic.'"90 The "drama" that Lacan refers to stages a specular and spatial
189
Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 40.
190
Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection. p 4.
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relationship between self and other, it is a drama that must be performed in order for
a healthy relationship between self and other.
As discussed, Lacan only hints towards the explicit nature of the Papin
sisters' sexuality; he leaves it as a possibility, a move that renders his article more
ambiguous and intriguing. As he writes: "One must have lent an attentive ear to the
strange declarations of such patients to know the follies that their shackled
conscience can build upon the enigma of the phallus and of female castration (11)."
He suggests that they hold secrets and answers to the enigma of crucial theories on
female desire. That is, the Papin sisters as a case for inquiry, as objects to be
'unshackled' by the right psychoanalyst (namely Lacan), could offer critical answers
to the riddles ofwoman's desire.
The sisters' language and silence is an important site for debate. Perhaps one
of their most subversive acts was to refuse to offer an explanation for their crimes, to
stay quiet and unavailable to those, such as Lacan, who wanted to get inside their
minds to find answers to his own questions, questions outside the brutality of the
murder itself. In her account of the courtroom events, Elisabeth Roudinesco writes:
"[The Papin sisters] used words unknown to their public, half in dialect, half in some
primordial language, thus expressing the secret significance of an act whose meaning
they themselves were ignorant of."191 Roudinesco draws attention to the "secret
significance" of the Papin sisters' language, as if the two sisters were trying to guard
hidden knowledge from outsiders. The "primordial language" that Roudinesco uses
to describe the breakdown of the Papin sisters' language also seems to support
191
Roudinesco. Jacques Lacan & Co., p. 126.
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Lacan's suggestion that their over-identification with each other causes a breakdown
in subjectivity and language.
However, what is often overlooked in the dynamics between analyst and
analysand is the position of the listener. The speaker is often held accountable for the
listener's interpretations, and in this case, often misinterpretations. In Crazy Talk: a
study of the discourse of schizophrenic speakers, psychiatrists Sherry Rochester and
J R. Martin question the definition of schizophrenia, defined as 'the failure of
discourse.' They argue that historically the direction of analysis has moved from
analyst to patient, placing the responsibility on the speaker for the listener's
comprehension: "To say that a speaker is incoherent is only to say that one cannot
understand that speaker. So to make a statement about incoherent discourse is really
to make a statement about one's own confusion as a listener. It is therefore just as
appropriate to study what it is about the listener which makes him or her 'confusable'
as it is to study what it is about the speaker which makes him or her 'confusing.'"192
They question: "to what extent is the speaker's utterance responsible for the
listener's confusion?"193 This is a very important distinction to make. Are the Papin
sisters responsible for giving their observers an answer to their madness, for
providing an understanding of their crime, or for speaking a language that can be
understood by their listeners0
In the case of Aimee, Lacan looks directly at her language in order to read
whether it communicates madness The positions of speaker and listener can be
compared to that ofwriter and reader and of analyst and patient. One communicates
192
Sherry Rochester and JR. Martin. Crazy Talk: A Study of the Discourse ofSchizophrenic Speakers
(New York: Plenum Press. 1979). p. 3.
193 Rochester and Martin. Crazy Talk. p. 3.
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through language, the other interprets. Lacan understands the failure of their
discourse to be rooted in their madness, not in his ability or inability to understand
what they communicate
According to Clement, Lacan does try to fall into the excesses that would
allow him access to that knowledge, however, it is almost as if he gives up frustrated
and falls back to the analyst's chair, resigned to sexual repression as a motive for
murder. He dives and swoops as Clement tells us, however, he never reaches the
knowledge he is looking for, although subsequent accounts of the crime rely on him
as the communicator of truth on their behalf. They see Lacan as deciphering the
noncommunicable signifiers, as decoding the mystery, and they gladly accept his
truth and move on with their own. This is one of the problems that underlines
psychoanalytical critiques on desire. Something is taken for granted, taken as truth
and then repeated in another context.
This is not to say that an 'original' truth exists, waiting to be found. Rather,
the assumption of truth is an unstable premise to build theoretical foundations on. In
a similar way, it becomes very difficult to suggest alternative constructions to those
offered in psychoanalytical critiques because so much recovery is necessary. Not
only does the critic need to revisit the 'crime' scene, as it were, but s/he has to follow
along the same path of the psychoanalyst, seeing yet avoiding the traps of his/her
guide.
Lacan's article in the Minotaure locates him as an observer in the scene of a
crime passionel, like the opening scene of Marguerite Duras's Moderato Cantabile,
which begins with two lovers in a square, one having just shot the other.194 However,
194
Marguerite Duras. Moderato Cantabile trans. Richard Seaver (London: Calder Publications. 1997;
originally published. 1958).
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unlike Duras' Anne Desbaresdes, who witnesses the two lovers on the ground, Lacan
was not at the scene of the crime, nor did he involve himself in the case directly as an
analyst. Instead, he reconstructs the scene of the crime in his imagination, he sees the
events that have no doubt been offered prior in newspapers or criminal reports. In
doing so, he engages himself with the sublime aspects of the crime, reading the
events like he does in his thesis on Aimee.
In her influential essay, "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," Shoshana
Felman suggests that in the psychoanalytic model, knowledge resides in the Other
and is there to be grasped, seized by the subject. "Knowledge haunts,"195 she tells us.
The knowledge that Lacan imagines the Papin sisters possess and keep from his
grasp haunts not only him, but those who later critique his theories. Lacan seems to
imagine that he has found the meaning of the Papin sisters' crime, that he has seized
their knowledge, however, as Felman goes onto argue, this position places the
subject who believes s/he is in the know, as analysand.
In her exhaustive history of Lacan's life and work in Jacques Lacan & Co.,
Elisabeth Roudinesco risks a hypothesis regarding Lacan as analysand to 'his'
criminal and madwomen:
The analysis [. . .] occurred for Lacan elsewhere - and with a woman.
Aimee the criminal, Aimee the paranoid played a fundamental role in
Lacan's itinerary. She gave him her words, her story, her writing, her
madness, allowing him to become the artisan of a new introduction of
Freudian thought in France [. . .] Aimee was for Lacan what Fliess had
been for Freud [. . ] There is always a woman behind the emergence of a
195 Shoshana Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation." p. 157.
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master, and it was this one that Lacan underwent something in the order
of a spontaneous self-analysis that would prevent his lying down for real
on the couch of a man.196
Although Lacan may have induced a poetic madness, as Clement wants us to believe,
he does not capture the 'truth' about the Papin sisters, nor that of Aimee's attempted
murder. Whether incapable of language, such as the statue of St. Teresa that will
appear later in Lacan's examination of female desire, or rendered as incapable of
language, such as the Papin sisters and Aimee, the non-speaking female subject is the
perfect model for Lacan's explanation of feminine desire, in these cases, lesbian
desire. As Luce Irigaray and Diane Elam argue,19" speaking on behalf of a statue is an
easy choice, just as speaking on behalf of paranoid, psychotic women. She either
can't speak back, or if she does, her language is signified as incomprehensible, or
what Roudinesco describes as "primordial language." It is not the fault of the listener
(Lacan in this case) but of the speaker, who fails to communicate the logic of her
desires Her 'failure' signals a lack, a gap that Lacan rushes to fill.
PART TWO: CRITICAL RETURNS
Lacan is not the only one who arrives on the scene proposing an answer to the
ambiguity of the Papin sisters' crime Several other accounts, both journalistic and
fictional, also detail the Papin's trial.198 The second part of this chapter examines
other accounts of the Papin sisters' case followed by recent critiques of Lacan's
article. These revisions and critical returns to Lacan's ideas in "The Motives of
196 Roudinesco. Jacques Lacan & Co., p. 120.
19
Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One. pp. 90-91; Elam, Feminism and Deconstruction, p. 54.
198 Jean Genet's play The Maids: A Play, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Grove, 1954) and
Wendy Kesselman's play My Sister in this House (New York. French. 1982) are both based on the
Papin case.
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Paranoid Crime" perform "Freudian readings" in that they foreground the sexual
relationship in their analyses.
Shoshana Felman examines the critical analysis of the 'Treudian critic" and
the intersections between psychoanalysis and reading literature in her essay,
"Turning the Screw of Interpretation." One 'problem' with Freudian readings,
according to Felman's argument, is the way they attempt to 'cure' or 'solve' a
textual, or in this case, historical event.199 What calls out for such a reading, Felman
argues, citing Edmund Wilson's analysis ofHenry James's The Turn of the Screw as
an example, is the ambiguity of a text: "It is ambiguous, that is, its meaning, far from
being clear, is itself a question "20° Sexuality, she maintains, is "the foundation and
the guidepost of the critical interpretation [it] takes on the status of an answer to the
question of the text."201
In questioning the 'truth' of 'Freudian readings' Felman argues that these
readings often miss the textuality of the text itself.202 She writes: "The question of a
reading's 'truth' must be at least complicated and re-thought through another
question, which Freud, indeed, has raised, and taught us to articulate: what does such
'truth' (or any 'truth') leave out9 What is it made to miss? What does it have as its
function to overlook9 What, precisely, is its residue, the remainder it does not
account for?"203
In her analysis, Felman critiques the textual scene (Henry James' The Turn of
the Screw) and, to begin with, I am critiquing a spontaneous scene, a cultural event.
199 Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," pp. 94-207.
200 Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," p. 104.
201 Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," p. 105.
202 Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation." p. 117.
203 Felman, "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," p. 117.
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There are, of course, many differences, and therefore problems with eliding textual-
based criticism with cultural events. Another crucial difference to draw out is that
Felman is calling these readings "Freudian," not Lacanian. Felman uses Lacan's
revisionary work on Freud as text not as an authoritative doctrine in order to
construct an alternative way of reading.204 As she explains: "Our reading of The Turn
of the Screw would thus attempt not so much to capture the mystery's solution, but
to follow, rather, the significant path of its flight, not so much to solve or answer the
enigmatic question of the text, but to investigate its structure [ . . .] The question
underlying such a reading is thus not 'what does the story mean?' but rather 'how
does the story mean?"'205
Although I agree with the way of reading Felman proposes here, I disagree
that it is Lacan's work that will help us, as theorists, to read for hon' a story means
instead of what it means. I am also sceptical that it is possible to take 'meaning' out
of the psychoanalytic process. Although Lacan has moved psychoanalysis beyond a
Freudian search for meaning, his work still remains indebted, and therefore linked, to
a Freudian understanding of mental processes, as discussed in Chapter One.206 I
continue this strand of the argument in more detail in the final chapter on Deleuze
and Guattari. Here I want to focus on critiques of Lacan's article on the Papin sisters
in order to demonstrate the way sexual desire is placed at the forefront of their
analyses, how authority is given to Lacan although other accounts of the crime exist,
204 Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation" pp. 118-119.
205 Felman "Turning the Screw of Interpretatioa" pp. 119.
"!l6 See also Jacques Lacaa The Psychoses 1955-1956: The Seminar ofJacques Lacan Book 111, ed.
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: WW. Norton &Company, 1993, pp. 196-205.
In his chapter, "On primordial signifiers and the lack of one," Lacan reconceptualises the way
'meaning' has been understood in psychoanalysis.
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and how some feminist theorists, in an effort to counter Lacan or to assert a
'feminist' reading of crime, end up falling into the role of "infatuated observer."
Felman argues that the critical scene is repetitive and performative of the
textual moment.207 1 would like to extend her argument to include the moment of the
Papin sisters' crime, which Lacan returns to in his article as do critics of Lacan's
article. The critic's doubling back to Lacan's answer of sexual desire between the
sisters misses crucial information and overlooks some of the most important aspects
of the case itself. In their desire to uncover new ways of reading and arriving at the
sexual implications between the sisters or in a desire to usurp Lacan's authority, their
readings put the criminal scene into a field of abstraction, where they can critically
distance themselves from the actual brutality of the crime. These critics enter into the
crime scene constructed by Lacan and in so doing are blind to the other signifiers that
Lacan has considered irrelevant to his own theorisation.
Ambiguity shrouds the Papin sisters' case and haunts its onlookers. Why did
they kill these women and why in such a horrible and brutal manner9 The answer to
these questions will remain with the Papin sisters, but will forever more haunt those
that seek to recover any meaning to the crime. However, this sort of ambiguity is
exactly what draws readers into the critical scene. As someone who is writing about a
case such as the Papin sisters, a case that has been written with different approaches,
I, as a literary critic, must look to see what has been overlooked. In this way I
become the literary critic come detective that Felman critiques in her essay. That is, I
am performing the very desire that Felman claims underlines psychoanalytic
interpretation: "the desire to be non-dupe, to interpret, i.e., at once uncover and
20 Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation." p. 117.
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avoid, the very traps of the unconscious."208 The critic, according to Felman's
argument, becomes desperate not to be on the outside of the 'truth' or even of the
'joke' - whichever one it may be. S/he wants to discover answers, meanings and to
solve the textual, or in this case, the criminal ambiguity. Or, to look at Felman's
argument from another angle, the critic desires to turn the previous critic into a
"dupe," to read for a better, more convincing answer in order to seize control over
any final interpretation. In trying to 'out-dupe' one another, critics miss the
possibilities that lie in not-understanding or in not making-meaning.
The Papin sisters' case demonstrates the way in which critics seize upon the
implied 'answer' of desire in Lacan's article in order to construct new answers and
solutions. However, before discussing these critiques, I would like to briefly offer a
variation on Lacan's account of the Papin sisters case, as it highlights the way even
the most insignificant (or seemingly insignificant) signifiers can be (and are) read for
multiple interpretations.
There are several journalistic accounts of the Papin sisters' case;209 one such
account can be found in a collection of Janet Flanner's columns entitled, Paris was
Yesterday 1925-1939. Known under the pen name, "Genet," Janet Flanner reported
significant events in France from 1925 to 1939 in her column entitled "Letter from
Paris" for The New Yorker There are two particularly interesting details that Flanner
includes in her account of the Papin sisters' case that cannot be found in Lacan's.
Firstly, Flanner identifies the policeman who enters the murder scene as "Monsieur
208 Felman. "Turning the Screw of Interpretation." p. 187.
209 See also Simone de Beauvoir. The Prime ofLife, trans. Peter Green (London: Deutsch. 1962); for
an extensive and well researched bibliography of French accounts of the Papin trial and case see
Christine E. Coffman's "The Papin Enigma" footnote 2.
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Truth."210 Whether or not this was his name, it lends itself to a number of different
interpretations. In their interpretations of the murder scene, critics are trying to
discover the truth of what happened both to explain the murder and to answer why
the two girls were found in the same bed after the crime. In her account, Flanner
writes: "Truth took what was left of the candle - the short circuiting electric iron had
blown out the fuse again that afternoon [. . .] and lighted the girls downstairs, over
the corpses, and out to the police station. They were still in their blue kimonos and in
the February air their hair was wild, though ordinarily they were the tidiest pair of
domestics in Le Mans."211 In Flanner's description it is "Truth" that lights the way for
the girls as they pass over the reality of their crime. The fact that "Truth" sheds light
on the 'dark' secrets the girls' harbour in their bedroom reminds readers of the way
this fact, that they were found in bed together, has gained so much significance and
attention. As argued, Lacan's article demonstrates an attempt to figure out the 'truth'
of what happened, both about the crime and perhaps even more so, about the sisters'
sexuality.
Flanner's inclusion of "blue kimonos" is another very interesting addition.
Perhaps the blue kimonos are not their kimonos, but those of the women they have
just murdered. Tired and fed up with their position as relegated others, they kill and
lacerate the women they work for in a revolt against the bourgeoisie. Or perhaps they
saved up their money for this one decadence. The "blue kimonos" also suggest a
certain sexual element, they are silk, often read as an alluring or sexy fabric, as
opposed to cotton or terrycloth. In Elizabeth Roudinesco's Jacques Laccm and
210 Janet Flanner. Paris Was Yesterday 1925-1939. ed. Irving Drutman (London: Angus and
Robertson. 1972). p. 99.
211 Janet Flanner. Paris Has Yesterday 1925-1939. p. 99.
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Company, she tells her readers that the two women were in "a simple robe" at the
time of their arrest. Another account has them in "pink dressing-gowns,"212 and in
other versions - Lacan's to name one - it is implied that they are naked in bed
together.213 What they were wearing is a small detail, and yet an indeterminate
signifier. In a case that has been read, revised, interpreted, and critiqued, every detail
has an impact on any final analysis or meaning it is given. As Catherine Clement
writes: "The enigma stands before us: we must now decipher it."214 The 'we' stands
for the psychoanalysts, both then and now. 'We' analysts must 'solve' the hidden
meanings, 'cure' the unconscious desires and drives, and decipher the hidden
signifiers in order to make sense of this dark and mysterious case. This is the call
Lacan answers. It is also the drive behind the critiques of Lacan's article that have
followed.
In recent criticism, Lacan's subtle suggestion that the two sisters had a
lesbian relationship is foregrounded as the most important element in the case.
Christine E. Coffman elaborates on this presupposed homosexual dimension in her
essay, "The Papin Enigma." Coffman's title immediately draws her readers' attention
to the unsolved nature of the crime and the way it haunts a collective imagination.
Choosing to focus more on Nancy Meckler's film, based on the Papin case, 'Sister,
My Sister, '21S CofTman reads the gaps that she argues have been left as a result of
cultural taboos against incest and lesbianism.216 She also witnesses Lacan's attempt to
212 Nicola Ward Jouve. "An Eye for an Eye: The Case of the Papin Sisters." ed. Helen Birch, Moving
Targets: Women, Murder andRepresentation (London: Virago. 1993), p. 7.
213 See also Jacques Lacan, "Motives of Paranoid Crime." p. 7.
4 Clement. The Lives and Legends ofJacques Lacan, p. 72.
215
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216 Catherine E. Cofiman. "The Papin Enigma." GLQ: A Journal ofLesbian and Gov Studies, 5. 3
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locate the Papin sisters' crime within a psychoanalytic framework that figures them
as lesbian and therefore underdeveloped. Their lack of a male partner, according to
Coffman, symbolises for Lacan their refusal of heterosexuality, a refusal that Lacan
reads as aggressive paranoia However, as Coffman points out, such a conclusion is
not surprising: "Lacan's analysis of the Papins' 'paranoia' is not so much a
conclusive diagnosis as evidence of psychoanalysis's obsession with the phallus,
which drives his solution to the enigma of the two women's murderous motives."217
Although I agree with Coffman's analysis to a great extent, as reflected in the
first part of this chapter, what Coffman leaves out of her analysis is the
indeterminacy ofLacan's suggestion As she states in the preface to her article, she is
reading in the 'gaps,' that is, she is filling in the missing pieces, the grey areas of
Lacan's argument. In doing so, Coffman runs the risk of repeating Lacan's reading of
the Papin sisters' case. That is, she, like Lacan, fills in the blanks of what is unknown
and therefore inconclusive. Although I agree with her critique of Lacan, her method
puts her in danger of repeating Lacan's quest for the 'truth.' Although she will not
fill the missing spaces with the Phallus, as Lacan does, she is nonetheless trying to
'solve' the ambiguity of the case. The fact that Lacan leaves his readers with a
degree of ambiguity is certainly contrived and is no doubt evidence that he has
managed to capture some of the madwoman's style he was so keen to emulate.
However, it leaves us, as critics, in the a dangerous position of repeating the very
thing Lacan is accused of doing: offering an answer to solve the enigma of desire.
Coffman's critique ofLacan's analysis puts her in jeopardy of committing the
'crime' that she accuses Lacan of committing. Barbara Johnson argues that Derrida is
21 Coffman. "The Papin Enigma.'' p. 350.
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guilty of falling into a similar theoretical 'trap' in her article, "The Frame of
Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida." Johnson suggests that that Derrida's "one-
upmanship" of Lacan in his article "Le Facteur de la Verite," turns instead into a
"one-downmanship" in that he repeats the very 'crimes' he accuses Lacan of
committing.218 Johnson calls this critical pitfall "the logic of the purloined letter"
because Derrida is analysing Lacan analysing Poe's short story The Purloined
Letter219
Whereas Coffman's article offers a close reading of the crime itself, the case
of the Papin sisters appears in other articles as a way of talking about wider concerns
such as "paranoiac space,"220 connections between psychoanalysis, Surrealism and
Existentialism,221 and representations of lesbian sexuality or criminality.222 For
example, in Teresa de Lauretis's article entitled, "The Stubborn Drive," she
examines conceptions of sexuality in Freud's and Foucault's work in order to
consider cultural productions of sexuality and aggression.223 In a subsection entitled
"Delires a deux," de Lauretis suggests that recent films such as Nancy Meckler's
Sister, My Sister (1994), a film based on the Papin case, and Peter Jackson's
Heavenly Creatures (1993), set in New Zealand and based on two girls whose fear of
218 Barbara Johnson. "The Frame of Reference: Poe. Lacan. Derrida" in Psychoanalysis and
Literature the Question ofReading: Otherwise, ed. by Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 457-505. (pp.464-465).
219 Johnsoa "The Frame ofReference." p.465.
220 See also Victor Burgtn. "Paranoiac Space," In/Different Spaces.
221 See also Christopher Lane. "The Delirium of Interpretation."
222 See also Lynda Hart. Fatal Women: Lesbian Sexuality and the Mark ofAggression (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994); Lynda Hart. "'They Don't Even Look Like Maids Anymore':
Wendy Kesselman's My Sister in This House" in Making a Spectacle: Feminist Essays on
Contemporary Women's Theatre, ed. by Lynda Hart (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
1989), pp. 131-146; Nicola Ward Jouve. "An Eye for an Eye: The Case of the Papin Sisters," pp. 7-
31.
223 Teresa de Lauretis. "The Stubborn drive." Critical Inquiry. Summer (1998). pp. 851-877. (p. 853).
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being separated leads them to kill one of their mothers, are both influenced by
Lacan's early theoretical work on the Papin sisters. De Lauretis writes: "The motifs
(motives) that Lacan identified as the syndrome of female paranoia - namely,
identification between women as repressed homosexuality, 'erotomania' toward a
female ego-ideal, and delire a deux leading to murder - are all foreground in the last
two films."-24 De Lauretis's assertion should make clear the way Lacan's analysis of
the Papin sisters, although made from afar, has been accepted or given authority over
time His ideas are those that come back to us, as theorists, this time within a feminist
reading ofFreud and Foucault as well as of cultural productions of sexuality.
De Lauretis's cites Lacan's article on the Papin sisters and the films that she
believes are influenced by his theoretical analysis as an example of how the media
uses "lesbian chic" as a marketing tool, and goes on to read delire a deux in films
such as Paul Verhoeven's Basic Instinct (1992).225 Although there is little doubt that
"lesbian chic" is used in marketing campaigns, the examples that de Lauretis chooses
necessitate some clarification. De Lauretis suggests that films such as Meckler's
Sister, My Sister and Jackson's Heavenly Creatures perpetuate a connection between
the perverse and the pathological, or more specifically, between lesbians and
"women who kill."226 Although de Lauretis's claim, that "lesbian chic" is being
popularised in film is well taken, her argument fails to problematise the way these
films distort and revise the original case they are based upon.
In other words, de Lauretis fails to remind her readers that Lacan's suggestion
of sexual relations between the two sisters is conjecture, not fact, and that Meckler's
224 De Lauretis. "The Stubborn Drive." p. 869.
225 De Lauretis. "The Stubborn Drive." pp. 869-870.
226 De Lauretis. "The Stubborn Drive," p. 870.
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version is based on this loose assumption, not on a concrete analysis. In fact, it is
more likely that Meckler draws her reading of the Papin case from Wendy
Kesselman's playMy Sister in this House, also based on the case. De Lauretis misses
the chance to demonstrate the way in which a subtle suggestion (made by Lacan) is
picked up and worked into the "lesbian chic" that she identifies. The re-writing and
re-marketing of the case demonstrates the way sexuality and gender have taken
precedence over other aspects of the case
In citing examples of both in-depth analyses of the Papin case such as
Coffman's "The Papin Enigma" and more casual references such as in Teresa de
Lauretis's "The Stubborn Drive," I am drawing attention to the concern that appears
at the forefront of all the recent critiques of the Papin case: the sisters' sexuality.
Whether their sexuality is alluded to in order to draw out Lacan's overuse of the
phallus as primary signifier, as Coffman argues, or whether their sexuality is used as
an example of lesbian representation in film, media or in relation to serial killers, as
de Lauretis develops, the Papin sisters' sexuality dominates recent discussion of their
case. Broken down this way, it seems highly problematic that so much attention can
be drawn to one aspect of an extremely complicated case. It also demonstrates a
theoretical interest or impulse to use the figure of the criminal or mad woman as
capable of exceeding representation. She is represented in psychoanalytic and
feminist accounts as hiding secret knowledge about life and death.
WRITING ON THE BODY
What appears to be missing from the numerous re-readings of the Papin
sisters' case is the violence of the crime In the articles I have just discussed, there is
little to no mention of the brutality of the event nor of the victims themselves, they
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are relegated to corpses on the floor. In order to pursue this point further, I would
like to connect the markings the Papin sisters make on the bodies of their victims
with Jenny Holzer's collection entitled Lustmord I would also like to problematise
the role of the observer in the spectacle of desire and in the returns made by theorists.
Jenny Holzer works with visual placement and language in her art. Two
things are important here: her use of language as a medium of exchange and the use
of public space to project something as intimate as desire, arguably taking desire out
of the 'bedroom' and into the streets. Like Lacan, she is interested in the overlapping
spaces between language and desire. Holzer's 'truisms' (1977-79) demonstrate, both
textually and visually, the influence dominant ideology maintains. In an interview
with Diane Waldman she says: "I started the work as a parody, like the Great Ideas
of the Western World."221 Holzer's project interrogates the 'truisms' that western
society (in particular) take as fact or 'truth ' Placing these truisms in everyday space
seems to at once articulate the very truisms western society takes as truth and to
throw them out for questioning.
Holzer's Lustmord collection, a photographic study of the relationship
between writing and violence, was first exhibited in the Suddeutsche Zeitung
Magazin (19 November 1993). Unlike her previous work, the writing is in ink mixed
with blood (originally) thus introducing an organic element to the presentation of her
words. The pictures in the Lustmord collection capture only a segment of skin, a
fragment, just enough background for the written words. Holzer's project focuses
specifically on violence to women during war, however, the words relate to violence
women endure outside war as well. Using a fragment of skin as a canvass, Holzer
22 Diane Waldham. "The Language of Signs." in Jenny Holzer (New York: Guggenheim Museum
Publications. 1989), p. 18.
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writes phrases such as: "THE BLACK SPECKS INSIDE MY EYES FLOAT ON HER BODY I
WATCH THEM WHILE I THINK ABOUT HER;" "YOU CONFUSE ME WITH SOMETHING
THAT IS IN YOU I WILL NOT PREDICT HOW YOU WANT TO USE ME;" "THE COLOR OF
HER WHERE SHE IS INSIDE OUT IS ENOUGH TO MAKE ME KILL HER."228 These phrases
voice the words of the observer, the victim, and the perpetrator in that order. Each
phrase relates to the way violence positions woman as "lack" and as a receptacle to
the desires projected onto her. The words also refer to the speculative position each
(observer, perpetrator, and victim) takes within the act of violence, in particular,
sexual violence.
Writing these words on the body reminds the viewer that the site for this lack
and violence is the body. Language may distance the reader from making a visual
link to the body whereas the photo reminds the viewer explicitly that the body is the
site and the location for trauma Holzer's photographs de-gender the violence
although the viewer may code the bodies as female considering they appear under the
heading of rape.
In her essay on Holzer's Lustmord project titled "Cut-and-Dried Bodies, or
How to Avoid the Pervert Trap," Renata Salecl analyses Holzer's work through a
Lacanian framework, drawing a distinction between the artist who practices sado¬
masochistic forms of body art and Holzer's Lustmord collection. For Salecl, artists
that undertake cutting or mutilating their body parts are operating under a perverse
law.
However, Salecl is defining the word 'perverse' within a psychoanalytic
framework which understands the pervert to be a person who has not undergone the
228
Jenny Holzer. eds. David Joselit. Joan Simon and Renata Salecl. Jenny Holzer (London: Phaidon
Press. 1998). pp 82-3.
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castration complex and is therefore searching to find a sense of law.229 Salecl argues
that: "A crucial difference between masochistic body art practice and the Lustmord
project is that the body artists seem to be constantly attempting to re-establish the big
Other through the laws that their practice itself invents, while Holzer's work assumes
that the big Other does not exist, without attempting to cover up this realisation of
emptiness. This acknowledgement, in contrast to the actions of body art, endows
Holzer's work with a far more heroic dimension."230 Framed within a psychoanalytic
order, artists that practice sado-masochistic rituals such as body piercing or genital
mutilation are, for Salecl, substituting an alternative order for a patriarchal or
phallocentric order. In other words, the sado-masochist artist uses his/her body as a
way of challenging the authority of the big Other whereas Holzer's work accepts the
big Other's non-existence without trying to hide its absence.
The distinction that Salecl draws between sado-masochistic art and Holzer's
Lustmord project can be applied to how the Papin case has been and continues to be
understood and theorised. Understanding the sisters to be emotional twins, Lacan
argues that they lash out against their ego-ideal, Mme. and Mile. Lancelin, instead of
hurting the true object of their desires: themselves. To use Salecl's words, the Papin
sisters wanted to hurt themselves in order to "re-establish the big Other." However,
the fact that the sisters did not flee the scene of the crime may be interpreted as a
recognition that the big Other "does not exist." This interpretation would support a
"heroic dimension" to their crime. In fact, at the time, Surrealists such as Paul Eluard
229 Renata Salcel. "Cut-and-Dned Bodies, or How to Avoid the Pervert Trap," in Jenny Holzer, ed. by
David Joselit. Joan Simon and Renata Salecl (London: Phaidon Press Ltd. 1988), pp 78-87, (p. 86).
230 Salecl. "Cut-and-Dried Bodies, or How to Avoid the Pervert Trap." p. 87.
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and Benjamin Peret believed the Papin case demonstrated a liberatory rebellion
against the bourgeoisie.231
Whether heroines or criminals, the point in sustaining these readings is to
demonstrate the way the Papin case has been and continues to be used to construct a
particular reading, whether tragic or heroic. The search for the 'truth' about the
sisters' desire will not yield a secret or hidden knowledge about 'woman' as Lacan
may have presumed Nor can we read the sisters as representatives of something
beyond their circumstances without running the risk of incorporating assumptions
that have been made along the way. The Papin case reflects the desire to 'make
sense' of'woman' and of'desire' as well as the impossibility of doing so.
231
Christopher Lane. "The Delirium of Interpretatioa" pp. 43-45.
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4. Duras and Desire
I began with an examination of the way 'lack' is understood in
psychoanalytic and feminist interpretations in an effort to move beyond reductive
arguments. In chapters two and three, I raised the impossibility of any one reading of
desire and demonstrated a psychoanalytic conflation between 'woman,' 'truth,' and
'desire.' This chapter will continue these arguments through Marguerite Duras's
work. Duras's writing takes desire as a central theme, whether between two lovers,
two strangers or a mother and her child Her work reflects the uncertainty and
indeterminacy in desire and in doing so poses alternative ways to theorise desire.
This chapter is divided into two sections The first section examines the 'lack'
that Duras assigns to her female characters, particularly in The Ravishing of Lol V.
Stein I will argue that although Duras describes her female characters with a 'lack'
that can be likened to Lacan's theorisation of 'lack,' she does not do so in order to
constitute it as a masculine desire, a narrative decision that can be read as feminist.
Instead, Duras maintains a 'lack' in her female characters and at the centre of the text
which poses an alternative to psychoanalytic and feminist interpretations. Duras
demonstrates the desirability of the lacking female subject so much so that readers
and critics alike find themselves lost in a struggle to seek out the 'truth' of characters
suph as Lol V. Stein.
The second part of this chapter addresses Duras's Moderato Cantabile in
order to consider the way Duras draws on psychoanalytic influences in order to tell
stories and yet does so in a way that resists any final interpretations. In creating
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ambiguous terms, ones that resist meaning and formulation, Duras suggests that
language is incapable of speaking the 'beyond' of desire; to insist on a singular
meaning of desire denies its elusive nature. Duras's narratives suggests that although
language is not capable of expressing this 'beyond' of desire, it is nonetheless
present within discourse. Her writing reflects the influences of psychoanalysis and
yet she does not 'cure' the text of its ambiguities and 'symptoms.' I argue that this
textual ambiguity allows desire to remain productively undefined.
Marguerite Duras's work is influenced by psychoanalytic and feminist
ideology and yet is faithful to neither Her divided loyalty to psychoanalysis and
feminism is reflected in the strong divide in criticism on Duras's work. Feminist and
psychoanalytic critics try to read Duras through their models and yet, as they
sometimes conclude, her work will not fit neatly into either framework. Many of the
critical interpretations of Duras's fiction rely on psychoanalytic theory, particularly
Lacanian theory, to make the implicit suggestions in Duras's work explicit.
Psychoanalytic perspectives are largely dominated by a Lacanian approach, most
likely due to Lacan's "Hommage" to Duras in which he claims that "Duras proves to
know without me what I teach."232 Titles such as: "Feminine Masquerade in
L 'Amant: Duras with Lacan," "The Dance of the Signifier: Jacques Lacan and
Marguerite Duras's Le Ravissement de Lol V. Stein," and "Metaphor Between Lacan
and Duras: Narrative Knots and the Plot of Seeing," exemplify the way critics have
232
Jacques Lacan. "Hommage Fait a Marguerite Duras. Du Ravissement de Lol V. Stein," Ca(s)hiers
de la Compagnie Madeleine. Paris: Renard-Jean Louis, Vol. 52 (1965), pp. 7-15, (p.9). "C'est
precisement ce que je reconnais dans le ravissement de Lol V. Stein, oil Marguerite Duras s'avere
savoir sans moi ce que j'enseigne " The translation is my own.
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read Duras with Lacan, as if the two are involved in a partnership.233
However, criticism of Duras is not limited to psychoanalytic readings.
Feminist critics often use Duras's work to suggest that she constructs an alternative
reading of female madness or hysteria,234 while others see her narrative ambiguity as
representative of the male narrator's inability to grasp a female narrative.235 Other
feminist critics have struggled with whether Duras offers a positive view of feminism
and argue that her texts punish women who fall outside of traditional feminine
roles.236 Whether the readings are psychoanalytic or feminist, each model seeks to
reveal the elusive and ambiguous suggestions in Duras's text. In other words, they
perform an analytic session: they pull out the gaps and silences in an effort to make
them signify something.
Although a feminist or a psychoanalytic approach produces interpretations
that are worthy of consideration, I would like to suggest that both interpretations are
problematic when it comes to Duras's work. Each approach maps out how Duras's
represents 'woman' and desire and in so doing limits the possibilities in her work.
The feminist and psychoanalytic impulse to solve and 'cure' the text of its
ambiguities and enigmas misses the play in Duras's texts. In order to pursue these
233 John O'Brien. "Metaphor Between Lacan and Duras: Narrative Knots and the Plot of Seeing."
Forum forModern Language Studies, Vol.29. Pt.3 (1993), pp. 232-245; Janet Thormann. "Feminine
Masquerade in L Amant: Duras with Lacan," Literature and Psychology, Vol. 40, Pt. 4 (1994), pp. 28-
39: Kimberly Philpot Van Noort. "The Dance of the Signifier: Jacques Lacan and Marguerite Duras,"
Symposium, Vol.51, No. 3 (1997), pp. 186-201.
234 Joline Jeanine Blais, in her unpublished thesis entitled. "Plotting Against Oedipus: Narrative
Alternative to Hysteria in the Novels of Jean Rhys and Marguerite Duras," argues that textual readings
ofDuras's and Rhvs's female characters as mad or hysterical is actually a misreading of their (Rhys's
and Duras's) attempts to construct a non-Oedipal plot. Blais pays particular attention to the links
between suffering and motherhood in her critique (University of Pennsylvania, 1991), abstract.
235 For example, see also: Laurie Edson. "Knowing Lol: Duras, Epistemology, Gendered Mediation,"
Substance. Vol. 21. Pt.2 (1992). pp. 17-31.
"3b For example, see also: Susan D. Cohen. Women and Discourse in the Fiction ofMarguerite Duras:
Love, Legends, Language (London: Macmillan), 1993,
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ideas, I will first examine the way 'lack' functions in Duras's work.
DURASSIAN LACK
'Lack' or absence pervades Duras's fiction and resides predominately within
her female characters. Although the plot structures and the characterisations support
and foster this 'lack,' the origin or cause for it remains an enigma. The characters in
Duras's fiction search for meanings or answers to define or to explain this 'lack' and
yet in almost every case, the novel ends without any narrative 'cure' or solution.
These unsettling endings disturb both reader and critic, as will be discussed later, and
leave 'lack' in place which problematises psychoanalytic and feminist readings.
'Lack,' by definition, is a very difficult thing to explain or describe. Trying to
articulate an abstract 'something' that is desired is close to impossible. Duras seems
to allude to this linguistic impossibility when she writes in The Ravishing ofLol V
Stein "It would have been an absence-word, a hole-word, whose centre would have
been hollowed out into a hole, the kind of hole in which all other words would have
been buried. It would have been impossible to utter it, but it would have been made
to reverberate."237 The struggle to discover and name this "absence-word" dominates
the narrative. 'Lack' reverberates throughout Duras's novels and yet it is almost
impossible to utter it or to explain just how Duras intends 'lack' to function.
As a way of entering Duras's fiction and of providing a clear example of the
way 'lack' is situated in Duras's female characters, I want to refer briefly to The
Malady ofDeath, one ofDuras's later novels. The Malady ofDeath is short and
23
Marguerite Duras. The Ravishing ofLol V. Stein, trans. Richard Seaver (New York: Pantheon
Books and Grove Press. 1966. originally published. 1964). p. 38. Subsequent references will appear in
the text after "Lol."
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elliptical, two characters, a man and a woman, meet and spend the rest of the
narrative in a hotel bedroom. He pays her to stay with him, although she not a
prostitute.238 The entire text is narrated with the pronouns "she" and "you,"
implicating the reader in the desirous gaze of the male character.
The following two passages demonstrate the way Duras constructs a 'lack' in
her female character: "You wouldn't have known her, you'd have seen her
everywhere at once, in a hotel, in a street, in a train, in a bar, in a book, in a film, in
yourself, your inmost self, when your sex grew erect in the night, seeking somewhere
to put itself, somewhere to shed its load of tears," "She's more mysterious than any
other external thing you've ever known. Nor will you, or anyone else, ever know
how she sees, how she thinks, either of the world or of you, of your body or your
mind, or of the malady she says you suffer from. She doesn't know, herself. She
couldn't tell you. You couldn't find out anything about it from her."239
The first thing to note is the way "she" is described as someone who is both
ordinary, "you'd have seen her everywhere at once," and yet "more mysterious than
any other external thing you've ever known." Duras implies that "her" elusiveness is
due, in part, to her everyday appearance. Unsurprisingly the central female figures in
Duras's fiction are often housewives, mothers, or schoolgirls, people that would be
considered ordinary and yet, as the texts reveal, they are enigmas to other characters
as well as to their readers and critics Duras's choice of an 'ordinary' woman can be
interpreted as a way of undermining assumed and enculturated images of desirable
women or as offering her male voyeur a cliched fantasy: a nameless, faceless woman
238 Marguerite Duras. TheMalady ofDeath, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Grove Press. 1986.
originally published. 1982). p. 18.
239 Duras. TheMalady ofDeath, pp 1. 14.
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who is solely interested in his own desires.
In addressing two distinctly different ways of reading the representation
Duras offers, 1 am suggesting not only that Duras's work is open to multiple
interpretations, an argument I will develop later, but also that in figuring 'lack' it is
important not to overlook the moments in which Duras's representations of women
do correspond with a psychoanalytic or even anti-feminist interpretation. Although I
prefer to read Duras as a feminist writer, in order to do so it is necessary to examine
carefully the way her work responds to psychoanalytic processes.
In the example offered, Duras clearly positions "her" as a receptacle for
masculine desires, the veiled reference to sexual intercourse ("somewhere to shed its
load of tears") situates "her" as a receptacle for her desirer's pleasure. The implicit
suggestion in these passages is that "she" is nothing more than an object for an
Other's desires; to use Elizabeth Grosz's words, cited in the first chapter, "she" falls
within the logic of "lack and acquisition, a logic that has rendered women the
repositories, the passive receptacles ofmen's needs, anxieties, and desires."240
Using an example such as the one cited, it is possible to draw a comparison
between the way Duras represents the woman in The Malady ofDeath and Lacan's
theorisation of 'lack' and woman. As discussed in Chapter One, Lacan claims that
"woman does not exist,"241 thus equating woman with pre-discursive 'lack.' He also
theorises a feminine jouissance that women possess and yet have no knowledge of or
access to. Lacan refers to Bernini's statue of St. Teresa for confirmation of his theory
and to suggest that woman knows nothing, at least nothing that she can fully
understand about pleasuring herself. This 'lack' in woman, under the signifying force
240
Grosz, "Rcfiguring Lesbian Desire," pp. 69-70.
241
Jacques Lacan. Encore, p. 7.
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of the phallus, structures desire in Lacanian terms.
Duras creates a 'lack' in her female character that can be likened to Lacan's
interpretation both of'woman' and desire. To a certain extent, the woman in Duras's
text does not exist. That is, "she" can be anyone and, to some degree, Duras implies
that she is any woman. "She" has no distinct identity of her own that is represented
through Duras's language. The "you" who pays for her to stay mediates her presence
in the text. "She" knows that he suffers from a "malady of death" and yet she "knows
without knowing how."242 The secret knowledge that she possesses, and yet has no
access to, carries similarities to Lacan's refusal to allow women as well men access
to the hidden knowledge of the phallus. As discussed previously, although both men
and women are denied access, Lacan implies that woman harbours a secret
knowledge, she "knows without knowing how."
Although Duras's female characters share similarities with Lacan's
theorisation of lack and 'woman,' the 'lack' in Duras's fiction is not filled or
constituted by male desire. Despite his attempts to reach the secret or veiled
knowledge in this woman, the "you" in the text can never possess her. "She" leaves
without a trace at the end of The Malady of Death The sense of absence, "the
malady of death" that begins the text is still in place at the end of the narrative. Duras
does not try to 'cure' the 'lack' in either character. Instead of trying to elevate
woman to a position equal to man or even higher, or to 'cure' 'lack,' Duras's texts
demonstrate how desire creates connections and builds foundations. In other words,
Duras's texts allow us, as readers, to think about the productive possibilities in the
movement of desire. Duras gestures towards a way of thinking about desire outside
242 Duras. The Malady ofDeath, p. 19.
157
of 'lack' and acquisition when she writes: "When you wept it was just over yourself
and not because of the marvelous impossibility of reaching her through the
difference that separates you."243 Instead of mourning the impossibility of grasping an
imagined 'secret' knowledge, Duras suggests "you" marvel in the difference between
man and woman. In this way, Duras's text reflect the way we, as readers, look for
meaning, or look to 'make sense' of the woman and the circumstances in the text and
in so doing overlook other possible readings. Like the "you" in the text, we have no
access to the secret knowledge "she" possesses, that is, we are offered no explanation
for the "malady of death."
In order to consider this argument further, I turn to The Ravishing ofLol V.
Stein, one of Duras's most theorised texts. In his brilliant study of Duras's work,
Leslie Hill claims that "of all Duras's novels the one that is best known and has
given rise to the most extensive commentary is without doubt her text of 1964, The
Ravishing ofLol V. Stein. "244 The central drama in the novel revolves around a dance,
the South Tahla Beach ball. Like many of Duras's novels, a pivotal moment in the
narrative, what I am calling a "scene of desire," is repeated throughout the text as a
way of developing both the plot and the characters. The "scene of desire" in The
Ravishing of Lol V Stein occurs the night of the Town ball when Lol loses her
fiance, Michael Richardson, to another woman, Anne-Marie Stretter.
The events of the Town ball are told by the narrator Jacques Hold, whom we
later learn is Lol's lover The following sentences begin Hold's "story of Lol Stein:"
(Lol, 4) "The orchestra stopped playing. A set was just ending. The dance floor had
emptied slowly. There was no one on it" (Lol, 5). The description reads like the start
243 Duras. TheMalady ofDeath, p. 54.
244 Leslie Hill. Marguerite Duras: Apocalyptic Desires (London: Routledge. 1993), p. 64.
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of a play, and reflects Duras's dramatic style and influence. As readers, we are
invited to enter into the "scene of desire" that Duras sets. Anne-Marie Stretter arrives
as the music ends, a character that will later feature in Duras's India Song. She
captures the attention of everyone in the room, including Lol, her schoolfriend
Tatiana and Lol's fiance, Michael Richardson. Questions begin to circulate on the
dance floor: "Who was she?" [. . .] "Was she beautiful?" [. . .] "What had she, Anne-
Marie Stretter, experienced that other women had missed? By what mysterious path
had she arrived at what appeared to be a gay, a dazzling pessimism, a smiling
indolence as light as a hint, as ashes9" (Lol, 6). Framing the description of Anne-
Marie in questions suggests that she possesses something that is indescribable,
something that seduces men and women and yet can only be gestured to, not
represented in language. She is described in seemingly opposing terms "smiling" and
"indolent," "light" and "ashes," which suggests her ability to be seductive and
elusive, available and yet impossible to possess. Her beauty, for 'lack' of words,
eludes everyone's grasp and establishes her as a 'supreme' object of desire.
Lol responds to her fiance's betrayal with fascination instead of devastation:
"Lol had watched [Michael and Anne-Marie Stretter], the way a woman whose heart
is wholly unattached, a very old woman, watches her children leave her: she seemed
to love them" (Lol, 8). Duras stages a very extraordinary scene of betrayal and
abandonment. Instead of being consumed by jealousy and anger, Lol is enraptured
and consumed by the "scene of desire" that she witnesses. Towards the end<of the
novel she confirms this detachment by stating "that from the first moment that
woman walked into the room, I ceased to love my fiance" (Lol, 126). This is perhaps
the most unsettling line in the text and subverts any expectation a reader may have at
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understanding or knowing Lol. It is possible that seeing Anne-Marie Stretter, this
superior 'object' of desire made Lol feel inferior, perhaps she recognises a 'lack' in
herself when confronted by the image of Anne-Marie Stretter9 On the one hand, Lol
is apathetic that she has lost her fiance, and yet on the other, she is never the same
after the Town ball. The central question of the novel is what causes Lol's illness?
The question of Lol's insanity frames the way the narration unfolds and
situates 'lack' as Lol's defining feature. After the Town ball, Lol collapses, leaving
the town to question and gossip about her condition: "But what is one to make of
suffering which has no apparent cause?" (Lol, 13). Lol is no longer the same person
she was before the night of the Town ball, now described with words such as
"meekly," and as having the "odor of some long-unused object," (Lol, 19) she is no
longer the radiant beauty who "slipped through [boys'] fingers like water" (Lol, 3).
After her collapse, Lol is "married, without wanting to be" (Lol, 21), that is, she does
not choose her husband because she loves him, rather she accepts him because he
cannot replace her fiance or "[betray] the exemplary abandon in which [her fiance]
had left her" (Lol, 21).
Several interpretations emerge to explain and answer the question of Lol's
'lack.' Tatiana, Lol's school friend and witness to her abandonment the night of the
Town ball "does not believe that [the] fabled Town Beach ball was so
overwhelmingly responsible for Lol Stein's illness"(Lol, 2). She claims that: "there
was already something lacking in Lol, something which kept her from being [. . . ]
'there'" (Lol, 3). Tatiana's uncertainty over what it is that Lol 'lacks' or what keeps
her "from being 'there'" demonstrates the way Duras locates an absence in Lol but
refuses to explain or define what it is. As Lol's only witness to her betrayal,
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Tatiana's suggestion that Lol was "already lacking" undermines the focus and
attention to the Town ball, thus making it difficult for a reader to determine exactly
why Lol falls ill
The townspeople explain Lol's condition from "the simple reason that she
was jilted by the man from Town Beach," they suggest that she is paying "the price
for the strange absence of pain she had experienced during the ball itself' (Lol, 15).
This analysis, arising from gossip, reflects a more general or obvious assumption. By
calling it a "simple reason" a reader is left to wonder and question whether there may
be a more 'complicated' explanation. This narrative device encourages a reader to
ask questions, pose solutions, and analyse the interpretations offered in the text, and
yet, as discussed, no final 'solution' is offered.
There is an implicit suggestion that the 'lack' in Lol is due, in part, to the fact
that she marries a man she is not in love with after she has been rejected by her
fiance. Duras touches on the 'lack' that arises for some women after marriage and
childbirth. In an interview, Duras writes: "[women] are completely alone in their
millions, in their poverty, in their comfort, and in their slums, in all their completely
functional marriages - whether rich or poor. They are as alone as before."245 Duras
suggests that despite a societal expectation that women who are wives and mothers
should be happy, many in fact are not, they are lonely and suffering from a particular
kind ofmadness.
Descriptions of Lol often define her in terms of how she satisfies her
husband's desires not her own or they place her desires solely in relation to her
245
Marguerite Duras. "Interview with Susan Husserl-KapiL'in A'ew French Feminisms: An
Anthology, ed. by Elaine Maries and Isabelle de Courtivron. trans. Susan Husserl-Kapit. (New York:
Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1981). pp. 174-176. (p 176): originally published in Signs. Winter. 1975.
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husband's needs. Lol's husband describes her as: "[a] sleeping beauty who never
offered a word of complaint, this upright sleeping beauty, this constant self-
effacement which kept him moving back and forth between the forgetfulness and the
rediscovery of her blondness, of this silken body which no awakening would ever
change, of this constant, silent promise of something different which he called her
gentleness, the gentleness of his wife" (Lol, 24). Lol is happy being thought of in
terms of her husband and with the mundane rituals of her life that everyone claims
are "perfect" (Lol, 24). There is a sense that she is happy to fulfil the role expected of
her because it provides her with anonymity. After the attention drawn to her from the
Town ball, she is happy in her obscurity. Yet, like the "she" in The Malady ofDeath,
Lol is an enigma to the other characters, the reader and critic.
So far Lol fits within the representation of Lacanian 'lack.' The 'lack' in Lol
and the similarities with a psychoanalytic 'lack' make it difficult to claim Lol as a
representative of a feminist subject or even as a woman in control of her own desires.
Helene Cixous writes in The Newly Born Woman, somewhat optimistically perhaps,
"we will never lack ourselves,"246 "we" referring to all women. In the case of Lol,
however, her "self' appears to be exactly what she is lacking. "She" like the woman
from Duras'sMalady ofDeath is only in the text insofar as she is narrated or enjoyed
by her desirer. So what is the feminist reader/critic to do? Before we, as readers or
critics, can arrive at any final interpretations of this 'lack' in Lol, we must consider
the fact that the events of her life, what we know of Lol, is mediated through Jacques
Hold's surveillance and imagination.
246 Helene Cixous and Catherine Clement. The Newly Born Woman, p. 100.
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READING FOR THE ANALYST
As the narrator, Jacques Hold's observations and analyses of Lol dominate
the text. It is difficult and problematic to separate the details of Lol's life from the
fact that they are given to us, as readers, by Lol's lover. Ln other words we are given
an interpretation of Lol from the perspective of someone else's desire and so it is
possible to read his descriptions as a product of what he wants to see in Lol, not
necessarily what is there. As Hold narrates: "As for the nineteen years preceding [the
night of the Town ball], I do not want to know any more about them than what I tell
[. . .] I am therefore going to look for [Lol], I shall pick her up at that moment in time
which seems most appropriate, at that moment when it seems to me she first began to
stir, to come toward me" (Lol, 4-5). As Hold admits, he is deliberately omitting
details of Lol's life in order to substantiate his own understanding of Lol. Because
we, as readers, understand Lol through the desiring gaze ofHold, we must be suspect
of the information we are given and how Hold represents Lol.
Approximately one third of the way into the novel, Hold reveals himself:
"I'm thirty-six years old, a member of the medical profession. I've been living in
South Tahla only for a year. I'm in Peter Beugner's section at the State Hospital. I'm
Tatiana Karl's lover." At this point, the reader learns that the explanations offered for
Lol's 'lack' come from the narrator, Jacques Hold, Lol and Tatiana's lover. Already
there is a perversion of the 'truth' or of the origins for Lol's 'lack.' This narrative
device destabilises a reader's interpretation, s/he must return to the beginning and re¬
read the last 74 pages in order to re-learn the way s/he has come to 'know' Lol, for
surely knowing her through a new lover is different from hearing the details from her
husband or from her old friend Tatiana.
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Hold's self-description reads like a medical profile: age, address, profession,
and marital status. Narrative breaks such as "Here is my opinion" (Lol, 35) suggest
his intrusive and diagnostic approach to Lol's history. Hold states his objective as
follows: "To level the terrain, to dig down into it, to open the tombs wherein Lol is
feigning death, seems to me fairer - given the necessity to fill in the missing links of
Lol Stein's story - than to fabricate mountains, create obstacles, rely on chance"
(Lol, 27). Instead of "creating obstacles, or relying on chance" Hold prefers to "fill in
missing links" of Lol's story. In other words, instead of allowing her to formulate her
own history, he will fill in the 'lack' he imagines to exist in her story. He will
assemble the pieces he imagines she has lost in order to restore her sense of identity
and to 'cure' her in a truly psychoanalytical sense.
Returning to some of the central ideas in Chapter Two, I want to suggest that
Hold's narrative performs a similar splitting between a 'then' and a 'now' that H.D.'s
Tribute to Freud demonstrates. Doubling back on himself, Hold creates a rupture in
the constitution ofLol's identity. She is both the woman she is 'now' and the woman
she was then. The narrative movement between Hold's observations and the dialogue
between Hold and Lol or Tatiana and Hold displace any 'authority' or any 'one' way
of analysing Lol's 'lack' or her desires. Hold assumes the position as the "subject
who is supposed to know"24 and yet, as the narrative begins to demonstrate, Hold
has very little control of the narrative ofLol's life. Clearly Duras intends the name
play to reflect Hold's attempt and failure to 'know' Lol.
Jacques Hold is often described in ways that position him as an analyst figure
to Lol. He can be read in psychoanalytic terms as voicing the question of the Other,
247
Jacques Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, pp. 230-243.
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or in Lacan's words, Che vuoi? 'What do you want?' The question of the Other
leads the subject along his/her path towards desire. The 'path' is Lacan's shorthand
for the analytic experience. As he argues:
That is why the question of the Other, which comes back to the subject
from the place from which he expects an oracular reply in some such
form as 'Che Vuoi?\ 'What do you Want?,' is the one that best leads him
to the path of his own desire - providing he sets out, with the help of the
skills of a partner known as a psychoanalyst, to reformulate it, even
without knowing it, as 'What does he want ofme?'248
Without going into the varied processes this formation involves, such as transference
and resistance, terms that have been explored elsewhere in this thesis, it is important
to point out the role the analyst's assumes along the path of desire. Far from being an
onlooker, the analyst is actively engaged in the deciphering and decoding of the
patient's language and/or silence.
For example, Hold's observations of Lol place him in a position of an analyst
or in Lacan's words, "the subject in the know." Statements such as: "[Lol] is trying
to listen to some inner commotion, fails to, is overwhelmed by the realization,
however incomplete, of her desire" (Lol, 120, 121) and "[Lol] is repressing some
frightful pain to which she fails to yield" (Lol, 121) expose Hold's analytic gaze on
Lol. These statements also reveal his conviction that he is the one to help Lol
confront her desires.
Indeed, it is possible to construct a reading in which Hold assumes an analyst
role and helps Lol to confront and resolve the 'lack' he diagnoses her as having from
248
Jacques Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 312.
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the beginning of the text. As suggested before, Hold connects the 'lack' in Lol with
the events of the Town ball. Throughout the text, Hold is involved in telling Lol's
story, which can be interpreted as an attempt to provide her with a sense of self, or to
constitute her desires with his own.
At the end of the novel, Hold returns with Lol to the Town Beach so that she
can come to terms with the events of the ball. This return to the scene of the town
ball can be read as a literalisation of what happens in an analytic session. Instead of
talking Lol through the events as she remembers them, as an analyst might do, Hold
returns with her to the physical cite of her trauma in order to help her confront her
relationship to the past. Lol tells Hold that she could not return to the Town beach
without him. She tells him: "I realized that without you there was no point in going. I
wouldn't have recognized anything" (Lol, 157). Her admission that she would not
"have recognized anything" without Hold, reassures his position as an analyst of her
experiences.
As the train takes Hold and Lol to the Town beach, Lol begins to recall and
recognise the events that took place ten years before, when her fiance left her for
Anne-Marie Stretter. At the same time, Hold begins to formulate and recognise his
own role within Lol's return: "Now the hour ofmy entering Lol Stein's memory is at
hand. The ball will be at the end of the trip, it will fall like a house of cards, as this
trip is presently falling [. . .] In the future it will be today's vision she will recall, this
companion beside her in the train. This trip, in the future, will be like the town of
South Tahla is for her now, lying in ruins beneath her footsteps of the present" (Lol,
165). For Hold, the ball represents the final 'solution' to the 'lack' he sees in Lol. He
sets up a confrontation, which can be interpreted as an analytic 'session' as the
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moment in which he will 'cure' Lol and replace her desire for her fiance with her
desire for him.
Hold's comment upon their return suggests that their 'sessions' have ended:
"1 refuse to admit the end which is probably going to come and separate us, how easy
it will be, how distressingly simple, for the moment I refuse to accept it, to accept
this end, I accept the other, the end which has still to be invented, the end I do not yet
know, that no one has invented: the endless end, the endless beginning ofLol Stein"
(Lol, 174-175). His comment also reflects the "endless end" of Duras's text.
Although they return to the 'scene' of the trauma, nothing happens to reveal any
further meaning or explanation for the 'lack' in Lol. As readers, we are no closer to a
'truth' about Lol than we are in the beginning Hold has not 'cured' Lol, nor has he
arrived at any conclusions about her suffering. In fact, as Hold gets closer to the
physical 'origin' for Lol's 'lack,' or to the place he believes responsible for Lol's
suffering, his 'hold' on the narrative begins to break down. He begins to lose control
over the narration of Lol's life.
Hold's analysis of Lol is far from stable; it is continually interrupted by
narrative intrusions that make it difficult for the reader to decide who is 'in charge'
of telling Lol's story. For example, the narration abruptly shifts from Hold's first
person analysis to a narrative perspective that can 'see' Hold in his pursuit of Lol:
"He scanned the boulevard in the vicinity of the cinema. Lol had taken refuge back
around the corner of the building. Behind him, in her gray coat, Lol, unmoving, waits
for him to make up his mind which way to go" (Lol, 43). Hold imagines that he is
guiding Lol along the path of her desire, and yet the sense we get, as readers, is that
he is following her, tracing her movements and trying to bring order and sense to
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them The narrative intrusions break down his authority over her desire and allow the
reader to follow his construction of Lol, for it is more construction work that Hold is
involved in than the unearthing he imagines. He is putting things together, building
up his interpretation, rather than digging into Lol's account of her life.
In this way, Duras exposes the inconsistencies of the analytic narrative. Not
only is the analytic narrative subject to the feeling or emotional blindsights of the
analyst, but the analysand is capable of evading his watchful gaze. S/he can hide
behind the "corner of language" (Lol, 39) in order to resist his/her analysis. Like Lol,
the analysand can anticipate the steps the analyst will take next, or wait to see the
direction s/he will take in analysis. In doing so, the analysand can provide the analyst
with what he is looking for, what he desires, as opposed to what the analysand
desires, although Lol's desire remains unclear throughout the text.
Although Hold believes the Town ball is the origin for Lol's suffering, his
trip to the Town beach with Lol does not reveal any final meanings or explanations.
He fails to uncover any 'truth' about Lol. Hold's 'failure' suggests that the act of
giving something meaning, of signifying the Town ball as an origin for Lol's
suffering, excludes the possibility that there is no meaning to grasp. In this way,
Duras demonstrates the impulse in psychoanalytic structures to enforce signification
- to make meaning. The text also implies that Lol's suffering may not have an
explanation or secret meaning to uncover. However, instead of examining the
possibilities in the lack of conclusion in Duras's texts, critics have largely tried to
make meaning of the non-meaning.
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ANALYSING THE ANALYST
Jacques Hold is a central concern in psychoanalytic and feminist criticism on
The Ravishing ofLol V. Stein. For example, Kimberly Philpot Van Noort argues for
reading Hold as an analyst in her article 'The Dance of the Signifier: Jacques Lacan
and Marguerite Duras's The Ravishing of Lol V. Stein " Van Noort suggests that
Hold not only represents the analyst's perspective, but is "caught in a full-blown case
of transference [. . .] so much so that his own identity is seemingly absorbed by
[Lol's.]" Van Noort takes her argument a step further by suggesting that the
breakdown of Hold's narration can be read as demonstrating Lol's feminising
influence on Hold. She argues that "Duras's novel points to the possibility of a
'feminine' signifier, singularly distinguished by its quality of absence."249 Van Noort
understands absence in The Ravishing ofLol V Stein to be at the centre of a process,
"one which lacks neither identity nor the power to signify."250
Van Noort's analysis offers her readers an alternative way to engage with the
'lack' that is central to Duras's novel And yet, she connects this absence to the
signification of the Phallus, which situates her argument within a psychoanalytic
framework. Following Lacan's lead in his ""Hommage fait a Marguerite Duras,"
Van Noort reads the text as offering no possibility of castration because the Town
ball is never given a final meaning.251 Instead of acknowledging the possibility that
the Town ball has no final meaning, Van Noort argues that this 'lack' of meaning
reflects the absence of castration. In this way, Van Noort supplies meaning where she
sees no meaning, as if to make the ending mean something, when it may not. In the
249 Van Noort. "The Dance of the Signifier." p. 195.
250 Van Noort, "The Dance of the Signifier." p. 200. footnote 4.
251 Van Noort. "The Dance of the Signifier." p. 195.
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same way that Hold is desperate to 'solve' Lol, Van Noort appears to want to 'solve'
the ambiguity of the text by providing it with an answer: no meaning means no
castration.
John O'Brien reaches a similar conclusion in his essay on The Ravishing of
Lol V. Stein entitled "Metaphor Between Lacan and Duras " O'Brien, also drawing
heavily from Lacan's essay, argues that Hold's efforts to figure Lol's identity
implicate him in a loss of his own identity "by replaying the castrative moment with
Lol in the phallic role."252 In both examples, Lacan's theoretical interpretation of the
Phallus and castration, as well as his theories on "regard" and "vision" are mapped
onto Duras's text in order to fill the absence with meaning. Both Van Noort and
O'Brien take a suggestion made by Lacan in order to find it in Duras's text.
Although these analyses may secure Lacan's place within literary criticism, they do
so at the expense of Duras's text. That is, the theoretical mapping limits and
constricts the possibility for desire to be figured as "endless." In the case of The
Ravishing ofLol V Stein, psychoanalytic critics with Lacanian tools in hand repeat
what Lacan asserts and in so doing not only support his claim but subjugate Duras's
fiction to his theoretical framework. In the same way, the interpretations that focus
on the character Hold subjugate the story of Lol.253
And yet, psychoanalytic critics are not the only ones who focus on Hold's
character in a way that restricts the possibilities in Duras's text; feminist critics such
252 John O'Brien. "Metaphor Between Lacan and Duras," p. 240.
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as Laurie Edson and Emma Wilson attempt to interpret and, in a sense, to solve the
relationship between Hold and Lol. However, before discussing examples of feminist
criticism on Duras's The Ravishing ofLol V Stein, I would first like to clarify my
use of the term 'feminist framework' in order to avoid confusion. As discussed in the
first chapter, although Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray offer feminists useful and
constructive ways of re-considering psychoanalytic interpretations, their work often
weaves itself back into the arguments they differ from and in so doing, provide little
alternative to psychoanalytic models. On the other hand, theories that consider both
perspectives in an effort to think through dynamic and complicated issues, theories
such as Diane Elam argues in Feminism and Deconstruction, offer feminists an
alternative approach to thinking through questions such as 'woman' or desire. In
short, I am distinguishing between two models or frameworks available to feminists.
One opposes the models it disputes or seeks to establish 'woman' or the feminine in
a position beyond a male or masculine parameter. The other 'brand' of feminism
interrogates the dynamics at play in a structure or logic in order to confront the way
they are intertwined, and to pose alternatives that do not simply substitute one
restrictive construct with another, but attempt to escape the circular pull of these
theoretical models altogether.
Feminist critics, such as Laurie Edson, read Hold's character as
representative of the male narrator who is struggling to grasp the enigma of woman
and/or of truth, Edson argues: "In representing a male narrator who is ostensibly
unable to represent a female character, Duras has ingeniously represented
unrepresentability while foregrounding the inevitable failure of any quest to solve the
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enigma ofwoman and/or truth."254 I am uneasy with Edson's elision of'woman' and
'truth,' not only because of the problems it generates for feminism, but also because
Duras problematises the relationship between 'woman' and 'truth' in her work By
resisting a final solution to Lol's 'lack,' Duras delays any final 'answer' or 'truth' to
why she is lacking Also, in leaving the ending ambiguous, Duras resists revealing a
'truth' about Lol and thus avoids any elision between 'truth' and 'woman.' Although
she does position Lol as "the object of some secret" (Lol, 49), her resistance to
revealing any 'truth' about Lol undermines the possibility of uncovering anything
about this "secret " A reader is forced to question whether there was or is a 'secret'
or hidden meaning to solve in the first place.
I would also argue that Hold's "failure" to represent Lol has less to do with
gender than Edson suggests. Instead, Hold's "failure" begins with his attempt to
grasp Lol's story in the first place. The text demonstrates that any attempt made by
character or reader to grasp hold of a 'truth' will end in "failure" (irrespective of
gender) Edson's argument falls into a feminist framework that attempts to reverse a
masculine structure by noting its failures and inconsistencies. However, in doing so
she overlooks the inability of either gender to control the narrative.
Emma Wilson's critique of The Ra\>ishing of Lol V Stein, although
persuasively argued, falls into similar problems with gender. Wilson argues in
Sexuality and the Reading Encounter that Hold's lack of narrative control can be
contrasted with Tatiana's narrative who "as lover, not analyst, becomes the key to
both reincarnation and carnality in within the text."255 Wilson argues that Tatiana
254 Laurie Edson. "Knowing Lol: Duras. Epistemology and Gendered Mediation," pp. 26-27.
255 Emma Wilson. Sexuality and the Reading Encounter: Identity and Desire in Proust. Duras,
Tournier, and Cixous (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1996). p. 175.
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functions as Lol's double, and as such, Lol has a chance to replay the trauma of the
town ball through her relationship with Tatiana However, reading Tatiana as Lol's
double or witness to the trauma of the town ball is no more stable than reading Hold
as analyst. Although Tatiana's relationship to Lol may be different, as Wilson
suggests in her reading, she is no more 'truthful' or 'accurate' as narrator of Lol's
life than Hold
Instead of, or as well as, reading Hold as representative of the failure of either
an analytical or masculine narrative, I prefer to read the loss of control in Hold's
narrative as reflecting a shift in the relationship between desirer and desired.
Although Lol is described as an object in the beginning of the novel, as the novel
progresses Hold's objectivity also becomes suspect. Hold admits:"[Lol] loves, loves
the man who must love Tatiana. No one. No one loves Tatiana in me. I belong to a
perspective which she is in the process of constructing with impressive obstinacy, I
shall not resist. Tatiana, little by little, is forcing her way in, is breaking down the
doors" (Lol, 122). Hold recognises that he is an object to Lol's reconstruction of the
Town ball. He imagines that Lol wants to recreate being on the outside of a passion
between two people. And so instead of watching Michael Richardson and Anne-
Marie Stretter, she wants to watch Hold and Tatiana. However, as the passage
reveals, by participating in a fantasy he imagines Lol to have, Hold is denying his
own desire to be with Lol.
Duras undermines any confidence that we, as readers or critics, may have in
Hold's narration of Lol's story through Hold's admissions that he is actually the
object of Lol's desire instead of the other way around. The first half of the novel
leads us to believe that Lol is the object of Hold's desire as well as the object of a
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profound rejection, whereas the second half of the novel develops Lol's subjective
role through Hold's admissions that he is in fact an object of Lol's fantasy, not his
own. He tells us that he "had to know [Lol], because such was her desire" (Lol, 75),
which shifts his penetrative gaze on Lol to her demands of him.
I am not suggesting simply that Hold's loss of subjectivity can be equated
with Lol's acquisition of subjectivity, that is, I am not taking sides with Van Noort's
or Edson's criticism that Hold's narrative be read as representing a "failure" of an
analytical or masculine narrative. Although both of these arguments can be supported
in the text to a certain extent, neither takes into account why Lol returns to the rye
fields at the end of the novel. Lol's return to the rye fields can be interpreted in
distinctly different ways. To identify a few: either Lol returns to assume her role as
voyeur or she assumes her desire to be outside the relationship between two people,
or she positions herself as an object to Hold's desire. In other words, Lol can be
constructed as an object or subject to her desires or the desires of an Other. No
conclusive reading can be drawn.
I am arguing here that the narrative shifts positions between Hold and Lol in
terms of object and subject so much so that it is difficult to determine when Hold is
the object or when Lol is the subject and vice versa. Instead of trying to pin down or
fix the text into supporting one or the other as subject or object, it is possible to read
both as objects and subjects to the desire in the text. In doing so, critical focus is
placed on the movement between desirer and desired and how desire functions rather
than on the roles of subject and object positions.
In this way, Duras's depiction of desire in her fiction is more in line with the
model of the "ms. en abyme" that Diane Elam theorises or the "both/and" that
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Schneeman demonstrates through her work. As discussed in chapter one, the "ms. en
abyme" problematises the relationship between subject and object in representation.
In the "ms. en abyme," the movement between subject and object is fluid and
unstable. The object's endless regression into itself escapes the subject's hold, which
leads to a destabilisation of the subject itself. Following out of this logic, women can
be neither subject nor object (and in the same way, men can be neither subject nor
object).
Using the framework of the "ms. en abyme," desirer and desired can be
figured as always in motion, as continuously changing positions with each other
instead of as fulfilling particular roles set out for them in a static and fixed logic. The
fluidity of these roles is particularly important to a feminist rethinking of desire.
Instead of trying to refigure woman as subject, it is possible to consider the role of
desired and desirer as infinitely changing positions in the movement of desire. That
is, neither man nor woman determines or is determined by a position of desire.
Instead of trying to raise woman to a position equal to man or even higher, or to cure
the Tack' she is given by psychoanalysis, Duras's representation of woman in her
fiction suggest that it is possible to focus on how each position in desire functions as
well as how desire creates connections and builds foundations. In other words, we, as
readers and critics, are invited to think about the productive possibilities and the
limitations in the movement of desire.
On the one hand, it is possible to argue that Duras, in situating Tack' in her
female characters and yet not leaving them as objects, suggests that there is
subjectivity in Tack.' That is, shifting the positions between Hold and Lol (and even
Tatiana) Duras contends that each position, whether object, subject or voyeur, has
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both a subjective and objective role in desire. However, to claim for a power in 'lack'
is to embrace a negative, a politics that could be linked to Helene Cixous's claim in
The Newly Born Woman that "we are 'black' and we are beautiful."256 Cixous
explodes the binary oppositions that she believes structure knowledge and culture. In
saying "we are 'black' and we are beautiful" she is challenging the negative binary
that women are often aligned with, while men assume the 'positive or white' end of
the opposition. However, as argued in Chapter One, to take one side of an opposition
is not necessarily to release oneself from the dominating influence of that opposition.
Duras maintains a 'lack' in desire, both through her characterisations and
through her resistance to any textual 'arrival.' That is, her narratives resist any one or
singular reading or framework. The resistance to one reading functions as a
guarantee that the desire in the text is not solved which leaves the reader with
questions, not answers. The reader is left to consider the desire in the text and how it
functions rather than 'solve' desire, which would put at end to its movement in the
text. Duras's alternative construction of Tack' demands that her feminist reader
understand how it functions, or rather, how it could function, before s/he abandon the
possibility altogether. Her texts make it possible to read desire as mediated either by
a masculine or patriarchal influence or by one's own desires. In either case, desire is
not allowed to 'arrive' at a final 'solution,' which keeps it 'in motion.'
256 Helene Cixous and Catherine Clement. The Newly Born Woman, p.69.
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THE DESIRE FOR LOL
Returning again to the text itself, I want to argue that the desire to know and
understand Lol V. Stein is not confined to Jacques Hold or Tatiana Karl, characters
in the novel, but extends to her readers, her critics and even to Duras herself:
Lol V. Stein. Mad. Brought to a halt at the dance at South Tahla. She
stops there. It's the dance that grows, making concentric circles round
her, bigger and bigger. Now the dance, the sound of the dance, has
reached as far as New York. Now, of all the characters in my books, Lol
V. Stein comes top of the list. It's a funny thing. She's the one who 'sells'
the best. My little madwoman.257
Duras's claim to Lol, expressed in the phrase "my little madwoman," reflects the
way the characters in the novel, the reader and the critic all participate in an attempt
to grasp hold of Lol's narrative.258 "She stops there " in other words, the text ends
and yet the circles of interpretation grow and expand around Duras's "little
madwoman."
Instead of reading for a definitive history of Lol, I prefer to read the struggle
to define Lol as a dual struggle between psychoanalysis and feminism to grasp hold
of an elusive and enigmatic 'woman.' In order to construct an alternative reading of
female desire, as this thesis attempts to do, one must first read through
"5
Marguerite Duras. Practicalities: Marguerite Duras speaks to Jerome Beaujour, trans. Barbara
Bray (London: Flamingo, 1990), p. 29.
~58 In Sexuality and the Reading Encounter. Emma Wilson argues that to a certain degree Duras
participates in establishing Lol's elusive character. She argues: "Duras herselfmay be seen to
collaborate in the framing of her novel as a case history, whose subject and heroine becomes
synonymous with the complex the text itselfmay seek to analyze. Yet Duras works to undermine, too,
any possibility of finite analysis or knowledge within the text. Her own remarks are suitably tenuous,
dissolving any fixed interpretation the reader may have salvaged." p. 165. Also in Practicalities: Duras
claims that all the women in her books, regardless of age. are based on the character of Lol V. Stein,"
pp. 27-28.
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psychoanalytic interpretations as they dominate and underline western theories on
sexuality. In other words, the reader of desire must first read through the narrative of
female desire as seen through the eyes of psychoanalysis. If we read this in terms of
The Ravishing ofLol V Stein, the reader first encounters Hold's descriptions of Lol,
without knowing his position at first. It is only later in the text that the reader
becomes aware s/he is reading a 'biased' and unstable account of Lol's history.
Reading Hold as an analyst figure, as some critics have done, the reader must then
reconstruct his/her reading to understand the way in which Hold may be biased or
may have transferred his affections for Lol onto his narrative of her story. In a
similar way, the reader of female desire must return and review the accounts made by
psychoanalysis in order to construct an alternative view.
However, in reading the psychoanalytic account, it becomes very difficult for
the reader to remember how s/he was influenced and by whom. As readers, we are
looking for an origin to Lol's madness. Like the characters in the novel, we are trying
to discover why she is lacking, instead of reading her as fulfilled. This is a crucial
distinction and one that both psychoanalysis and feminism are 'guilty' of. Both
psychoanalysis and feminism want to fill a 'lack' in the representation of a woman.
Psychoanalysis imagines this 'lack' in woman is constituted by male desires.
Feminism on the other hand may argue that the 'lack' should be filled by the woman
herself - through self-awareness, knowledge of her own desires. Either is
prescriptive, and limiting. In the case ofLol, Hold believes that she only desires to be
a voyeur of a couple she is intimately involved with, which means neither he nor
Tatiana can 'have' her. Her desires fall outside his own.
If Hold is representative of the psychoanalytic 'hold' on female desire, then
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Tatiana reflects the restrictive view of some feminist readings on female desire.
Instead of reading Tatiana as Lol's double, as Wilson does convincingly,259 1 would
argue that Tatiana is Lol's opposite. One has been married for ten years, has three
children and stays at home; the other is married although is currently having an affair
and has no children. The only thing they have in common is free time and Jacques
Hold.
The two women can be read as having taken the two options Duras envisions
are open to women: to settle down and have children, or to remain free from those
responsibilities. As Tatiana tells Lol: "There were two choices open to me from the
start: to live the way we used to when we were young, open to a whole range of
possibilities, you remember, or else settle down into a fixed pattern, the way you
have, you know what I mean, please don't take offence, but you know'" (Lol, 84).
What Tatiana expects Lol to 'know' is that she has taken one path, the one with
possibilities and Lol has taken the other, the fixed path. As readers we know that the
path Lol takes is not fixed by her marriage or by her role as mother, as Tatiana
assumes. Tatiana's assessment ofLol's life and position is reflective of the somewhat
unspoken view many feminists have about a woman's decision to be just a mother
and wife.260 There is a subtle implication that choosing to be a mother and wife limits
and defines you as a woman in ways that being free with your sexuality or with the
other possibilities life presents does not. On the surface, and to Tatiana, Lol is
nothing more than a dutiful wife and mother, and yet we are led to believe through
Hold's narration that Lol is open to and engaged in other sexual possibilities. Not
259 Wilson. Sexuality and the Reading Encounter, pp. 172-180.
260 I am placing the word 'just' in italics to underline that very few if any feminists suggest that being
a mother is easy or invaluable, rather the suggestion is that in choosing to be just a mother, a woman
often loses her own identity to her children's needs and desires.
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only does this disrupt Tatiana's reading of Lol but it may also challenge some of the
assumptions that are deemed acceptable in the feminist arena. Feminist viewpoints
and experiences may reflect both Tatiana and Hold's accounts of Lol, but neither can
capture the essence of Lol nor know the truth about her wanderings. Even as readers,
we are left unsure whether to believe what we have read ofLol.
In taking a critical step backwards from the desire to 'know' Lol it is possible
to see the way in which characters like Hold and Tatiana represent the need to gain
mastery and authority over the narrative of desire. It is also clear that attempts to do
are unsuccessful. Duras represents the impossibility of maintaining authority or
mastery over the narrative of desire, whether psychoanalytic or feminist, and the
failure that inevitably accompanies the act of interpretation. As Leslie Hill argues:
"any reading ofDuras's novel that seeks to establish the veracity of the story of Lol,
whether based in Lacanian psychoanalysis or on the certitudes of female experiences,
is bound to fail."261
REPLAYING THE SCENE OF DESIRE
In order to further examine the way in which Duras's texts resist final
interpretations and 'narrative cures,' 1 turn to an earlier novel by Duras entitled,
Moderato Cantabile. In his essay on knowledge and repetition, Michael Sheringham
argues that "since 1964, with The Ra\>ishing ofLol V Stein, [Duras] had freed herself
from the thematic and generic constraints which enabled a book like Moderato
Cantabile to be readable in terms of fairly traditional psychological and metaphysical
261 Hill. Apocalyptic Desires, p.73.
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schemes."262 As Sheringham suggests, Duras develops her use of analytic processes
in The Ravishing of Lot V. Stein which makes the latent suggestions in Moderato
Cantabile more accessible. For this reason, I have chosen to analyse these texts in a
reverse chronological order.
The opening scene of Moderato Cantabile introduces the reader to Anne
Desbaresdes and her son in the middle of his piano lessons: "'Will you please read
what's written above the score?' the lady asked. 'Moderato Cantabile,' said the child
[. . .] 'And what does moderato cantabile mean?' '1 don't know.'"263 The struggle to
make the child say what moderato cantabile means continues amidst his mother's
excuses and apologies. Several levels of interpretation open up in this scene alone. A
child is trying to interpret the annotations in the margins of a musical score. His
teacher, frustrated with his reluctance to answer her, interprets his behaviour as
reflective of his mother's bad parenting. The child's mother looks at the situation and
interprets her child's stubborn behaviour in terms of herself. She is shocked and yet
pleased that she has such a difficult child (MC, 14).
'Moderato cantabile' appears in the margins of the music that the child is
supposed to be performing. It is a musical term that reflects the composer's
interpretation of how the score should be played. In Madame Girard's room the child
is trying to learn how to play the piano, he is trying to learn what things signify, how
he is supposed to make sense and interpret the notes he sees in front of him. The
child is confronted with the terms that are laid out in front of him, just as we, as
readers, encounter the signs ofModerato Cantabile as text.
262 Michael Sheringham. "Knowledge and Repetition in Le Ravissement dc Lot V. Stein," Romance
Studies, No.2, Summer (1983). pp. 124-140, (p. 125).
263 Marguerite Duras. Moderato Cantabile, trans. Richard Seaver (London: Calder Publications. 1997,
orjginally published 1958). p. 11. Subsequent references will appear in the text after "MC."
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Intrusions from the outside world interrupt the piano lessons: the purring
engine of a motorboat, the sound of the sea, and the pink hues of the sunset. These
images distract the child from his task of defining 'moderato cantabile.' They also
distract the reader, who in trying to figure out what this scene means finds
him/herself seduced by the images Duras evokes of the outside world. In this way,
Duras suggests that attempts to make meaning of her text will end in failure, they
will also miss the sensual and evocative images that exist in the margins of the act of
interpretation. Duras encourages her readers to inhabit the desire she narrates instead
of interpreting it, instead of forcing one meaning, the narration opens up the
possibility ofmultiple readings.
By juxtaposing an interpretative act with a sensual or stimulating image,
Duras implies that desire arises from a combination of understanding and non-
understanding or knowledge and non-knowledge, which leaves desire as something
which can be talked about, analysed, and yet never fully understood or defined. Her
narrative also suggests that the act of interpretation, the retelling of the story,
incorporates within its structure the interpreter or reader's desire, which changes the
structure of the story itself.
To take this a step further it is necessary to explain the central events in the
text. The novel revolves around a crime passionel, a man shoots his wife in a cafe.
The crime passionel is the central image in the novel and is repeated again and again
through the discussions between Anne and a man she meets in the cafe where the
murder takes place. Their meetings together in the cafe can be read as their attempts
to interpret the lover's intention for the crime. As they reconstruct the events, to play
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at being the lovers, they enter in their own desires (like a musician does with music)
which changes the structure of the crime passionel.
The drama of the crime passionel takes place outside the house where Anne's
son is learning to play the piano. The shouts from the streets draw her into the scene,
making her an eyewitness to the event. Through the cafe windows Anne sees a man
hovering over the body of his dead wife: "He turned and looked at the crowd, they
saw his eyes, which were expressionless, except for the stricken, indelible, inward
look of his desire" (MC, 19). The crime passionel functions as a break; the murder
gives her an excuse to enter the cafe and an opportunity to step outside her role as
mother and wife.
Like Lol, Anne is in a "completely functional marriage" and yet very lonely.
The narrative suggests she is 'lacking' any ambition of her own; she is defined solely
in terms of her husband: "You are Madame Desbaresdes. The wife of the manager of
Import Export et des Fonderies de la Cote. You live on the Boulevard de la Mer"
(MC, 32). And yet Anne's husband, like Lol's, is almost entirely absent from the
text. Although they are both alluded to, Lol's husband more than Anne's, they are
silent figures in the lives of both women. This absence, in part, suggests an
inadequacy on the husbands to participate in a desiring relationship with their wives.
It is implied in each, although not stated, that neither woman is in love or sexually
involved with her husband. And yet, both Anne's and Lol's involvement with
another man is not figured as a consequence of sexual desire but rather as a way of
working through an emotional desire. In this way, Duras distinguishes the 'other'
man as someone who is guiding Lol or Anne toward her desire, rather than simply
someone she is having an 'affair' with.
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The narrative implies that the crime passionel has a transformative effect on
Anne, similar to the effect the Town ball has on Lol. Instead of following their
everyday schedule, Anne returns with her son to the cafe where the murder took
place. While in the cafe, Anne deviates from her 'usual' behaviour by ordering a
glass of wine. As the narrator emphasises: "It was obvious that [Anne] was not used
to drinking wine, and that at this hour of the day she was generally doing something
quite different" (MC, 28) Not only is Anne "doing something quite different" but
she is in a place where she does not necessarily belong; she is in a bar generally
frequented by workers from her husband's foundry, as the narrative implies. "Two
customers came in. They recognised this woman at the bar and were surprised" (MC,
28). The crime passionel is set up by the narrative as a catalyst in Anne's life; after
she witnesses the murder she is never the same nor is her relationship to her husband
and son. However, why the murder has such a profound effect on her life remains
unanswered.
Duras develops the novel largely through the conversations between Anne
and a man she meets at the cafe. In the first instance we, as readers, are led to believe
that the man Anne speaks to is not entirely unknown to her. She tells him: "I
recognise you" (MC, 27), to which he replies "There was a murder" (MC, 27), and
then, somewhat curiously, the text reads: "Anne Desbaresdes told a lie" (MC, 27).
Her "lie" is seemingly uncomplicated - she tells him: "I see ... I was just
wondering," (MC, 27) - a way to move past his dismissal of her recognition.
However, this brief and seemingly innocuous exchange is anything but innocent as
we learn much later in the text. Like The Ravishing ofLol V. Stein, Duras teases her
reader by delaying the revelation of important information. Duras waits to reveal that
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the man Anne begins to meet daily in a cafe is an unemployed worker from her
husband's foundry. Chauvin, whose name we learn halfway through the text, has
seen Anne before at company events, a detail that appears towards the end of the
novel. The delay of information in Duras's texts derails its readers and unsettles
whatever interpretations they have been constructing.
Anne and Chauvin's discussion about the murder often mirrors what is
happening between them. For example, the following passage, referring to the crime
passionel, could also be read as a description of what is happening so far in the text
between Anne and Chauvin: '"And so they talked,' said Anne Desbaresdes, 'they
talked for a long time, a very long time, before it happened.' 'Yes I think they must
have spent a lot of time together to reach that stage Talk to me.' 'I don't know what
else to say,' she admitted. He gave her an encouraging smile. 'What difference does
it make?'"(MC, 46-47). The narration often moves fluidly between Anne and
Chauvin's speculations on the crime to their interactions which makes it difficult for
a reader to determine whether they are talking about themselves or the couple in the
crime passionel. Chauvin's reply suggests that their conversation about the crime is
only a pretence for their meetings in the cafe and yet we are left uncertain whether or
not there is a 'true' reason
The conversations between Anne and Chauvin play with the boundaries
between what is known or 'true' and what is unknown and abstract. As readers we
are left wondering what the nature of their relationship is and whether or not they are
having an affair. Duras provides just enough information, both within their
conversations and from the onlookers in the cafe, to spark curiosity about their
involvement and yet defers any final answers or conclusions. 1 have quoted the
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following passage at length in order to demonstrate the narrative ambiguity in the
discussions between Anne and Chauvin:
Lots of women have already lived in that same house and listened to the
hedges at night, in place of their hearts. The hedges have always been
there. They all died in their room behind that beech tree which, by the
way, you're wrong about: it has stopped growing.' 'That's as much a lie
as what you told me about their finding that woman dead drunk every
night.' 'Yes, that's a lie too. But this house is enormous. [. . .] 'Hurry up
and say something. Make it up.' She made an effort, her voice was almost
loud in the cafe, which was still empty. 'People ought to live in a town
where there are no trees trees (sic) scream when there's a wind here
there's always a wind always except for two days a year in your place
don't you see I'd leave this place I wouldn't stay all the birds or almost
all are seagulls you find them dead after a storm and when the storm is
over the trees stop screaming you hear them screaming on the beach like
someone murdered it keeps the children from sleeping no I'll leave.' She
paused, her eyes still shut with fear. He looked at her attentively. 'Perhaps
we're wrong,' he said, 'perhaps he wanted to kill her right away, the first
time he saw her. Talk to me (MC, 61-63).
This passage demonstrates the ambiguity and confusion within the discourse between
Anne and Chauvin. It is difficult to determine whether they are referring to the crime
passionel or to Anne's life or to something else entirely. It Is also hard to distinguish
between Anne's response and Chauvin's at times, Duras often runs the dialogue
together, making them indistinguishable at times.
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On the one hand, the text implies that Chauvin encourages Anne to talk about
her life, particularly her 'home' life, in order to get her to recognise that she should
leave her husband and son. However, the text does not suggest that Chauvin wants
Anne to leave for him, but rather to leave town or to want her own death. In other
words, the narrative develops the beginning of a second crime passionel, this time
between Anne and Chauvin. If he convinces her that she has nothing to live for, then
he may also convince her to stage a scene like the one they both witnessed in the cafe,
except that in this crime passionel not only will they know why the man shot the
woman, but they will play those roles.
The suggestion that Anne and Chauvin are trying to understand the motives
behind the two lovers in order to play the roles themselves is an unsettling and
confusing one. The text does not fully substantiate why Anne would want to die,
except that in passages, such as the one cited, there is a suggestion that Anne is
unhappy and in a loveless marriage. Anne's response to Chauvin, the only one in the
novel without any syntax, emphasises her own desperation and misery and yet also
reveals her subjectivity, the "I" in the passage affirms her individual desire to leave.
Although the majority of the novel takes place in the cafe where Anne and
Chauvin discuss the events of the crime passionel, Duras somewhat curiously adds
two chapters before the final one which serve to emphasise the effect these cafe
meetings have on her role as mother and wife. The way Duras describes Anne makes
it clear that she has undergone a transformation. Although she and Chauvin spend
their afternoons talking and interpreting an imaginary affair between the dead woman
and her lover, it is obvious through these final chapters that the town believes Anne
to be engaged in an affair with Chauvin. In other words, their 'non-affair' has the
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same or similar consequences to a 'real' affair.
The effects of Anne and Chauvin's 'imaginary' affair are made explicit
when Anne takes her son to his piano lessons for a second time Once again her son
refuses to do as he is told by his instructor which leads her to judge Anne for her
poor discipline: "You ought to be ashamed, Madame Desbaresdes,' said
Mademoiselle Giraud. 'So they say,'" (MC, 72) Anne replies, with an implied tone
of dismissal. Her comments reveal that there are other people, apart from
Mademoiselle Giraud, who believe Anne should be "ashamed" of her behaviour,
rather explicitly referring to her meetings with Chauvin. And yet, her comment also
reveals a detachment or inevitability, as if the circumstances are out of her control
and already in place. Duras suggests a cause and effect relationship between the
child's reluctant acquiescence to play the musical piece and Anne's fate, which is
being decided whether or not she wants it to be: "The sonatina still resounded, borne
like a feather by this young barbarian, whether he liked it or not, and showered again
on his mother, sentencing her anew to the damnation of her love. The gates of hell
bang shut" (MC, 77). Duras makes it clear that something has happened to Anne, a
transformation has taken place. And yet a reader is no closer to understanding why
she is sentenced to "damnation" or what Duras means when she writes: "the gates of
hell bang shut." As readers, we can infer from the language that Anne awaits a
tormented fate, but Duras leaves it unclear why.
As if to dispel any doubts a reader may have that Anne has changed or that
those around her have cast judgement on her actions, Duras draws attention to
Anne's inability to control herself during a societal dinner party hosted by Anne and
her husband. The party marks the first event in which Anne must perform her role as
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wife and hostess. Arriving late to the party after drinking with Chauvin, Anne is
unable to engage with her guests or to join in the polite discussion at the dinner table.
Duras contrasts Anne with the other women at the party whose "bare shoulders have
the gloss and solidity of a society founded and built on the certitudes of its rights"
(MC, 101); Anne is described as a "wild animal" (MC, 99) with "wildly protruding
eyes" (MC, 98) and a "warmth [that] fires her witch's loins" (MC, 105). The
narrative makes it clear that Anne is no longer able to control herself or her desires,
although it does not specify what these desires are or whom they are for.
The descriptions of Anne reflect the opinions of those around her, the
townspeople who decide that she and Chauvin are having an affair. However, as
readers, we are given no confirmation of an affair between Anne and Chauvin in the
narrative. Apart from their meetings in the cafe, there is no suggestion in the text that
they have met elsewhere to consummate any passionate feelings they may have for
each other. Their conversations provide the only insight into their 'affair' and do not
reveal a desire or even a 'hidden' desire. Instead, Duras suggests that relationship
revolves solely around their shared interest in re-enacting the crime passionel they
witness at the start of the novel.
In the final scene, Anne initiates an end to the imaginary affair that has now
developed between Anne and Chauvin in the minds of their onlookers: "Their hands
were so cold they were touching only in intention, an illusion, in order for this to be
fulfilled, for the sole reason that it should be fulfilled, none other" (MC, 115-116).
With icy formality Anne kisses Chauvin in what Duras describes as a "mortuary
ritual" (MC, 118). The implicit suggestion is that Anne and Chauvin stage a
confirmation of their affair for their onlookers in order to provide them with a motive
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for their own crime passionel. They are touching for no other reason except to
perform their role as lovers.
After their "mortuary rituals" Chauvin tells Anne: '"I wish you were dead" to
which she replies, 'I am"' (MC, 119). In telling Chauvin she is 'already dead' Anne
takes control of the ending of the crime passionel she witnesses in the beginning of
the novel. Instead of allowing herself to be killed by Chauvin, she leaves on her own
terms. The apocalyptic "fiery red rays" (MC, 120) that mark Anne's departure from
the cafe can be interpreted as forbidding and ominous or as signifying a new
beginning. Either way, Anne faces whatever lies ahead on her own. Her reply
changes the outcome of the original crime passionel.
In Anne and Chauvin's desire to reconstruct or solve the crime, they produce
an alternative interpretation. The narrative suggests that as they ask questions and
construct interpretations about the crime their own desires enter in, which changes
the outcome of their 'ending.' They are unable to reconstruct the crime because their
individual desires have an alternative effect on the structure they inhabit through the
story telling. Likewise, when a reader attempts to interpret a story his or her own
desires enter in which change the original story.
The end ofModerato Cantabile, like the end of The Rcn'ishing ofLol V. Stein
leaves the reader confused and somewhat unsettled. The narrative does not make it
clear whether this is a 'bad' or 'good' ending for the Anne. Duras does not allow her
a 'new' beginning, although she has allowed her a 'becoming.' The text makes it
clear that Anne is a different woman from the one she is in the beginning but does
not suggest whether her transformation is positive or negative. As readers, we know
that Anne's child, who once sustained her life, is no longer around, someone else
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takes him to his piano lesson (MC, 113). The narrative confirms that she is "again
moving forward into the fiery red rays of a dying day" (MC, 120). Curiously the
word "again" appears which implies that this is not the first time Anne is moving
forward and away from a life she has left behind. The simple addition of this word
can give new meaning to the conversations between Anne and Chauvin: perhaps she
recognised him from the past9 Perhaps she has left her husband and son before and
returned? Either reading is possible and yet neither is confirmed.
Anne is not murdered, as is the woman in the crime passionel. She is not put
on trial for her misconduct. There are no divorce proceedings, although all these
things could logically follow such a transgression. The ending is inconclusive which
leaves a reader questioning what this indeterminacy leaves us with. Leslie Hill
contends that: "Duras's refusal to subordinate desire to any prescriptive moral code
is one of the main sources of disturbance and provocation in Moderato Ccmtabile [. .
.] In desire, as the murder scene in Moderato Ccmtabile shows, one cannot tell what
is literal or proper from what is figural or improper, and this loss of origin severely
undermines the competence of any moral code to decide what is and is not legitimate
or acceptable in the realm of desire."264 Hill's interpretation is a useful one to
consider He draws attention to the way Duras blurs the boundaries between what is
'real' and what is 'imagined,' this textual blurring is most explicit in the
conversations between Anne and Chauvin. Hill also suggests that Duras's refusal to
make a clear distinction between the literal and the figural results in an undefined
and non-judgmental approach to desire.
264 Hill. Apocalyptic Desires, p. 54.
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As discussed, because Duras ends the novel with Anne's departure, she
leaves the consequences of Anne and Chauvin's 'affair' unexplained. As readers, we
can not be sure whether Anne is punished for her 'affair' or whether she will leave
the town entirely and start a new life somewhere else. The ambiguity suggests that
either conclusion is possible. However, both readings confirm that a change has
taken or will take place. The suggestion that something has changed or will change is
perhaps the most important implication because it aligns desire with production, not
acquisition. Desire in Duras's texts makes connections, creates changes, it does not
necessarily mean any one thing nor does it dictate terms.
This is a point worth considering further with regard to psychoanalytic and
feminist interpretations of desire. Because the ending is left unclear it is possible to
interpret the text within a psychoanalytic or a feminist framework, although, as
suggested before, the text does not entirely correspond to either For example, if we
read the ending within a psychoanalytic framework, it is possible to suggest that the
"again" which appears in the context of Anne's departure, is meant as a kind of
refrain, suggesting that the desire in the text or the crime passionel, will be
performed again The opening reference to a child's piano lesson corresponds well
with the possibility of a final encore that demands the crime passionel be re-played.
As discussed in the first chapter, Lacan theorises desire as man's desire for an
Other's desire.265 In Encore, he states that "'Encore' is the proper name of the gap
(faille) in the Other from which the demand for love stems."266 Because Anne leaves
"again" as opposed to a 'first time,' it can be suggested that the "gap" in Anne
remains and will cause another crime passionel to occur. For Lacan, nothing is more
265 Lacan, Encore, p. 4.
266 Lacan, Encore, p. 4.
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enigmatic than the process of repetition.267 The word repetition itself is close to the
verb, 'to haul,' as Lacan points out, "very close to a hauling of the subject, who
always drags his thing into a certain path that he cannot get out of."268 Duras 'hauls'
her subject, Anne, dragging her down the same path as if to force recognition and yet
she does so without assigning meaning to the trajectory. The path is repeated
endlessly which slowly erases the path taken. The crime passionel that is at once so
central to the text slowly becomes secondary, if not invisible, to the process itself. In
this way, Duras emphasises that the movement of desire is more important than an
arrival or an origin, and end of a beginning Like the Town Beach Ball in The
Ravishing ofLol V. Stein, Duras does not refer to these "scenes of desire" in order to
make meaning of them, as the psychoanalytic reader may want to do, instead she
demonstrates their meaninglessness in comparison to the transformative effects
desire has on her subjects.
From a feminist perspective it is possible to interpret Anne's decision to
leave, and not to fully assume the identity of the dead woman, as expressing agency
as well as a determination to leave her role as wife and mother. In his critique of
Moderato Cantabile, David Cowart suggests that Anne undergoes a process of
becoming, he writes: "Moderato Cantabile is not an histoire d'amour, or even much
of a story, but a fable of a woman who loses the world and gains herself."269 The
implicit suggestion in Cowart's analysis is that Anne, in leaving roles that determine
her, is assuming her own fate and determining her own identity. Cowart's notion of
'becoming' and gaining 'self is an inherent part of feminism, particularly a notion of
26~ Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, pp. 50-51.
268 Lacan. The Four Fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanalysis, p. 51.
269 David Cowart. Moderato Cantabile (London: Grant and Cutler. Ltd., 1981). pp. 55-56.
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feminism that is influenced by ideas of the sixties and seventies.
And yet, I would argue that the strength in the representation of women in
Duras's novels lies in the fact that they do not fully fit the mold of feminist models
that have been popularised by seventies feminist novels such as Erica Jong's Fear of
Flying or Lisa Alther's Kin/licks or by the onslaught of images in the eighties and
nineties of 'girl' power, almost all of which suggest that a woman should be able to
be strong, independent, and yet still feminine. Duras's representations of women
pose an alternative to these models, which should remind reader and critic alike
about the dangers and limitations of a static image of woman. As discussed in the
first chapter, a politics based on a static image of woman denies the inherent
multiplicity in women. As Diane Elam argues: "Women both are determined and are
yet to be determined. There are established, pre-conceived notions of what women
can be and do, at the same time that 'women' remains a yet to be determined
category."270 In leaving her novels with ambiguity, Duras forbids her reader to define
her female characters or to use them as a representation of woman. The uncertainty
in the endings not only keeps desire from being defined and thus regulated, but they
also keep woman from being 'solved' and thus used by feminist politics such as
identity politics.
Although to a certain extent, Duras's texts do correspond with important
issues in both psychoanalytic and feminist ideology, her work does not fit neatly into
either framework. For this reason, as well as others, Duras's work is essential to
theorising desire and the notion of 'woman.' Reading psychoanalytic and feminist
critiques of Duras's work should remind a critic of the way each tries to make
270 Elam. Feminism andDeconstruction, p. 27.
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meaning of the text in a way that often overlooks the alternative representations and
configurations that Duras's work presents. It should also remind critics of a shared
dependency on a static representation of 'woman.' Both psychoanalysis and to a
certain degree, feminism, rely on a static image ofwoman in order to theorise desire.
In doing so they limit and restrict alternative representations both of 'woman' and of
desire.
NARRATIVE CURES
Duras does not offer her readers a clear answer to the ambiguity in her
novels. Desire, in Duras's novels, retains an element of the unknown or the beyond
within its structure. This point is explicitly made in the following dialogue between
Anne and Chauvin: "'I'd like to understand why his desire to have it happen one day
was so wonderful?' [. . .] 'There's no use trying to understand. It's beyond
understanding.' 'You mean there are some things like that that can't be gone into?' 'I
think so'" (MC, 116). Although Duras's work demonstrates that, to a certain extent,
desire can be discussed and represented, she also insists that it remain undefined by
leaving a crucial component of desire unanswered.
Although her work often responds to fundamental processes in
psychoanalysis, such as alluding to an analyst figure in order to work through the
implications of a central and repetitive image, her texts resist the most important
step: the cure. The ambiguous and apocalyptic endings in Moderato Cantabile and
The Ravishing of Lol V Stem leave the reader with uncertainty and irresolution.
Duras's readers are left unsure what will happen next and even wondering whether it
was a 'happy' or 'sad' ending. Julia Kristeva takes this absence of a narrative cure as
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the central focus of her criticism of Duras's work in "The Malady of Grief." In her
critique Kristeva argues that Duras's inability to 'cure' the text and to provide her
reader with a narrative solution reflects her failure as a writer. Kristeva writes:
"[Duras's] books [. . .] bring us to the verge of madness. They do not point it from
afar, they neither observe or analyse it for the sake of experiencing it at a distance in
the hope of a solution [. . .] There is no purification in store for us at the conclusion
of those novels written on the brink of illness, no improvement, no promise of a
beyond, not even the enchanting beauty of style or irony that might provide a bonus
of pleasure in addition to the revealed evil."211 The words that Kristeva uses such as
'solution,' 'purification,' and 'improvement,' avoid articulating the latent implication
that what Duras's texts do not offer her readers is a 'cure.'
Kristeva's essay is an important one to consider, not only because of
arguments she raises against Duras's work but also because she stands theoretically
within psychoanalysis and feminism. From this vantage point, she offers a unique
take on the problems ofDuras's uncertain and ambiguous texts. Kristeva appears to
be angry not only because Duras's text do not respond fully to the processes in
analysis but also because the women in her novel do not offer her readers a 'positive'
representation of woman. In discussing women such as Lol and Anne, Kristeva
writes: "Sadness would be the basic illness, if it were not, for Duras, women's sickly
core: Anne-Marie Stretter (The Vice-Counsul), for instance, Lol V. Stein (The
Ravishing ofLol V. Stein), or Alissa {Destroy, She Said), to mention only three. It is a
non-dramatic, wilted, unnameable sadness. A mere nothing that produces discreet
211 Julia Kristeva. Black Sun: Depression andMelancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York:
Columbia University Press. 1989), pp. 227-228.
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tears and elliptical words."212 Kristeva finds this "sickly" sadness in Duras's
characters particularly reprehensible because Duras does not offer any reconciliation
for their suffering at any point in her novels.273 Once again, the central complaint that
Kristeva levels at Duras's writing is that Duras does not remedy the sadness she
portrays
Duras's reluctance to 'solve' or 'cure' her narrative throws a psychoanalytic
reader and, to a certain extent, a feminist reader off balance. Some psychoanalytic
readers, such as Kristeva, are troubled by the absence of a 'solution,' particularly
given Duras's use of analytic processes in her narratives And yet, Jacques Lacan,
after reading The Ravishing ofLol V. Stein wrote a "Hommage" to Duras praising her
for understanding his theories without having read them Duras is one of the only
writers so loved and hated by psychoanalytic and feminist readers alike. The fact that
she appeals so strongly to both psychoanalytic and feminist critics makes her an
important writer to examine, particularly with regard to the question of desire. And
yet, because of her ambiguous and enigmatic style, she also remains one of the most
difficult and infuriating writers to critique. On the one hand, the presence of a
definitive ending or representation of woman offers readers a more accessible way of
talking about desire or 'woman.' And yet, on the other, the indeterminate endings
and representations in Duras's work offers feminist readers a chance at examining
how a lack of restrictive and singular interpretations of desire and 'woman' can
function.
Leaving her texts ambiguous and undefined, Duras allows desire and
'woman' to be "determined and yet undetermined." This indeterminacy means that a
2 2 Kristeva. Black Sun. p. 239.
273 Kristeva, Black Sun, p. 240.
197
reader must question and examine the possibilities both in desire and 'woman,'
instead of coming to fixed conclusions or meanings of either. Desire, in Duras's
work, is left 'unsolved,' which emphasises production, not acquisition. In other
words, desire is figured as something that creates connections, that keeps things in
motion and something that causes and underlines change as opposed to something
that ends with possession or determines limitations and boundaries. Duras's notion of
desire poses an alternative to psychoanalytic and feminist interpretations in that it
does not correspond directly with either However, because Duras's work does
engage with each to a certain extent, her writings offers critics a way of negotiating
the limitations and possibilities in each.
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5. Deleuze, Guattari and Feminism
Duras's work offers her readers another way of looking at the question of
desire and of 'woman.' Her resistance to a narrative 'cure' leaves her texts with a
certain degree of ambiguity and 'lack.' As discussed, this indeterminacy forces a
reader to question accepted or established notions of desire and 'woman.' Duras's
writing shares many similarities to Deleuze and Guattari's work in Anti-Oedipus and
A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari's thinking encourages an approach to
reading that examines how a text creates and sustains desire as opposed to what it
means or signifies. Their work challenges fundamental concepts in psychoanalysis
by interrogating assumptions that are made, such as does the psychoanalytic 'cure'
really cure? Their questions, and more importantly, their style of thinking, poses an
alternative way of theorising desire.
INTRODUCTION
One of the more pressing reasons to explore psychoanalytic models and
criticisms is to expose a certain way of thinking, to suggest alternative models and to
find ways to escape the dominant discourse of psychoanalysis. This thesis is an
attempt to perform such an exploration; it also involves an examination of the
boundaries of feminist theory, boundaries that can, at times, be more limiting and
constricting than helpful. The logical next step for feminists is to consider other
theorists who are struggling with related issues concerning desire in discourse and to
look for analogous alternatives to those offered in the psychoanalytical model -
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allies, in other words At first glance Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari appear as an
answer to my feminist search for alternatives. However, a closer look reveals the
problems that arise from their line of questioning Deleuze and Guattari do not offer
a unified theory to contradict psychoanalysis, and perhaps that is why feminist
theorists do not often use them. As Michel Foucault warns readers in the preface to
Anti-Oedipus. "It would be a mistake to read Anti-Oedipus as the new theoretical
reference (you know, that much-heralded theory that finally encompasses everything,
that finally totalizes and reassures, the one we are told we 'need so badly' in our age
of dispersion and specialization where 'hope' is lacking.)"274 However, to dismiss
Deleuze and Guattari on the basis of such a shortcoming would be to deny the
possibilities in their work for a feminist rethinking of desire in discourse.
Deleuze and Guattari's works, both individually and collectively, are far-
ranging and dense For this reason, 1 will focus on Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand
P/ateaus, two texts that make up their collection on 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia.'
In the first section, this chapter addresses ways in which Deleuze and Guattari's
work opens up alternative possibilities for theorising desire. Deleuze and Guattari
question the underlying foundations of psychoanalysis and in so doing refigure
desire and the way we read for desire. The second half of this chapter focuses
specifically on the relationship between Deleuze and Guattari and their feminist
readers in order to question a feminist suspicion of using Deleuze and Guattari in
conjunction with feminist readings of desire. I argue that feminist critiques focus
more on the limitations than on the possibilities Deleuze and Guattari offer in
~14 Michel Foucault. "Preface" to Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Gilles Deleuze and
Felix Guattari. trans. Robert Hurley. Mark Seem. Helen R. Lane (London: The Aihlone Press, 19%
original publication in French. 1972). pp. xi-xiv. (p. xii).
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rethinking desire. I also argue that feminist critics often lapse back into a
psychoanalytic approach in order to contradict the theoretical moves Deleuze and
Guattari make.
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI'S STYLE
Feminist theorists have often avoided using Deleuze and Guattari to talk
about desire; considering the amount ofwork Deleuze and Guattari have written and
the focus they place on desire in their theories, this omission is telling. Perhaps one
of the reasons for feminist trepidation is the style in which Deleuze and Guattari
write. Their writing can be confusing at times, contain too many 'in-jokes,' and often
rely on repetitions or allow inconsistencies. And yet, some of the greatest potential in
Deleuze and Guattari's work lies in the style in which it is written. In A User's Guide
to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari, a text that
is more for the avid reader of Deleuze and Guattari than for the beginner, Brian
Massumi suggests that: "Deleuze recommends that you read Capitalism and
Schizophrenia as you would listen to a record."275 As Massumi goes on to explain.
"[Deleuze and Guattari's] hope [. . .] is that elements of [their writings] will stay
with a certain numbers of its readers, weaving new notes into the melodies of their
everyday lives."216
Most readers ofDeleuze and Guattari do take a certain part with them as they
close the text; whether an aspect of their style or a concept they elucidate. What is
important here is that Deleuze and Guattari attempt to create a style that does not
275 Brian Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and
Guattari, (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. 1992), p. 7.
276 Massumi A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 7.
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insist that the reader leave with a unified idea in mind. They are not proposing a
grand narrative for their readers to subscribe to after their disappointments with
psychoanalysis. To return to Michel Foucault's interpretation of Deleuze and
Guattari's project, they are not trying to offer a 'new' and 'improved' theory for their
readers to cling to or to reassure themselves with.
In many ways it is good and necessary that Deleuze and Guattari do not offer
their feminist readers, or readers in general, a master-discourse. Firstly, to impose
grand meanings and definitions would only provide readers with ready-made tools to
use in textual interpretation. Secondly, to offer up a new master-discourse to that of
psychoanalysis would not be an alternative rather it would be another complex logic
for readers to follow Deleuze and Guattari's project is to see ways outside master-
discourses, such as psychoanalysis, not to reinscribe their readers into another all-
encompassing framework. This lack of a totalising theory is, in some ways, part of
the reason for a feminist resistance to Deleuze and Guattari. Feminism as a
philosophical movement has often relied on a critical opposition or hierarchy; it
opposes that which it perceives as oppressing its own agenda. Deleuze and Guattari
do not provide the right amount of resistance or friction. Despite the well argued
criticisms against Deleuze and Guattari, one has the sense that they would only nod
and acquiesce, not fight back.
Instead Deleuze and Guattari offer different approaches, alternative
perspectives, and even a sense of humour to combat the heavy-handed tone of
psychoanalysis Of course it is not as simple as it sounds, and it will take more than
good humour to come up with alternatives to a field of study as vast and influential
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as psychoanalysis. However, it seems to be that Deleuze and Guattari are on their
way to something productive.
In his work on Deleuze and Guattari and the politics of desire, Philip
Goodchild argues that:- "The most striking aspect of Anti-Oedipus is its style and
humour: as a theory, it only gains significance through the ways in which it affects a
reader, creating machinic relations and desires."2"1 To read desire in discourse with
Deleuze and Guattari's theories in mind encourages readers to make connections, to
follow movements, to create new possibilities instead of closing them down with
interpretative solutions. For example, in order to define the Oedipal triangle, Deleuze
and Guattari ask: "What ought to go inside the Oedipal triangle, what sort of thing is
required to construct it? Are a bicycle horn and my mother's arse sufficient to do the
job? Aren't there more important questions than these, however?"278 Deleuze and
Guattari's sense of humour is upfront and confrontational. It is not for everyone.
However, it does dismantle the seriousness of psychoanalytic interpretations. Their
sense of humour voices the doubts and outright confusion that many have with
psychoanalytic terminology and theoretical assumptions. It also initiates a move
beyond the construction of psychoanalytic concepts, in this case the Oedipal triangle,
towards a line of questioning that focuses on how these constructions work not what
they mean.
In their two volumes on capitalism and schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari
make reference to the problems inherent in accepting psychoanalytic interpretations
2
Philip Goodchild. Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics ofDesire (London: Sage
Publications. 1996), p. 52.
278 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert
Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: The Athlone Press. 1996; original publication in
French. 1972), p. 3. Subsequent references will appear in the text after "Anti-O."
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without question. They make statements such as: "We are all Archie Bunker at the
theater, shouting out before Oedipus: there's my kind of guy, there's my kind of
guy!" (Anti-O, 308) that bring the discussion into a humorous arena as well as onto a
level that is accessible to those outside the academy or outside the psychoanalytic
field. In doing so, they not only approach the dominance of psychoanalysis at the
level of its reception but they mock the way psychoanalytic theory has entered the
homes of most everyone in the western world, even Archie Bunker's. This example
also demonstrates one of the central concerns in Deleuze and Guattari's work: the
way Oedipus has been dissolved into the social arena and accepted as fact, left
unquestioned and unchallenged.
LACK VS. PRODUCTION
In theorising desire in discourse the most fundamental problem feminist
theorists have with psychoanalytic interpretations is with "lack." As discussed in the
first chapter, psychoanalytic interpretations of desire posit lack at the centre of the
movement between subject and object. Lack is understood as the driving force in
desire and is often associated with female sexuality. One of the most important
moves Deleuze and Guattari make, particularly for feminists, is to rethink desire
outside of lack and outside a negative framework In her early work on desire and
Hegel, Judith Butler argues that Deleuze's theory moves desire from a negative
interpretation towards a productive one. She writes: "Deleuze's theory prescribes a
move from negative to productive desire which requires that we accept an
emancipatory model of desire."279 Although Deleuze and Guattari do move away
279 Judith Butler. Subjects ofDesire, p. 213.
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from a negative construction of desire, one commonly associated with a
psychoanalytic one, they do not fully accept the positive or productive reading of
desire, that Butler suggests.
Deleuze and Guattari begin their rethinking of desire with Plato's distinction
between desire as production and desire as acquisition, a division that Deleuze and
Guattari feel is wrong from the beginning: "From the moment that we place desire on
the side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic)
conception, which causes us to look upon it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a
lack of the real object" (Anti-O, 25). Thinking about desire in terms of acquisition
introduces a lack within the subject desiring. Put simply, one must lack something in
order to desire something. Conceptualising desire in terms of acquisition forces a
lack within the subject that can only be fulfilled by the object of desire, an object that
will never actually be acquired. This structuring of desire follows the psychoanalytic
model. As Elizabeth Grosz succinctly phrases a psychoanalytic interpretation of
desire: "To provide desire with its object is to annihilate it. Desire desires to be
desired."280
Deleuze and Guattari object to aligning desire with acquisition and yet they
do not simply hold up production as a solution; to choose production over acquisition
would only support the binary oppositional relationship that Plato constructs.
Deleuze and Guattari also acknowledge that psychoanalysis does not simply choose
acquisition in its theorisation of an object of desire (or objet petit a in Lacanian
terms); they are not unaware of the link psychoanalysis makes between desire and
280 Elizabeth Grosz. "Refiguring Lesbian Desire." p. 71. See also. Catherine Belsey's Desire: Love
Stories in Western Culture: "Desire is the desire of the other precisely as other, and it
characteristically includes the longing for closure," p. 37.
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production, as they write: "Desire thus conceived as production, though merely the
production of fantasies, has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis" (Anti-O,
25). The key phrase here is 'the production of fantasies;' with this distinction
Deleuze and Guattari isolate the difference between their project and that of
psychoanalysis. Instead of understanding desire as only a production in fantasy, or in
the imaginary or symbolic domains, Deleuze and Guattari want to understand desire
in the real, the social, or even within the splitting between the real and the imaginary.
Deleuze and Guattari do not simply promote production instead of lack, rather they
problematise the psychoanalytic usage both of lack and of production and locate that
problem in the use of the imaginary and symbolic to structure desire
Deleuze and Guattari locate the lack in the subject as well as the object in
desire. Instead of understanding desire as lacking its object they claim that desire is
lacking a fixed subject (Anti-O, 26).281 In this way, they shift the emphasis in the
movement of desire towards an in-between territory; or, to use their terminology, a
"deterritorialized" space (Anti-O, 35). Lack in Deleuze and Guattari's refiguration
becomes an effect of desire, rather than an origin (Anti-O, 27). The shift that they
make in emphasising the subject rather than the object has important bearings on
feminist revisions of desire in discourse. As discussed in Chapter One, when lack is
located in the object and driven by fantasy, woman often becomes the bearer of these
fantasies. To shift the 'burden' of the lack suggests some possibilities and limitations
281 In her article entitled "Feminist Assessment of Emancipatory Potential and Madonna's
Contradictory Gender Practices." Lynn O'Brien Hallstein argues thai Deleuze and Guattari introduce
Georges Batille's theorisation of excess into their understanding of desire: "Thus, Deleuze and
Guattari argue that desire, the investment of human energy for satisfaction, is fueled by excess energy
and lacks nothing, which means desire is excessive, has no permanent object, structure, or pre¬
ordained form: it is characterised by continual flows of connections. Desire, then, is the radically free
investment of energy without any boundaries, with the capacity to create a radically free
unconscious." The Quarterly Journal ofSpeech. 82 (1996). pp. 125-141. (p. 126).
206
that have largely been overlooked
Figuring desire in terms of a movement between subject and object keeps
desire active and productive. In Deleuze and Guattari's rethinking, desire moves
along deterritorialized lines. Unlike a psychoanalytical model, desire does not move
within predetermined limits. To explicate this point, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish
between their conception of productive desire and psychoanalytic desire through the
figure of a tree and a rhizome in A Thousand Plateaus. In their argument, a tree is
representative ofmovement that begins and ends, that has a starting point and ending
point and that imposes the verb 'to be.'282 This structure gives way to questions such
as: 'Where are you going7,' questions that Deleuze and Guattari suggest are useless
(T-P, 25). On the other hand, the rhizome in Deleuze and Guattari's figuration
represents the middle or in-between territory and is linked with the conjunction
'and.' The figure of the rhizome rejects a linear pattern in favour of a groundless and
infinite structure.283 Deleuze and Guattari connect these figurations to desire by
suggesting that: "Once a rhizome has been obstructed (sic), arborified, it's all over,
no desire stirs, for it is always by rhizome that desire moves and produces. Whenever
desire climbs a tree, internal repercussions trip it up and it falls to its death; the
28~ GiUes Deleuze and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans.
Brian Massumi (London: The Alhlone Press. 1996: original publication in French. 1980), p. 25.
Subsequent references will appear in the text after "T-P."
283 In drawing attention to Deleuze and Guattari 's conception of the "rhizome" I am not suggesting
that they are the only thinkers who construct a figurative 'in-between territory' or 'groundless
structure.' For example, in Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis ofRepresentational
Time. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth discusses Vladimir Nabokov's "anthematic" system in a way that
demonstrates Nabokov's use of "elaborate interlacements and expanding clusters" in his writing
(198). She argues that "Nabokov's 'anthemion' is like Cortazar's 'polychromatic rose' design [. . .]
where every departure implies a return, not in terms of a single pattern of rationalized space or time
but in terms of a multiplex figure-in-process." a conception that anticipates Deleuze and Guattari's. p.
198: see also. pp. 194-210.
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rhizome, on the other hand, acts on desire by external, productive outgrowths" (T-P,
14). The model of a tree is akin to the psychoanalytic structure of desire. As
discussed in chapter one, when desire comes close to its limit (marked by the term
jouissance) in the psychoanalytical model, it ends and begins again within another
object. To put this in simpler terms: the fulfilment of a man's desire for the latest
model of his favourite car is always delayed by the arrival of the next latest model.
Desire in these terms moves from beginning to end and back again. The figure of the
rhizome suggests that desire can be understood in terms of the connections it makes
and how it links things together creating an assemblage of desire Deleuze and
Guattari's model does not fix itself in any one object or subject, rather it encourages
its own expansion and movement through the connections it makes. The linking
'and' inhibits an arrival at any one object or within any one subject.284 Deleuze and
Guattari's model of desire does not rely on lack to structure and motivate desire as
does the psychoanalytical interpretation. Their alternative model opens up new ways
to think about desire as well as about subjectivity and objectivity, as will be
discussed later.
REFRAMING THE GRAND NARRATIVE OF OEDIPUS
Deleuze and Guattari's refiguring of desire stems from their rereading of
Freud's Oedipus complex and of the analytic scene. In order to contradict the
284 Deleuze and Guattari's model of desire can be extended into an argument on postmodemitv and
desire, however, there is not space in this thesis both to make these connections fully nor to enter into
a discussion as to whether Deleuze and Guattari actually support the doctrines in postmodernism, as
there are many differing debates on this subject alone. For a discussion on postmodernism and desire
see also 'postmodern love' in Catherine Belsey's Desire: Love Stories in Western Culture, pp. 72-96;
for a discussion on Oedipus and postmodemity see also Slavoj Zizek's "Wither Oedipus." Analysis, .8
(1998). pp. 146-160.
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dominance of the master discourse of psychoanalysis, they turn to the most important
narrative in psychoanalytic interpretations: Oedipus.285 For Freud, the Oedipus
complex is the underlying foundation of psychoanalytic interpretation,286 as he
argues: "Every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of mastering the
Oedipus complex, anyone who fails to do so falls a victim to neurosis."287 To
summarise briefly: the boy desires his mother and feels aggression towards his father
until he is able to repress his aggression and transfer his erotic feelings for his mother
into a sense of identification with his father. The child must master the Oedipus
complex before he commits the same crime as Oedipus 'Mastering' the Oedipus
complex amounts to repressing and internalising desires. As Deleuze and Guattari
argue: "And everybody knows what psychoanalysis means by resolving Oedipus,
internalizing it so as to better rediscover it on the outside, in social authority, where it
will be made to proliferate and be passed on to the children" (Anti-O, 79). Here
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the Oedipus complex is an inherent part of social
authority as well as an 'inherited' trait. Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is an
inherent social need to codify and inscribe the movements of desire. They write:
"The prime function incumbent upon the socius, has always been to codify the flows
of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not
properly damned up, channelled, regulated" (Anti-O, 33). Honeymoon suites, gay
bars, singles clubs, 'adults only' stores testify to the ways in which desire is spatially
regulated and channelled.
285 See also Freud. The Interpretation ofDreams, pp. 200-204.
286 Freud writes: "With the progress of psychoanalytic studies the importance of the Oedipus complex
has become more and more clearly evident: its recognition has become the shibboleth that
distinguishes the adherents of psychoanalysis from its opponents." On Sexualitv, pp. 149-50. footnote
1.
"8
Freud. On Sexuality, p. 149, footnote 1.
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The social inheritance of the Oedipus complex is at the centre ofDeleuze and
Guattari's argument against psychoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus. They do not question
whether or not there is an Oedipus complex, rather they focus on the ways in which
we are Oedipalised In order to do so, Deleuze and Guattari contest aspects of
Freud's methodology. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that Freud discovers a "dirty,
little secret" called sexuality that he keeps within the family in order to monitor and
contain its boundaries 288 As they humorously suggest: "It was as though Freud were
asking to be forgiven his profound discovery of sexuality by saying to us: at least it
won't go any further than the family! The dirty little secret, in place of the wide open
spaces glimpsed for a moment" (Anti-O, 270).
Deleuze and Guattari depict Freud as a blind, old man, a man who cannot see
the possibilities that lie beyond his own ffont doorstep or someone who sees the
possibilities, then slams the door shut. Or perhaps they suggest that he is an Oedipal
figure, blinding himself to the 'truth' of his own sexuality. Either way, Deleuze and
Guattari argue that Freud reduces all the possibilities in understanding sexuality into
the familial constellation governed by the Oedipus complex. As they argue: "Hence,
instead of participating in an undertaking that will bring about genuine liberation,
psychoanalysis is taking part in the work of bourgeois repression at its most far-
reaching level, that is to say, keeping European humanity harnessed to the yoke of
daddy-mommy and making no effort to do away with this problem once andfor air
(Anti-O, 50). Instead of liberating sexual desire, Deleuze and Guattari argue that
288 Deleuze and Guattari 's argument shares many similarities with Michel Foucaulf s line of thinking
in The History ofSexuality. "Sexuality was carefully confined; it moved into the home" trans. Robert
Hurley (New York: Vintage Books. 1978). p. 3. To draw a distinction: Deleuze and Guattari question
the validity and necessity of the psychoanalytic 'cure.' w hereas Foucault questions the social
acceptance of repression in the history of sexuality and the critical discourse that surrounds repression.
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psychoanalysis, Freud in particular, restrains the possibilities of sexuality by positing
it within the confines of the family and under the yoke of the Oedipus complex.
Deleuze and Guattari recognise the Oedipus complex and the castration complex as
narratives that limit and confine desire.
Freud's theorisation of the Oedipus complex is dependent on both his own
self-analysis289 and on textual analysis. As discussed in Chapter One, Freud reads
Sophocles's text in order to interpret and analyse how it relates to unconscious
fantasies and desires not as an example of one instance of desire, but as a totalising
grand narrative.290 In this way, the figure of Oedipus becomes a dominant figure in
psychoanalytic interpretations on desire and as such becomes the central focus in
Deleuze and Guattari's work for untangling the emphasis psychoanalysis places upon
Oedipus. As they argue: "psychoanalysis undoes [myth or tragedy] as objective
representations, and discovers in them the figures of a subjective universal libido; but
it reanimates them, and promotes them as subjective representations that extend the
mythic and tragic contents to infinity" (Anti-O, 304). In other words, according to
Deleuze and Guattari, Freud takes the myth of Oedipus and transforms it into the
unconscious narrative of human development.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that Freud constructs the myth of Oedipus into a
grand narrative, an underlying structure of truth, knowledge, identity, and
289 "Freud's self-analysis, leading to the abadonment of the trauma theory and the recognition of
infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex," in On Sexuality, 28.
290 It is interesting to note that recent work on Freud's Oedipal complex by French psychiatrist,
Michel Juffe. questions why Freud places blame on Oedipus and not on his parents: "Freud [. . .]
made the mistake of placing the responsibility on the supposedly irrestible impulses of Oedipus which
compelled him to kill his father and marry his mother." Paul Webster. "Blame the parent not Oedipus,
says Freud critic," The Observer, 21 May 2000. World. 28.
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sexuality.291 In order to undermine the strength of this grand narrative, Deleuze and
Guattari confront and question Freud's theorisation and subsequent elevation of the
Oedipal complex at several different levels. Firstly, they suggest that myths
themselves, such as Sophocles's Oedipus the King, are forms of production only
when connected to social production. They argue: "Thus in order to keep an effective
grip on the zones of production, representation must inflate itself with all the power
of myth and tragedy, it must give a mythic and tragic presentation of the family -
and a familial presentation of myth and tragedy. Yet aren't myth and tragedy, too,
productions - forms of production? Certainly not; they are production only when
brought into connection with real social production, real desiring-production" (Anti-
O, 296-297). in other words, myths are not without their own social encoding, and so
are problematic when used, as Freud does, as a totalising narrative of human
condition. If Freud uses a narrative such as Sophocles's Oedipus the King to
structure foundational theories in psychoanalysis, then Deleuze and Guattari ask:
"Why return to myth? Why take it as the model?" (Anti-O, 57). In doing so, Deleuze
and Guattari question psychoanalysis's insistence on solving the enigma of desire
with an interpretative Oedipus complex; instead they insist that this 'narrative' be
interrogated for how it does or does not create possibilities.
Deleuze and Guattari also try to address the way psychoanalysis understands
the unconscious. They argue that in psychoanalysis: "The unconscious ceases to be
what is it - a factory, a workshop - to become a theater, a scene and its staging. And
291 In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari humorously suggest that the "International Psycho-Analytic
Association [. . .] bears above its door the inscription 'Let no one enter here who does not believe in
Oedipus" (45) and as Freud argues at the end of Totem and Taboo-. "At the conclusion, then, of this
exceedingly condensed inquiry. I should like to insist that its outcome shows that the beginning of
religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex," as quoted in The FreudReader,
ed. Peter Gay, p. 510.
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not even an avant-garde theater, such as existed in Freud's day (Wedekind), but the
classical theater, the classical order of representation" (Anti-O, 55).292 Deleuze and
Guattari not only question why psychoanalysis has been allowed to dominate
theoretical discussions on the unconscious but they also chastise the use of classical
representations instead of more complex and dynamic representations such as those
offered in avant-garde theatre. Their criticism is both serious and tongue-in-cheek,
they indict psychoanalysis for turning the unconscious into a theatre of representation
and yet combine the charge with a ironic jab at choosing classical drama instead of
contemporary (to Freud) theatre Their criticism of Freud is emblematic of the style
in which they confront psychoanalysis, as discussed earlier, and of the importance
they give to the structuring of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. In Deleuze &
Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire, Philip Goodchild explains that
the primary objection Deleuze and Guattari have against psychoanalysis is in regards
to understanding the unconscious.293 According to Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari
object to the way in which psychoanalysis avoids the power-relations within the
unconscious and the relation of the unconscious to the social field.294 They also
question the validity and viability of using myths and legends to explain the human
condition. In other words, they ask, why Sophocles and not Antonin Artaud?
Deleuze and Guattari's interaction with Freud lead them to their central
focus, Oedipus, and to their complaint against Freud for locating his mythical
29~ See also John Mark's analysis in Guiles Deleuze: Vitalism andMultiplicity (London: Pluto Press,
1998). Marie's writes: "In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari react against the Freudian notion of the
unconscious as a sort of classical theatre' which contains the key to consciousness. Instead they
propose an immanent conception of the unconscious as being like a factory for producing desire [.. .]
In this way, Deleuze and Guattari attack the theoretical dependence on a certain interpretation of
Freud and Marx; a pervasive 'Freudo-Marxism.' [.. .] Against this, they propose a machinic
production of desire." p. 91."93 Goodchild. Deleuze and Guattari. p. 124.
294 Goodchild. Deleuze and Guattari. pp. 124-125.
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interpretation of Oedipus in the unconscious. Notably missing from this discussion
so far is Lacan, who, for Deleuze and Guattari, takes a very different direction in his
handling of the Oedipus complex. According to Deleuze and Guattari: "[Lacan] is
not content to turn, like the analytic squirrel, inside the wheel of the Imaginary and
the Symbolic, he refuses to be caught up in the Oedipal Imaginary and the
oedipalizing structure" (Anti-O, 308). Believing the unconscious is structured like a
language, Lacan does not surround the unconscious in an oedipalizing structure, as
does Freud, instead he raises Oedipus to the level of self-critique (Anti-O, 310-311).
However, in doing so, Lacan replaces the Oedipal complex with the
'castration complex.' He sets up a dependency on castration instead of
oedipalisation. As Deleuze and Guattari mockingly suggest:
I reach desire when I arrive at castration! What does the desire-castration
equation signify, if not in fact a prodigious operation that consists in
replacing desire under the law of the despot, in introducing lack there at
the deepest levels, and in rescuing us from Oedipus by means of a
fantastic regression. A fantastic and brilliant regression: someone had to
do it, 'no one helped me,' as Lacan says, to shake loose the yoke of
Oedipus and carry it to the point of its autocritique (Anti-O, 268).
Deleuze and Guattari relate this 'rescue' of Lacan's to a story of resistance fighters,
who, wanting to blow up a pylon, balance the explosives so well that it falls back
into its hole (Anti-O, 268). It is important not to miss the reference to the 'hole' as it
plays with the way Lacan reduces desire to a lack, or void, that awaits to be filled by
the signifying phallus. What Deleuze and Guattari suggest within this example is that
although Lacan frees the Oedipal complex from the veil of the unconscious, he
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places renewed emphasis on the castration complex as well as on the importance of
the phallus in the movement of desire.295 Deleuze and Guattari suggest that although
Lacan does not accept the Oedipus complex as a grand narrative he does elevate the
castration complex as one In either interpretation, desire comes up against the
structuring narratives of psychoanalysis.
RE-READING DESIRE
In order to substantiate and develop their alternative construction of desire,
Deleuze and Guattari also address some of the fundamental concepts within the
scene of analysis. Most importantly, they question and interrogate the validity of the
psychoanalytic 'cure.' Instead of subscribing to the notion of a 'cure' and to the
neatly structured and organised Oedipal and castration complexes, Deleuze and
Guattari want to relate the subject away ffom a notion of a unified subject and to the
social production of the real, into fragments, flows, and multiplicities. In order to do
so they turn to the processes in analysis. In particular, they re-read the way the
analyst reads the expression and/or silence of the patient. Deleuze and Guattari argue
that the analyst inscribes the patient into Oedipal and castration complexes in order
to cure him or her.
They describe the scene as machinal: the analyst plugs the analysand into a
desiring-machine as well as into a consciousness that manufactures fantasy. They
argue that the process of being 'oedipalised' happens within the scene of analysis. In
other words, the psychoanalyst no longer says to the patient: "'Tell me a little bit
about your desiring-machines, won't you9' Instead he screams: 'Answer daddy-and-
295 See also Jacques Lacan. "Desire and the Interpretation ofDesire in Hamletpp. 11-52.
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mommy when I speak to you!'" (Anti-O, 45). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the
analyst's demands for the patient to recognise "daddy-and-mommy" relegates desire
into the realm of fantasy and imagination. In locating and maintaining the processes
of desire in the symbolic and the imagination, psychoanalysis treats desire as a
fantasy, dream, myth rather than as a social construction, a movement or an actual
event Deleuze and Guattari attempt to restructure and refocus desire away from the
imagination and fantasy and towards social production.
In analysing the psychoanalytic cure, Deleuze and Guattari question what
they feel Freud did not: whether the cure actually cures. Instead of focusing on the
obstacles to a 'cure' such as resistance, Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is
necessary to discuss whether the cure itself is viable, they ask: 'Tor what is the
meaning of'so that was what this meant'? The crushing of the 'so' onto Oedipus and
castration. The sigh of relief: you see, the colonel, the instructor, the teacher, the
boss, all of this meant that. Oedipus and castration, 'all history in a new version'"
(Anti-O, 67). Deleuze and Guattari's interpretation of the limitation of the
psychoanalytic cure is very relevant to the critical reffaming of psychoanalytic
criticism offered both in this thesis and elsewhere. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that
psychoanalysis inserts the Oedipal and castration complexes into the cure offered by
the analyst. "So that was what this meant" refers to the retrospective movement of
the psychoanalytic cure. Words, silences and images are gathered together, submitted
to the Oedipalising and castrating machines and out pops the answer and the
revelation 'so that was what this means,' at least within Deleuze and Guattari's
argument.
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To force meaning upon a situation, particularly a sexual meaning, suggests
that psychoanalytic readings produce ready-made answers or cures to abstract and
enigmatic situations The meaning producing that Deleuze and Guattari cite
constructs its own history, its own narrative, and traces its lines along and within
Oedipal and castration complexes. Deleuze and Guattari do not question whether or
not we are Oedipalised or castrated, instead they question why we think subjectivity
through these terms.
Through their engagement with Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari rethink the
emphasis Freudian psychoanalysis296 places on the Oedipal and castration complexes
as well as how we can read for desire differently. They also argue that until we begin
to examine and interrogate the boundaries and limitations of the Oedipus complex
we are doomed to circle within its borders:
It is a lie to claim to liberate sexuality, and to demand its rights to objects,
aims, and sources, all the while maintaining the corresponding flows
within the limits of an Oedipal code (conflict, regression, resolution,
sublimation ofOedipus) [. . .] For example, no 'gay liberation movement'
is possible as long as homosexuality is caught up in a relation of
exclusive disjunction with heterosexuality, a relation that ascribes them
both to a common Oedipal and castrating stock [. . .] In short, sexual
repression, more insistent than ever, will survive all the publications,
demonstrations, emancipations, and protests concerning the liberty of
sexual objects, sources, and aims, as long as sexuality is kept -
296 1 am distinguishing here between Freudian psychoanalysis and Lacanian psychoanalysis noting that
Lacan does not place the same emphasis on the Oedipal complex that Freud does in his theorisation of
subjectivity.
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consciously or not - within narcissistic, Oedipal, and castrating co¬
ordinates (Anti-O, 350-351).
Here Deleuze and Guattari raise some central limitations and possibilities for desire
that are later considered and debated amongst feminist theorists. Firstly, sexual
liberation, as a concept or reality, can not be actualised until desire is released from
the constricting definitions imposed on it by psychoanalysis, namely those within
narcissistic, Oedipal and castration complexes. Secondly, as long as sexuality is
defined vis-a-vis heterosexual and Oedipal co-ordinates, it will have no hope of
liberation or escape. Deleuze and Guattari use homosexuality as an example of the
way in which sexuality is monitored and regulated by heterosexual standards and
norms.297 Thirdly, and perhaps not explicitly addressed in the previous passage, is the
erasure of static gender categories For this Deleuze and Guattari turn to the notion
of'becoming,' which they address in more detail in A Thousand Plateaus.
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that we move away from interpretative
solutions and towards becomings and intensities by questioning the framework of the
analytic cure and the inheritance of Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari argue against the
meaning-making that they see as an inherent part of psychoanalysis and move
towards a reading of desire that focuses more on how the text creates connections,
rather than what these connections mean. As they write: "The unconscious poses no
problems of meaning, solely problems of use. The question posed by desire is not
29 Leo Bersani argues a similar point in Homos: "The notion of gay identity can go no further , every
move the invert makes manifests that identity. The subject fails to find himself in the world (fails to
find the same) not because of an openness to difference, but rather because it is only by eroticising
difference that the subject can hope for, or fantasize, the 'possession' of difference, and the
consequent transformation of both the self and the world into exact replications of one another"
(Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 134. Bersani's analysis follows along similar
lines to Deleuze and Guattari s argument. For Bersani. the world is divided into heterosexual
paradigms that the homosexual must either desire to subscribe to or remain in the margins.
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'What does it mean9' but rather 'How does it work?' [. . .] Desire makes its entry
with the general collapse of the question 'What does it mean9"' (Anti-O, 109). In his
introduction to zf«//-Oedipus Mark Seem refers to Deleuze and Guattari's style of
reading when he argues that they offer readers "point-signs that offer a multiplicity
of solutions and a variety of directions for a new style of politics."298
Deleuze and Guattari's argument with regard to literary analysis is very
similar to their restructuring of desire. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari
write: "A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters,
and very different dates and speeds [. . .] In a book, as in all things, there are lines of
articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories, but also lines of flight, movements
of deterritorialization and destratification" (T-P, 3). They do not locate desire in the
subject or the object, as discussed earlier, rather they are interested in the multiple
intersecting lines that make up desire and its movement. They apply this model to
reading. In A Thousand Plateaus, they write: "We will never ask what a book means,
as signified or signifier, we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask
what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not
transmit intensities" (4). In their approach to literature, Deleuze and Guattari offer a
crucial distinction for the interpretation of desire in discourse and theory: to read a
text for desire as a movement, or to see what desire creates, how it opens up new
possibilities as opposed to the limiting interpretative readings.
In her introduction to Deleuze and Feminist Theory, Claire Colebrook
distinguishes between the two approaches to reading with the words "interpretation"
298 Mark Seem. "Introduction." Anti-Oedipus, xix. In Anti-Oedipus. Deleuze and Guattari define a
point-sign as: "a singular point in the entire network of the intensive bod) that responds to History ,
that \ibrates with it" p. 352.
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and "inhabitation"299 which are helpful in trying to understand the politics of reading
that Deleuze and Guattari offer their readers. Colebrook argues that Deleuze and
Guattari's active way of reading theory and/or text is similar to feminist readings.
She asserts that: "Feminism has always been a question of what concepts do, how
they work and the forces any act of thinking enables.300 Colebrook connects the
approach Deleuze and Guattari take to reading, asking 'How does it work?' rather
than 'What does it mean?,' to feminist thought.301 It appears that feminism and
Deleuze and Guattari have everything to do with each other: they each activate
theory, they engage in politics of desire and subjectivity, and they both search for
alternatives to the dominance of psychoanalysis. And yet, as the second half of this
chapter will explore, the very opposite holds true in the majority of feminist
criticisms of Deleuze and Guattari.
THE FEMINIST RESPONSE: IRIGARAY, GROSZ AND BRAIDOTTI
Despite the possibilities Deleuze and Guattari's work raise for feminist
readings of desire in discourse, their work has more often been met with caution and
even hostility by feminist readers. One of the primary difficulties that feminist
theorists have with Deleuze and Guattari is with their terminology. Deleuze and
Guattari move away from words like 'identity,' 'gender,' and 'oppression' which
299 Claire Colebrook. "Introduction." in Deleuze and Feminist Theory, ed. by Claire Colebrook and
Ian Buchanan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2000), pp. 1-17, (pp. 3-4).
300 Colebrook. "Introduction." p. 9.
301 Colebrook. "Introduction." p. 8.
220
have often been the foundation of feminist politics.302 The anxiety that some
feminists have in using Deleuze and Guattari theoretically is obvious from the start
Feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti offer words of caution to their
readers to clarify that although they may find some ofDeleuze and Guattari's style or
theories useful, they do not accept them completely; it is a signposting particular to
feminist readings ofDeleuze and Guattari.
In her essay titled, "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics,"
Elizabeth Grosz acknowledges this when she states: "Deleuze and Guattari's work is
rarely discussed in the texts of feminist theory, even in those explicitly addressed to
what is commonly called 'French theory' or French postmodernism."303 After this
statement, the first in the essay, she goes on to explain feminist suspicions held
against Deleuze and Guattari, including her own (Grosz, 189-190). She also outlines
seven points of contention against Deleuze and Guattari as argued by Irigaray
(Grosz, 189-190). Grosz's introduction sets up some of the feminist disagreements
and apprehensions regarding Deleuze and Guattari. Her critique also demonstrates a
structural dependency on Irigaray's interpretations. Grosz moves through
rhizomatics, the "Body without Organs," and ethics, important foundations in
Deleuze and Guattari's thinking, and then she halts at the 'becoming-woman.' On the
302 Grosz makes this point in her analysis of Alice Jardine's criticism ofDeleuze and Guattari's work
in Gvnesis: Configurations ofWoman andModernity. Grosz argues that "[Jardine's] anxieties seem
related to the apparent bypassing or detour around the very issues with which feminist theory has
tended to concern itself: 'identity .' otherness, gender, oppression, the binary divisions ofmale and
female — all central and driving preoccupations of feminist thought.'" Volatile Bodies: Toward a
Corporeal Feminism (London: Routledge. 1994), p. 162. Subsequent references will appear in the text
after "Vol."
303 Elizabeth Grosz. "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics," ed. Constantin V.
Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski. Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre ofPhilosophy (New York:
Routledge. 1994), p. 187. Subsequent references will appear in the text after "Grosz." This statement
is the first in the essay that emphasises Grosz's claim that Deleuze and Guattari have long been
overlooked and dismissed by feminist theorists.
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one hand, Grosz is attempting to consider the possibilities Deleuze and Guattari offer
for feminist refigurations of subjectivity, the body and desire, and yet, on the other
hand, she is stating that 'we,' as feminists, can only consider using them so far and
then 'we' must stop.
Grosz's return to Deleuze and Guattari amounts to giving them a 'second
chance.' She quotes herself from an earlier publication to reassure her reader that she
comes back to Deleuze and Guattari with a new perspective as if to suggest that the
first time around she and other feminist theorists, like Alice Jardine, were too harsh
in their judgements. She states that the objective of the essay is to explore whether
the feminist attacks against Deleuze and Guattari are fair (Grosz, 190). She then
outlines six points of overlap between Deleuze and Guattari's theories and feminism:
1. Deleuze and Guattari challenge the dominance of binary logic (Grosz, 191).
2. They are interested in the question of difference, a difference that can be
understood outside psychoanalytic constructions (Grosz, 192).
3. Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of politics is aligned with feminist politics
in that they both affirm localised, non-representative struggles without a
hierarchicalized organisation or definitive goals and ends (Grosz, 193).
4. Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the body, as theorised through the "Body
without Organs," imagines the body as a discontinuous series of flows,
movements and intensities. This figuration is important for feminism as it begins
to think outside mind/body dualisms as well as outside definitive categories and
identities (Grosz, 193-194).
222
5. Deleuze and Guattari rethink desire in positive and affirmative terms. Instead of
framing desire within a negative lack, they theorise desire as positive and
productive (Grosz, 194-195).
6. Finally, Deleuze and Guattari promote a code of ethics in lieu of a breakdown of
both the rational, judging subject and the individual's indebtedness to the social
community (Grosz, 196-197).
These six points 'in favour' of Deleuze and Guattari stand in contrast to the original
seven points against them, those argued by Irigaray. In this way, the essay reads like
a defence trial for Deleuze and Guattari. Grosz's concluding lines suggest that,
although there are many possibilities in Deleuze and Guattari's texts for feminist
theorists to consider, ultimately they are to be approached with the same caution that
the essay begins with Grosz ends her essay by warning her readers to "remain wary"
as Deleuze and Guattari's theorisation of becoming-woman can lead to "a political
obliteration or marginalization of women's struggles" (Grosz, 209). In other words,
the 'becoming-woman' threatens to move beyond the question of woman before
feminist theorists have had a chance to consider it and beyond a sense of history,
which feminist theorists are anxious to protect. The instinct to protect and defend
women's struggles that Grosz demonstrates in her critique ofDeleuze and Guattari is
not a bad one, however, it can be a dangerous one theoretically.
Grosz interprets Deleuze and Guattari interpreting feminism. She is careful to
slap them on the wrist if they do not attend to the appropriate cure or necessary
definition. For example, she writes: "In what ways does this [passage from
Dialogues] contest, ameliorate, or act as restitution for the robbery of women's
bodies by men, in the service of their goals, interests, machines, and habitual power
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positions?" (Grosz, 206). But are Deleuze and Guattari theorising feminism? Are
they actually engaging with feminism so as to create a better feminist politics? Or are
feminist theorists angry that they do not take their struggles into account sufficiently?
If so, are feminist theorists, like Grosz trying to 'cure' Deleuze and Guattari of their
phallocentric symptoms by making them recognise sexual difference? Are they
trying to make them non-sexist by re-historicising their theories?
In order to address these questions it is necessary to return to Irigaray's
original objections against Deleuze and Guattari which have structured and
influenced the subsequent criticisms offered by feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz
and Rosi Braidotti.304
IR1GARAY AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
Luce Irigaray asks questions that are integral to the focus of this thesis and to
the focus of feminist politics, questions which seek to uncover a feminist discourse
free from dominant master narratives. In This Sex Which is Not One, she asks: "how
can women analyze their own exploitation, inscribe their own demands, within an
order prescribed by the masculine9 Is a women's politics possible within that
order?"305 The inverse of this question is thrown at Deleuze and Guattari by many of
their feminist readers. They ask: is it possible for male theorists to be aware of
women's politics? Irigaray answers no She argues that Deleuze and Guattari dismiss
the importance and weight of women's history in their theorisation of the 'body
without organs' and the 'becoming-woman.' In connection with the problem of
304 Julia Kristeva's writings, particularly in Desire in Language and on semotics. could also have been
considered in regards to Deleuze and Guattari's work in that each focus on a pre-Oedipal construction
of language, identity and desire.
305 Irigaray. This Sex Which is Not One, p. 81.
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creating alternatives to masculine discourses, Irigaray enters into a discussion of
Deleuze and Guattari's work. Although not directly citing their names, her use of
their terminology, particularly of the 'becoming-woman,' and the 'organless body'
makes it clear to an informed reader whom she is addressing:
And doesn't the "desiring machine" still partly take the place of woman
or the feminine? Isn't it a sort of metaphor for her/it, that men can use?
[. . .] Or again: can this "psychosis" be "women's"? If so, isn't it a
psychosis that prevents them from acceding to sexual pleasure? At least
to their pleasure? This is, to a pleasure different from an abstract -
neuter? - pleasure of sexualised matter. That pleasure which perhaps
constitutes a discovery for men, a supplement to enjoyment, in a
fantasmatic "becoming-woman," but which has long been familiar to
women. For them isn't the organless body a historical condition? And
don't we run the risk once more of taking back from woman those as yet
unterritorialised spaces where her desire might come into being*'306
The notion of the 'becoming woman' is an important one for feminism, both because
of the possibilities it generates in issues concerning agency and the body, and in
terms of the debate it generates. The issue of sexual difference is at the heart of the
feminist trepidation in using Deleuze and Guattari as well as at the centre of debate
and fracture within feminist politics. Sexual difference and questions concerning
gender cannot be avoided or missed within feminist articulations of the body or of
subjectivity, not to mention those concerning desire. Do we recognise sexual
difference as constitutive, as founding and fundamental or is it secondary, accidental
306
Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One. pp. 140-141.
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and necessary to move beyond? It is for these reasons the 'becoming-woman'
prompts the most division within feminist criticisms of Deleuze and Guattari For
example, the most recent work published on Deleuze and feminist theory is a
collection of essays devoted solely to the topic of'becoming-woman.'307 The feminist
engagement with Deleuze and Guattari appears to be stopped at the 'becoming-
woman;' halted in the tracks of the ongoing debate about sexual difference.308 Luce
Irigaray has called it the question of our age,309 and it seems one that is destined to
haunt and repeat itself through academic textbooks and theses.
Irigaray's work attempts to answer the question of sexual difference as well
as to articulate this difference outside master discourses. Either her style of writing
models how it is impossible for women to write their own politics without submitting
their writing to a male order or she is attempting to construct a new style of writing
that places her writing in direct contact/relation with the writings and theories of
those she has set out to confront, such as Freud's and Lacan's. There are many times
in This Sex Which is Not One where it is difficult for the reader to know where Freud
ends and Irigaray begins, or as in the example cited above, whether or not she is
referring to Deleuze and Guattari's work in particular. Irigaray seldomly uses
footnotes or endnotes and often splices her own words with Freud's or Lacan's. For
the reader who is well versed in psychoanalysis, this distinction is easier to make, yet
for the inexperienced reader, the two different writers can be mistaken for one.
30 Deleuze and Feminist Theory, eds Ian Buchanan and Claire ColebrooL Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University. Press. 2000.
308 See also Verena Andermatt Conley, "Becoming-Woman Now," in Deleuze and Feminist Theory,
ed. by Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2000), pp. 18-
37. Conley discusses the feminist debate over the 'becoming-woman' particularly in regards to
Helene Cixous's work.
309 Luce Irigaray. An Ethics ofSexual Difference, trans. Gillian Gill and Carolyn Burke (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press. 1993). Irigaray writes: "Sexual difference is one of the major philosophical
issues, if not the issue, of our age" p. 5.
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Irigaray's writing style seems contradictory to the theories she argues. On the one
hand, she argues for a recognition of two distinct voices in contrast to the
monosexual logic of psychoanalysis and phallocentric discourse. And yet, on the
other, she is blending the two discourses into one.
One way to explain this discrepancy is to look at Irigaray's latest book, 1 Love
to You: Sketch ofa Possible Felicity in History. As discussed briefly in Chapter Two,
Irigaray theorises a relationship between the sexes which acknowledges sexual
difference as the fundamental difference. For Irigaray, this difference is to be
respected and recognised by each sex.
In 1 Love to You Irigaray envisions a way for men and women to recognise
their sexual difference while, at the same time, being able to appreciate and respect
that difference. She expands upon some of the ideas developed initially in "When
two lips speak together," the final chapter in This Sex Which is Not One. Unlike
Deleuze and Guattari who want to see difference as multiple, Irigaray wants the
difference to be located primarily within the sexual difference between man and
woman. She envisions this difference operating within a framework of recognition:
"I recognize you, thus you are not the whole, otherwise you would be too great and I
would be engulfed by your greatness. You are not the whole and I am not the
whole."310 Irigaray's dialectics of recognition311 can be read in terms of her theories
on castration in This Sex Which is Not One Instead of recognising herself as lacking,
the little girl can recognise that she is different and therefore not the same, but not
310
Irigaray. I Love to You. p. 103.
311 The phrase 'dialectics of recognition' conies from reading Luce Irigaray's I Love to You and
Helene Cixous's "First Names of No One." The Helene Cixous Reader, p. 33.
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less worthy or missing something 312
Although Irigaray's theorisation of difference offers some possibilities for
feminist refiguring, there are some clear limitations in her argument that are
noticeable from the start. Firstly, she relies on a "generic female identity" in order to
establish this recognition She argues that: "Women's liberation, and indeed the
liberation of humanity, depends upon the definition of a female generic, that is, a
definition ofwhat woman is, not just this or that woman."313 To define 'woman' leads
to limitations of the possibilities inherent in women, to posit a definition of 'woman'
enacts a limit on what woman can be, what she is and what she will be.314 Irigaray
has often been accused by feminist readers of essentialising woman, a debate that
will not be developed in this chapter, but has been worked through at length by
others.315
Another limitation that has been considered more recently is the implicit
stress Irigaray places on a heterosexual framework for her 'recognition.' The pivotal
characters in Irigaray's refiguring of history are 'man' and 'woman.' For some, such
as Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler, this stress excludes homosexual relations from
the happy history Irigaray theorises.316 It also universalizes the position of 'man' and
312 To briefly summarise the castration complex: a little girl recognises, through looking at a little boy,
that she lacks a penis and is therefore expected to feel a sense of lack and to desire a child to replace
this void.
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Irigaray , I Love to You. p. 65.
3,4 See also Elam's discussion in her chapter entitled. "Questions ofwomen," in Feminism and
Deconstruction, pp. 27-66.
315 For a discussion on feminist resistance to Deleuze and Irigaray: how they overlap and yet offer
possibilities to their feminist readers, see also Dorothea Olkowski. "Body , Knowledge and Becoming-
Woman: Morpho-logic in Deleuze and Irigaray." in Deleuze and Feminist Theory, pp. 86-127. For
claims for and against Irigaray's essentialism see also: Toril Moi. Sexual Textual Polities', Naomi
Schor. "This Essentialism Which is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray." in The Essential
Difference ed. by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1994). pp.
40-62; Margaret Whitford. Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine.
316 See also "The Future of Sexual Difference: An Interview with Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell,"
Pheng Cheah and Elizabeth Grosz. Diacritics 28.1 (1998), pp. 19-42.
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'woman' in a way that precludes alternative perspectives.
For me, the difficulty in accepting Irigaray's 'I Love to You' is the stress she
places on a happy cure, an interpretation that can solve, or will solve the problematic
tension between man and woman. Instead of questioning the framework altogether or
throwing the question of sexual difference into crisis, Irigaray wants to solve or to
cure the 'lack,' to insert something more feminist, or perhaps more democratic. The
problem however lies within the plugging, inserting movement and within the need
to interpret and solve the riff between man and woman once and for all. The problem
is that no cure can provide healing for all: if we are different, as Irigaray stresses,
then there cannot be one solution or even a history. In this instance it would be
helpful to take Irigaray's need to solve the problem of sexual difference and apply it
to Deleuze and Guattari's resistance and interrogation of the psychoanalytic cure.
In her essay, "Is Sexual Difference a Problem?" Claire Colebrook addresses
the issues and debates argued by feminist theorists over the question of sexual
difference. Following the rhizomatic thinking of Deleuze and Guattari she considers
whether we, as feminists, could ask the question of sexual difference in another way.
Her re-questioning focuses attention away from who is right or wrong towards the
type of questions asked and what these questions do3,? - a methodology that stems
from the way in which Deleuze and Guattari rethink the cure. In returning to the
psychoanalytic scene Deleuze and Guattari do not look for the obstacles that prevent
it from happening, rather they question whether the cure actually cures. In a similar
way, Colebrook is not trying to solve or answer the question of sexual difference, she
is attempting to reformulate the question or the framework in which it is asked. Her
31 Claire Colebrook. "Is Sexual Difference a Problem?" in Deleuze and Feminist Theory, ed. by Ian
Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2000). pp. 110-127, (p. 161).
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methodology stems from reading Deleuze and Guattari's theories and demonstrates
one way they can be used by feminist critics to rethink feminist theory.
RETHINKING SUBJECTIVITY
Recent feminist theorists, like Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, have
overlooked some of the possibilities in Deleuze and Guattari's work because of their
political alliances to feminism. On the one hand, their solidarity within feminism is
necessary in a media-driven culture that increasingly dismisses the need for
feminism, however, on the other hand, this solidarity sometimes inhibits them from
exploring and/or accepting other possibilities in Deleuze and Guattari's work. Even
though many feminists disagree with Freud, Lacan, Derrida or Foucault, there is
rarely as much caution and uncertainty in the feminist critiques of their work.318
Theorists like Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz make use of the lateral
thinking in Deleuze and Guattari when thinking about subjectivity. However, their
alternative figurations of subjectivity ground themselves in a retrospective mapping
of identity that follows psychoanalytic structures. Their refiguring leads them back to
the meaning producing that Deleuze and Guattari argue against in psychoanalytic
constructions of identity. In Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference
in Contemporary Feminist Theory, Braidotti attempts to construct an alternative way
of thinking about subjectivity. Her nomadic subject is a political fiction,319 a
figuration that allows her to think through defined boundaries and categories. In
318 As Verena Andermatt Conley writes: "Where the texts of Jacques Demda and Jacques Lacan have
been a mainstay of feminist theories on subjectivity for several decades, welcoming receptions of
Deleuze's philosophy have been few and far between," in "Becoming-Woman Now," p. 18.
319 Rosi Braidotti. Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist
Theory (New York: Columbia University Press. 1994). p. 4. Subsequent references will appear in the
text after "Nomad"
230
thinking about this alternative figuration, Braidotti uses Deleuze and Guattari's
deterritorialized subjectivity as well as their lateral thinking to structure her nomadic
subject. She also relies on her own experiences to ground her nomadic subject, to
take responsibility for it, and to create a retrospective map of the places she has been
(Nomad, 6). However, in doing so, Braidotti slips away from the rhizomatic thought
ofDeleuze and Guattari and into a more psychoanalytic mode of thinking.
Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics is central to Braidotti's nomadic subject.
Braidotti defines the 'rhizome' as a root that grows sideways. As discussed earlier,
the rhizome represents an in-between territory in Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical
model. For Braidotti, this structure expresses a lateral way of thinking as opposed to
a non-linear, hierarchical way of thinking which Braidotti likens to phallocentric
modes of thought. In order to connect Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics with her
nomadic subject she maps out the roots and origins of feminism and subjectivity as
well as her own nomadic mappings. To begin with, Braidotti refers to Adrienne
Rich's 'politics of location.' Rich advocates for a feminist politics that begins with
the material of the body. However for Rich, saying 'the body' immediately
introduces a multiple set of identities such as: white, female, lesbian and Jewish.320
Braidotti adopts Rich's politics in her theorisation of her own experiences; this is
particularly evident in the way she traces her 'origins.' For example, she introduces
herself as born in Italy, raised in Australia, schooled in Paris and currently residing in
the Netherlands (Nomad, 8-9). She reminds her readers that her book is a translation
without originals as it has been written and translated into several different European
languages (Nomad, 1). Braidotti explains this mapping of her own experiences as a
320 Adrienne Rich. "Notes Towards a Politics of Location." in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. by
Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1998), pp 637-649. (p. 638).
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retrospective movement, one that produces identity as well as one that lays down the
foundations for her theorisation of the nomadic subject.
This 'mapping' can be found in other feminist critiques of subjectivity. For
example, in her work on feminism and corporeality Volatile Bodies: Toward a
Corporeal Feminism, Elizabeth Grosz tells her readers, as does Braidotti, that her
collection has been written in many different places and during different times
amidst different continents and spaces (Vol, xiii-xiv). On the one hand, this
information is there to excuse any lack of coherence or to excuse material that may
be more dated than others, and yet on another, Grosz's mapping of her intellectual
experience models itself after Rich's politics of location and Braidotti's nomadic
subject. The information offered by Braidotti and Grosz is there in order to underline
and emphasise the status of the nomadic critic who is enabled by social status to
move through different boundaries, whether spatial, national, personal or intellectual.
Each writer offers herself as a narrator, not only of the explicit ideas that follow
between subjectivity and corporeality, but also of the implicit suggestions of fluidity
and movement that stem from Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics.
However, this retrospective mapping is more aligned with psychoanalytical
models of identity construction than with Deleuze and Guattari's thinking. As
mentioned previously, Deleuze and Guattari argue against the meaning-making of
the "so that was what this meant," the crushing of the Oedipal and castration models
into identity formation. They argue against the interpretative model that traces
origins in order to pin down meanings. In Braidotti's move to include her personal
experiences she performs a meaning-making of her own life. For example, she
writes: "I have experienced this in my own existence: it was not until I found some
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stability and sense of partial belonging, supported by a permanent job and a happy
relationship, that I could actually start thinking adequately about nomadism"
(Nomad, 35). In other words, she argues that it is not until she has settled into a more
static identity that she can see the possibilities in nomadism: a retrospective
movement as opposed to the rhizomatic thinking that Deleuze and Guattari's
theorise.
Braidotti's "nomadic subjects" and Grosz's "volatile bodies" are
representative of a desire to think outside phallocentric logic. And yet they also
represent the problems that arise in doing so. In Volatile Bodies, Grosz's project
involves reframing the way in which the body is socially constructed and challenging
the discourses that surround the theorisation and understanding of the body. Her
focus, like many feminist projects, particularly Irigaray's, is to rethink the ways in
which the body has already been thought. She wants to see the female body framed
within a positive structure rather than a lack.
The problem that Grosz encounters is that to see the body in a positive
framework immediately introduces it back into the dualisms and binaries that she is
trying to think beyond. Although Grosz uses the body as a framework for working
through subjectivity instead of the mind, her project organises itself around the figure
of the Mobius strip, which Lacan likens to the subject (Vol, xii-xiii).32' She uses this
inverted three-dimensional figure eight to structure her chapters, her argument, and
as a touchstone for the multiple and inverted ideas she is trying to bring together. The
wager that she takes is to invert the emphasis on the mental processes of subjectivity
to look instead at the way bodily processes influence subjectivity. In her final
3:1
I have used Grosz's spelling. See also Malcom Bowie's discussion of the Moebius (sic) strip in
Lacan, pp. 192-193.
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chapter, entitled 'Sexed Bodies,' she admits that she is not offering a new concept of
the body for feminist consumption, rather she is laying out the history of ideas
surrounding the body in an attempt to rethink some of the assumptions and
complications that arise.
Whereas Grosz clearly states her need to think the body outside dualisms
(particularly that of mind/body or male/female), trying to theorise this into a
framework of positive/lack, only reintroduces the binaries and dualisms. Introducing
the framework of Lacan's mobius strip only ensures that there will be no way out of
psychoanalytic structures. At the same time trying to reframe the terms used to write
the body requires stating those terms, understanding those terms, and most likely
using those terms in order to reframe or rewrite Although an alternative may be
reached it is more likely to be one that still contains the language and logic of the
original. Grosz's project demonstrates the difficulty and perhaps the impossibility of
using existing logic to revisit, or revise ideology. Although her interest in Volatile
Bodies is to reframe the body in theory, by the end of the book she writes: "I have
not attempted to give an alternative account, one which provides materials directly
useful for women's self-representation [. . .] I am not suggesting that what is to
follow represents a new non-patriarchal or feminist framework, it clearly does not"
(Vol, 188-189). In citing this statement I am not suggesting that Grosz is
contradicting herself nor am I trying to expose an inconsistency in her argument. I
refer to this statement in order to suggest that attempts to rethink the female subject,
body or desire in positive terms often leads theorists to the recognition that these
attempts are impossible when considered within the very logic one wants to revise.
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Wanting to make meaning from experience, to chart places we have been in
order to examine who we are, all these tracings, mappings, and figurations are
desirable because they construct identity and create subjectivity, and yet they are no
more real or grounded or feminist than what has come before Braidotti wants to
construct new points of exit from old modes of thought and yet falls into trouble with
the very terms she uses. To want new things from old, to consume old modes of
thought to spit out new ones,322 all these trajectories operate within an old model of
thinking. In order to move sideways, as Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic thinking
entails, one has to abandon the notion or hope ofmoving forward.
Braidotti and Grosz's nomadic figurations posit a new subjectivity or way of
thinking about subjectivity, however, it is one that falls back into the psychoanalytic
construction of identity. Although they each make use of Deleuze and Guattari's
rhizomatic style of thinking, they lapse into psychoanalytic mapping in order to chart
the moves they take in constructing an alternative figuration of subjectivity. In doing
so, they find themselves trapped within the same logic and confines that they
originally began with.
BRATDOTTI'S "ORGANSWITHOUT BODIES"
Rosi Braidotti's project in Nomadic Subjects makes use of Deleuze and
Guattari's terminology and yet does not seem to engage directly with the theory
behind their work or, as discussed, she engages with the theory only to a point and
then reverts into a psychoanalytic structure to ground her theories. For example,
Braidotti's 'Organs without Bodies' is theoretically very different from Deleuze and
322 1 am referring here to Braidotti's strategy of consuming the old to generate the new. As she writes:
"I have referred to this technique as the metabolic consumption of the old in order to engender the
new." Nomadic Subjects, pp. 38-39.
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Guattari's 'Body without Organs.' Braidotti borrows the term, 'Body without
Organs' to theorise her "Organs without Bodies;" however, unlike the attention
Deleuze and Guattari give to the 'Body without Organs' as a surface for libidinal
intensities and flows, Braidotti's reversed version concentrates on the effects new
technologies have on the female body.
Deleuze and Guattari's 'Body without Organs,' referred to as 'BwO,' appears
in both collections of 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia.' In the first volume, Anti-
Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari devote a chapter to 'The Body without Organs,' and
in A Thousand Plateaus, they include another chapter called "How Do You Make
Yourself a Body Without Organs9" In Anti-Oedipus, the 'BwO' is able to avoid
being hooked up or connected to capitalist desiring-machines (15). For Deleuze and
Guattari: "The BwO is desire, it is that which one desires and by which one desires"
(T-P, 165); "The BwO is the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency
specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to
any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it)
(T-P, 154). That is, the body is not regulated or organised by the castration complex
or a privileging of one organ over another (i.e. the Phallus). It is deterritorialized in
the sense that it is free from categories like gender and sexuality. The 'BwO' is a
figuration for Deleuze and Guattari, a model that can avoid the repressing
triangulation of the Oedipus complex, for it has no parents, and a figure that can
resist the capitalist machine. It is very difficult to visualise this 'BwO' which is one
reason it becomes problematic to those attempting to use the 'BwO' theoretically. It
also implies a body undefined by categories of gender or sex, issues that feminist
readers take up in their discussions of sexual difference.
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However, Braidotti does not take on these issues in referring to the 'BwO '
Instead she discusses biotechnologies that, in her assessment, threaten to create
symmetry amongst women's reproductive organs that would reduce them into
procreative bodies. Braidotti uses biotechnologies as an example of the dangers
associated with removing organs from the totality of bodies. For example, she refers
to the position of the biotechnician who fixes his/her microscopic gaze on the
organisms below, and in so doing, loses sight of the human shape (to which they are
a part) or even the temporality of life - "it's 'living' in the most abstract possible
way" (Nomad, 47).
Braidotti links this scopic knowing with the invasive looking performed by
the gynecologist who looks inside the mother at the unborn child. For Braidotti, this
inward glance is metaphorical of the search for one's own beginnings or the triumph
of the image. She argues that this visual look inwards may also lead to a
fragmentation of the body that would encourage body parts to be seen and used as
commodified objects instead of parts of a whole. As Braidotti argues: "In a perverse
twist, the loss of unity of the 'subject' results in the human being lending its organic
components to many a prostitutional swap: the part for the whole" (Nomad, 52-53).
This interchangeability of organs, in Braidotti's argument, leads to symmetry
between male and female bodies. The breakdown of sexual difference as well as a
movement towards a 'beyond' sex makes Braidotti nervous that new technologies
and/or pop culture representations will begin to define the maternal as well as woman
before feminists have a chance to refigure the question for themselves (Nomad, 55).
And yet Deleuze and Guattari's 'BwO,' as discussed, represents a breakdown
of sexual difference. Perhaps Braidotti intends for the discrepancy in meaning
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between 'Organs without Bodies' and 'Body without Organs' in order to make use of
the friction. If so, she does not explicitly state this intention. I would argue instead
that she uses the term more to make use of the feminist debate surrounding the term
'BwO' than the theory behind the term as Deleuze and Guattari use it in their work.
The term 'BwO' for Irigaray in particular is symptomatic of the way male
philosophy appropriates female bodies, as she argues: 'Tor them isn't the organless
body a historical condition? And don't we run the risk once more of taking back
from woman those as yet unterritorialised spaces where her desire might come into
being?"323 Irigaray argues that the 'BwO' or, the 'organless body' as she refers to it,
represents the way in which women have not been allowed to own their own bodies,
subjectivities or their own desires. Irigaray calls upon history to argue that women
have not been given the rights to their own bodies or desires and so for male
philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari to theorise bodies away from women is
not only a threat to feminist projects but emblematic of male appropriation of
women's spaces In this sense, Braidotti's 'organs without bodies' is more closely
linked to Irigaray's criticism324 of Deleuze and Guattari's 'BwO' then to their theory
of the 'BwO.'
The fear expressed in both Irigaray's criticism and Braidotti's theorisation of
the 'BwO' is justified and yet it dismisses the possibilities in the model of the 'BwO'
for a feminist reading of desire. Instead of perceiving the 'BwO' as a threat against
discovering female desire, it is possible to see Deleuze and Guattari's project as
offering an alternate model to theorising the body. In Volatile Bodies, Grosz agrees
that the risk of engaging with Deleuze and Guattari's 'BwO' is worth the threat it
323 Irigaray, This Sex Hhich is Not One. p. 141.
324 See also. Irigaray. This Sex Which is Not One. pp. 24-25.
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poses to feminism (173). She argues convincingly for a reassessment of the 'BwO'
for the potential it holds in theorising the body, even a feminist body. For Grosz, the
'BwO' "invokes a conception of the body that is disinvested of fantasy, images,
projections, representations, a body without a psychical or secret interior, without
internal cohesion and latent significance" (Vol, 169).
Deleuze and Guattari's 'BwO' is removed from the Oedipal confines and
classical representations of psychoanalytic structures. For that reason it provides
theorists with an alternate figuration of the body and of subjectivity to that offered in
psychoanalysis While the 'BwO' does not offer a model without problems for
feminists, it does offer an alternative, one that deserves more attention and
theorisation with regard to the possibilities it presents.
CONCLUSION
Most of the feminist writing discussed within this chapter, that in Braidotti,
Grosz and Colebrook, has been influenced by Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic
thinking. The lateral placement of ideas, the stumblings and inconsistencies, the
nomadic positioning: all these come from Deleuze and Guattari's innovative and
radical return to desire in theory. However, the feminist engagement with Deleuze
and Guattari is characterised more by its caution signs than by the possibilities it
offers.
Feminist critics who do use Deleuze and Guattari's theories often lapse back
into a dependency on psychoanalytic models of desire and subjectivity or resist
making full use of the terms Deleuze and Guattari theorise. The fall back into
psychoanalytic interpretations could give validity to redundant arguments that
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suggest feminists are "dutiful daughters" to their psychoanalytic forefathers.
However, I would argue that these returns more accurately represent the difficulties
that lie within attempts at constructing alternatives to psychoanalytic interpretations.
As discussed in regards to Irigaray's and Grosz's writing, the language they use to
talk about identity or desire is so saturated with psychoanalytic inscriptions that it is
hard to avoid falling into the very traps one is criticising.
The cautionary notes that frame feminist readings of Deleuze and Guattari are
perhaps necessary. However, it is also necessary to continue our engagement with
Deleuze and Guattari's ideas, theories and style for they do offer alternative ways of
approaching desire in discourse as well as theoretical models that help feminists find
their way out of psychoanalytical pitfalls. Deleuze and Guattari's work opens up
possibilities for alternative conceptions of desire. Their resistance to cure the
narrative of desire, whether in fiction or theory, activates the movement of desire.
The questions they pose to psychoanalysis offer alternative ways to approach the
dominance of psychoanalytic interpretations. Instead of dismissing them because
they are male or because they do not explicitly engage with feminist debates, it is
possible and productive to see them as equals on a search for ways out of master
discourses and grand narratives.
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Conclusion
Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical approach to desire accepts indeterminacy
as part of its structure. Although the call to resist solutions and remedies is refreshing
in the face of restrictive and stifling psychoanalytical frameworks, it is not a call that
has definite answers nor does it replace one logic with another. Deleuze and
Guattari's work does not offer a unified theory that "finally totalizes and reassures,"
to borrow Foucault's words. So what does this uncertainty leave us, as critics, in
regards to a theorisation of desire9
Throughout this thesis I have suggested that any final interpretation of desire
is problematic. The difficulty with such a claim however is that it does not offer a
'solution' or an alternative logic to use instead, such an assertion presents
indeterminacy without explaining how this relativism functions morally or
politically. An inherent part of breaking down and interrogating structures is an
uncertainty over whether or not they should be reassembled.
As discussed in the last chapter, despite their intentions of moving beyond
psychoanalytic horizons, theorists such as Braidotti and Grosz often lapse back into
psyhoanalytic terminology or logic in order to ground their alternative figurations.
With these theoretical pitfalls in mind, I am reluctant to offer a definitive or
conclusive ending to this project. 'Making meaning' out of desire means setting up
limitations and restrictions to the movement in desire. The moment a definition or
answer is demanded other possibilities cease to exist. Instead of trying to formulate a
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theoretical framework to explain and regulate desire I would prefer that desire was
left a question, one that is continually negotiated and yet never fully understood.
HAVING THE LAST LAUGH
In an effort to provide some conclusion to the indeterminacy I have raised as
well as a way of returning to some of the central concerns in this thesis, I turn to Yve
Lomax's artistic piece cleverly titled, "Lack's Last Laugh." This piece appeared in
an exhibition entitled "Difference on Representation and Sexuality" in September
1985 at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London alongside work by other major
feminist artists including; Barbara Kruger, Sherrie Levine, Mary Kelly, Marie Yates,
and Ray Barrie.325 Her work reflects both a psychoanalytic and a feminist response to
desire and "lack."
Lacks's last laugh
Fearing the lack of the whole we journey to seek its presence. Between
two elements we search for a link - surely this will allow us to arrive at
the whole. What is it we fear we lack and how shall we exactly know
when we arrived, wholly satisfied9 Around and around we go. Desire
only comes when Something goes. Yes but also no. The whole
withdraws itself, it goes into hiding and creates a telling lack. By way of
all absence all is set in motion for the whole to be brought back. In the
name of absence the whole totalises the parts. It forms a constellation of
which it is a non-part. Representation hinges upon lack and this makes
all the difference. If we no longer play that game of hide and seek.
325 Information taken from Griselda Pollock. Vision andDifference: Femininity, feminism and the
histories ofArt. London: Routledge. 1988. p. 155.
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Laughter with a thousand edges. No part can ever stand alone, it takes
many lines to make a specific part. The title, the head - that too is an
open part. A part which constantly rings with other parts. There is no
sovereign or whole meaning, no one message going down the line.326
Lomax's piece recalls the role 'lack' plays in both psychoanalytic and feminist
interpretations of desire. Because, psychoanalysis positions woman as 'lack' in the
movement of desire, feminists often try to reinterpret and revise this logic. As
discussed in Chapter One, French feminists, Irigaray and Cixous, try to reffame
'lack' within positive and multiple images, such as Irigaray's "two lips" and
Cixous's notion of a "cosmic body." And yet, because these interpretations rely on a
psychoanalytic foundation, they do not actually present viable alternatives to a
theorisation of desire.
The question Lomax poses, "What is it we fear we lack and how shall we
exactly know when we arrived, wholly satisfied?" implies that "fear" causes
feminists to react and respond to a psychoanalytic use of "lack." She suggests that if
we, as feminists, are not afraid of being theorised as 'lack,' then we will no longer
involve ourselves with circular debates that continually return to the 'truths' of
psychoanalysis. The next line, "around and around we go," emphasises the endless
nature of these arguments. As Schneeman's "Vulva's School" demonstrates so well,
there is always another theory that tries to revise or refigure the "lack" in female
desire.
326 Yve Lomax as quoted by Pollack in Vision and Difference, p. 178.
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However, I would argue that it is not so much fear that keeps feminism from
moving beyond a psychoanalytic "lack," but the ways in which feminist theories on
desire are indebted to their psychoanalytic 'fathers.' Because psychoanalysis
maintains such a strong and influential grasp on desire, it is difficult to theorise
desire without having to mention Freud and Lacan. Instead of trying to oppose or
react to these theories I would argue that it is necessary to reconsider the way we, as
feminists, frame our examination of desire. Instead of revising psychoanalytic
interpretations into feminist ones, or tTying to cure psychoanalysis by giving it
lessons in feminism, we can expose the inadequacy of any one model or framework
to understand and explain desire. As Lomax concludes: "there is no sovereign
meaning or whole meaning; no one message going down the line." In other words,
instead of insisting that psychoanalysis has desire all wrong, we can insist that no one
field of thought is capable of fully theonsing desire by itself. In doing so, we, as
theorists, can encourage an interdisciplinary or "crossdisciplinary" approach which
keeps psychoanalysis and feminism as well as other disciplines continually
responding to the question of desire instead of settling on one conclusive answer.
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